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CHAPTER I. Int~oduetion 
It is the p~~pose of this thesis to make a study 
of wheat as a basic inte~national commodity. The physical, 
social, economic and political aspects of wheat a~e dis-
cussed. T~oughout the wo~k constant attention is given to 
the importance of the export of wheat in relation to the 
econom~ of the United States. 
It is hoped that this study may answe~ questions 
that sometimes arise relative to the o~igin of wheat: what 
its geographical sources are and which factors limit its 
g~owth; how it is cultivated, harvested, stored and rprocessed; 
what diseases have caused significant losses in wheat-g~owing 
.. . .. ~ 
and the steps taken to resist this destruction; why there is 
-· -
a decli~i~g p~r capi~a ~s?_o~ ~~eat in the United States and 
an ~n?~ea~ed ~se by ~~sa~~ ~eoples; and where the areas of 
~U~P.lus and_~~~ic~t pro~ucti~n are lo~ated. These considera-
ti?~~ a~e.accompani~~ by~ brief __ s?~Y~Y of t~e histo~ical and 
economic cha~ges w~ich ~ave taken place since 1920 tp 1939 
only, and thus, have affected the production, acreage, yield, 
... • .. • .. ~ 4 ""' • ..,. ~ • .. .. ... 
~rice_~~ ~nt~rn~t~on~l t~ade in wheat. More emphasis is 
placed on these conditions in the years between 1930-1939 
... - .. .. ..... 
than in the earlie~ years. The principal biological and 
me~hanical i~provements in the methods of p~oduction are 
investigated. 
The next step in the discussion is to desc~ibe 
the flow of wheat·t~ade f~om ~eas of p~oduction to ultimate 
consumption. Statistical figu~es must be ~elied upon to 
trace the su.pply and demand of wheat in the wo~ld. The 
questions then answe~ed a~e: how wheat is ma!'keted, what 
organized exchanges exist, how impo~tant they a!'e, how p~ice 
is set and what channels of distribution a!'e used. 
After these broader aspects a!'e desc~ibed the flow 
of wheat is na~~owed down to the p~incipal producing a.;r:aeas 
with thei~ ~espective control schemes. First place is given 
to the United States, followed by Canada, Australia rand 
A!'gentina. 
The general background of wheat having beeb surveyed, 
the policies adopted with regard to wheat by the impo~tant 
importing and exporting countries are examined and consideration 
is given to the inte!'national wheat control schemes in which 
the princ~~al producers of ~heat are united by agreements to 
restrict production with a view to price maintenance. Stress 
is placed upon the significance of the International \~eat 
. . 
Agreement of 1933; its origin, function, success and effects 
on the wheat industry. 
~ .. 4 "' • 
Fin~lly, conclusions ~e drawn concerning the influence 
of the .factors in the wheat si tuat:i.on prior to 1939 exerted on 
the wo~ld wheat problem of subsequent yea!'s. 
3 
From the excellent materials available on lthe 
s~bject of wheat, this brief survey and analysis of govern-
mental intervention in world wheat has been made pos"sible. 
Acknowledgment is particularly due to the generous assis-
tance afforded the writer by the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics of the United States Department of Agriculture 
ih furnishing valuable materials for use in this stu'dy. 
Appreciation is expressed to the authors of the bas~c 
studies p~blis~e? o~ this topic from which many of the facts 
~a drawn; as also ,to ~ll those who in any way aideCL the 
writer by encouragement, correction and helpful criticism. 
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CHAPTER II. The Ecology of Wheat 
A. Origin 
Wheat was probably one of the first crops 1 to be 
grown by ancient man. Its cultivation antedateB ali recor-
ded history. It was well suited for use as a food because 
less labor was required to produce it than any other crop. 
It could be easily stored for future use, as well as shipped 
around the world with a small percentage of spoilage. 
Grains closely resembling modern varieties in size 
and shape have been found in the prehistoric lake dwellings· 
in Switzerland, in remains from the Stone Age in England, 
in the tombs of the Pharaohs in EgYPt and in remains of 
ancient cities in Mesopotamia. Grain forms date back to 
as early as 4000 B.C. The grains are·blackened and will 
not grow but they have retained their original size and 
shape. 
As early as 2700 B.c. wheat was cultivated by the 
Chinese who considered the grain as a gift from heaven. 
The original home of bread wheat is believed to be in the 
Euphrates Valley region in southwest Asia and that of durum 
wheat in Asia Minor and areas surrounding the Mediterranean 
Sea. Early Phoenician, Chaldean and Babylonian writers all 
designated wheat as a food of great antiquity. The ancient 
Egyptians claimed that their principal deity, Isis, was the 
5 
~ispenser of wheat and instructed their ancestors in its 
cultivation. Wheat from Egypt fed ancient Greece and Rome 
and its cultivation spread far and wide through Europe in 
the Middle Ages. 
C~istopher Columbus brought wheat to the West 
Indies in 1493. Wheat was taken to Me:x:ico by Hernando 
Cortes in 1519. Jesuit and Franciscan missionaries carried 
it with them into what is now the states of California and 
Al;'lizona. English colonists brought it with them to,James-
town. By 1850# New York State was one of the grea~ wheat-
producing states and the· Genesee Valley was the greatest 
wheat-growing region in the country. In the long r.un# 
however, wheat was not so well adaptable for efficient 
growth along the Atlantic Coast, so that as the settlers 
moved'into the Ohio Valley and the West, wheat became one 
.!I. 
of the main prairie crops.~ 
Thus, wheat is a plant of vast economic importa~ce 
due to its wide distribution over the civilized wor+d and 
the fact that its history is coincident with that of the 
human race. ~om the dawn of history it.has been a staple 
food crop on which not only the life of individuals
1
but 
often the stability of states depended. 
*2, P• 502 
BOTAl.IJICAL CLASSIFICATION 2£: ~ TYPES QE 'IJ'ffiEAT ?f. 
TRITICUM 
A. Monococcum 
1. Einkorn 
· Germany~ Central and Southern Europe 
2. Spelt 
Central and Southern Europe~ Africa 
B. Satiocum-Dicoccum 
1. En'llner 
Dry regions where spring grain is grown 
Northern part of Great Plains in the 
United States~ Western Canada~ Eastern 
Russia and Western and Southern Siberia 
2·. Vulgare ( co:mmon) 
c. Tenax 
Found the world over 
The most valuable and widely distributed 
type of wheat 
1. Compactum (club) 
Pacific Coast regie~ and Chile 
Turkestan, Abyssinia, Europe 
2. Turgidum (poulard) 
Mediterranean Region 
Black Sea Region 
Egypt 
3. Durum (hard) 
nardest grained of all the wheats 
Especially valuable for the manufacture of 
~~-2 ~ pp. 546-552 
macaroni · 
Drought and rust resistant 
Mediterranean and Black Sea Regions 
Northern Great Plains of the United States 
Mexico, Chile~ Argentina 
5a 
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B. Geographic Sources 
A principal bread grain, wheat is to the peoples 
of the temperate zones what rice is to the inhabitants of 
the orient and manioc and bananas are to the peoples of the 
tropics. The cultivation of wheat is so widespread in the 
world that is is easier to state where it is not grown 
rather than where it is grown. Its range of growth is so 
wide that somewhere in the world wheat is being seeded 
every month in the year and, likewise, it is being har-
vested every month in the year. Among the continents, the 
world's wheat production is concentrated mainly in the 
Northern Hemisphere between 30°-60° north latitude and f~om 
the ~ropic of Capricorn to 40° south latitude. Ther.e are 
only four wheat regions in the Southern Hemisphere, although 
these are significant in exports of wheat as a result of the 
small consuming population at home. Among the countries of 
the world, the United States, the Soviet Union and China 
raise one-half of the world's wheat. 
c. Physiological Ecology 
Wheat is an aristocrat member of the grass tamily 
of plants. Barley was the earliest grain, succeeded by 
spelt or el.'qrller from which has developed the ·true wheat of 
today. It belongs to the Triticum group. As a grass it 
# See Chart on P• 5a 
needs a cool~ moist period during its early growth~ a 
coo1-t~-warm and moist period ~or its stooling~ a warm 
period during its later growth and pre~erably, a dr~ 
harvest season. It will grow in very hot areas provided 
the heat is dry. 
Humid climate~ such as that o~ the eastern United 
States and western Europe~ produces so~t wheat. In general~ 
such wheat is "starchy11 as well as so~t. Milling machinery 
crushes the kernels easily. Dry climates produces hard 
wheats. These wheats are higher in proteins and th~ir 
kernels are hard. In the early period o~ wheat growing 
in central Kansas the milling machinery o~ the day had 
di~~iculty in crushing the hard kernels o~ the wheat grown 
on the dry p~airie and st~ppe lands and new roller-milling. 
devices had to be per~ected. 
Wheat requires a mean temperature o~ at least 
550 Fahrenheit ~or three to ~our months o~ the year. It 
is grown mostly in regions where the annual rain~all is 
between 15-35 inches~ but it is also ~ound in areas with 
as little as 9 inches, and in others with as much as 65-70 
inches of rain~all. However, ~heat ~own in comparatively 
dry climates is superior in quality to that grown in humid 
regions. It is grown at elevations up to 10~000 ~e~t or 
more as in Tibet~ Abyssinia, Iran, Mexico and Afghanistan 
8 
and in other countries bel·ow sea level, as in the Imperial 
Valley of California. It is grown from the Arctic Circle 
in the U.s.s.R. to the high plateaus at the equator in 
Ecuador and Colombia. As the soil mainly af~ects the 
yield, wheat is best adapted to loam or clay soils well 
supplied with humus, such as are found on the prairies and 
plains of central United States and in the U.S.S.R. It 
is not adapted to sandy and peat soils. 
D. Structure o~ the Grain 
T.he wheat ~eed is the part of the, plant of greatest 
I 
economic value. It also ~the one means of reproducing 
the P,.ant. ·T.he seed is haJ?d, dry and varies greatly in size, 
shape, color, hardness and composition but J?etains distinct 
and common characteJ?istics. T.he colo!' of the seed is con-
sidered to have a close J?elationship to the haJ?dpess of the 
grain. The wheat gJ?ain consists of a small geJ?m having a 
high nutritive value. T.he wheat germ is not too desirable 
in the manu~actuJ?e of flour although it is utilized to a 
consideJ?able extent in the production of certain cereal 
foods and constitutes a very valuable by-pJ?oduct. The 
endospeJ?m is composed laJ?gely of pure starch which forms the 
chief constituent of wheat flour. It contains prote~ns whiCh 
by theiJ? veJ?y presence add la!'gely to the value of flour as 
prepared in the foJ?m of baker's bread. T.he most impoJ?tant 
9 
proteins, gliadin and glutenim, when combined are known as 
gluten. It is the gluten contained in the starchy parts of 
wheat, grain which distinguish it from flour made from other 
cereals, notably corn. Gluten gives the quality of elasti-
city to dough. While the quantity of gluten in flour is 
important the quality is even more so. Only by actual bread-
making tests can mi~lers select the type of wheat needed. 
The higher the percentage of gluten the greater the demand 
for that type of wheat. Wheat flour happens to be the only 
cereal which produces successt:ul "lightn bread because it 
contains the proper amount of gluten to hold the gas bubbles 
resulting from fermentation, i.e., the mixing of yeast dough 
with fresh wheat flour. Rye seems to approach the standard 
but it needs the addition of some wheat flour to maka pala-
table bread. Thus, practically all the wheat eaten by man 
is in the form of bread made with wheat flour. This superi-
ority of wheat bread may well be responsible for the culti-. 
vation of wheat wherever possible·'" 
E. Types and Blends 
T.he wheats of the world are divided into winter 
wheats and spring wheats, which are further divided into 
soft and hard wheats. There are soft and hard winter wheats 
* 80, PP• 13-16 
and so~t and hard spring wheats, and an especially hard 
variety o~ spring wheat known as durum wheat.# 
Winter wheat is seeded in the late summer or 
autumn. It obtains a good growth during the cool period 
prior to the winter season, and may be ~rom ~our to six 
inches in height at the onset o~ the cold season. During 
the winter it remains more or less dormant, then resumes 
its growth in the spring and reaches maturity and is ready 
~or harvesting by early summer. Spring wheat is seeded in 
the spring o~ the year, obtains its growth during the 
summer, and reaches maturity and is harvested in late 
summer. Probably more than 75% - so% o~ the world's wheat 
is winter wheat. There are only two spring wheat belts of 
major signi~icance in the world: (1) the region o~ the 
Dakotas, Montana and the Canadian Prairie Provinces and 
(2) the spring wheat belt of south-central European,Russia 
and western Siberia. In the eastern part of the State o~ 
Washington both winter and spring wheats are raised, as is 
also the case in southern Manchuria. Spring wheat is 
,, 
raised in the wheat regions which possess a severe winter 
climate; winter wheat., if' seeded in the~e areas., will 
invariably be vlnter-killed and therefore it is not a very 
dependable crop. 
T.he prepared commercial flours of the American 
# See Chart on p. 5a: 
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-market are usually blends • Eastern wheat f.rom the humid 
.regions is satisfactory for cakes, cookies and pies. It 
is blended with high-protein Western wheat to make bread 
flour. The hard winter wheats make excellent bread flours 
as do the hard spring wheats, and the latter are used ex-
tensively throughout the world to blend with the wheat of 
humid .regions for the ttst.rengthening" o.f flour. Thus, 
large milling centers such as Kansas City, Minneapoiis, and 
J 
Buffalo draw upon wheats from various regions for their raw 
material for flour. Small and local milling centers may 
use only the wheat grown in their immediate vicinities and 
commonly manufacture flour for sale ohly in their .regional 
I 
markets. Durum wheat, grown mainly in northeastern, North 
Dakota, in nearby districts in Canada, ~din parts of 
Russia, is sometimes :t?efe.r.red to as "maca.ronin wheat, 
as it yields a flour high in gluten-producing proteins 
which is used in the manufacture of macaroni, semolina and 
spaghetti. New varieties of spring wheat, equally suitable 
for the manufacture of flour, have recently been introduced 
so that durum is not alone in this special use. 
F. Cultivation 
In the major producing wheat .regions the wheat is 
often grown on the same land year after yea.r, or the land 
is allowed to .remain idle every second or third year because 
1]. 
such o~ops as clove~, timothy, soybeans and co~n a~e not 
adapted fo~ g~owth in these a~eas. In the United States 
wheat is nea~ly always g~own in ~otation afte~ co~n, since 
oo~n leaves the soil in olean condition; whe~eas in Eu~ope 
wheat is preferably g~own afte~ clove~. In the eastern 
part of the United States oomme~oial fertilizers are com-
monly used in wheat growing but in the weste~ part: of the 
count~y fertilize~s are gene~ally not applied. The p~ep~a­
tion of the land fo~ seeding whe~t depends la~gely on the 
p~eoeding o~op. Ih the southe~n part of the Great Plains 
it is usually plowed, listed o~ wo~ked with a one-way disk 
soon after ha~vest. Weeds are controlled by tilling until 
the c~op is seeded. In the Pacific No~thwest and in the 
d:rie~ sections of the G~eat Plains accommon p~actioe is to 
plow the land early in the spring and oulti v-B.te it .. just often 
enough du~ing the summe~ to keep down weed g~owth. This 
p~actice conserves moistu~e and ni t~ates for tl:ie fo'llowing 
ottop. 
Dutting colonial times'-.'and in the .early 1800's 
wheat seed was b~oadoast by hand and the ripe o~~ was 
harvested with hand sickles or cradles. Today seeding 
is done with drills pulled by ho~ses or tractors. Some 
large tttaotott-drawn outfits can seed more than·one hundred 
aottes a day. In the United St.ates harvest begins :i!1n Texas 
early in May and ends in some of the no~thern states in 
12: 
~~gust. Most of the wheat c~op of the count~y is h~vested 
and t~eshed in one operation by a combined harvester-
thresher or combine~ as it is commonly called. Large com-
bines can harvest as much as five acres an hou~. The 
production of wheat has become so completely mechanized 
in the United States that the number of man-hou~s of labor 
I 
requi~ed to grow~ harvest~ thresh and clean an ac~e of 
wheat yielding twenty bushels has been reduced from fifty-
eight hours in 1930 to t~ee hours in 1947.* Thus, the 
development of automotive machinery facilitated by the 
increased output of petroleum has helped the .expansion of 
wheat in the ~ie~ regions~ led to improved methods of 
cultivation and has·overcome many problems arising from a 
I 
limited labor supply. By displacing the horses an~ mules 
I 
on farms it has also ~eleased land forme~ly requi~ed fo~ 
crops to feed work animals.~~ 
The wheat once threshed must be t~ansferred to 
the count~y elevator as the first s tag_e o:r :Lts journey 
to the wo~ld's table. In the earlier days wheat was taken 
on a long~ slow drive in an open wagon to the local mill 
where it was ground into flour between millstones. Today 
it is usually hauled to town in modern t~ucks where. it is 
weighed, graded and dumped into a huge pit. From the~e 
* 55~ P• 3 
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it is elevated mechanically into large bins for storage or 
inte fre~ght cars for shipment to terminal markets. The 
ma.rket class and grade of each shipment are determined by 
the kind of wheat~ the weight of the measured· bushel, the 
condition of the grain, and other factors which indicate 
the use for which it is best suited and its general quality. 
Millers and other grain men purchase ~heat either according 
to the class or grade or by examining a sample of it. 
Canada is one of the few countries in which grain is sys-
tematically graded and sold on Official Certificates. 
This has been a fUnction of the Canadian Government since 
the passage of the Manitoba Grain Act in 1900~~ The 
assignment of grades·is conducted by government inspectors 
who have the assistance of the Research Laboratory cinder 
the Board of Grain Commissioners. Each year the ch~acter­
istics of the various grades of the new c~op are determined, 
the results are then published and distributed among the 
different wheat-importing countries. During the whole 
process of wheat from the farm to the te!'minal elev~toJ:~s 
located at the seaboard, the g!'ain is under the closest 
Gove!'nment supervision. The p!'imary world wheat markets 
are found in Chicago, Winnipeg, Buenos Aires, Liverpool 
14 
and London. The secondary markets are New York, Kansas City, 
Minneapolis, Duluth and St. Louis in the United States, 
* 45, P• 76 
Vancouve~ in Canada~ Sydney in Aust~alia an~ Rosa~io in 
~gentina. 
G. Wheat Hazards 
Wheat is exposed to many hazards between the time 
of seeding and harvest: some are climatic, others are 
biological. ~e chief climatic hazard is winter-killing 
15 
due to fall and winter droughts, alternate freezing and 
thawing which heaves the plants f~om the soil, soil blowing, 
low temperatures without a covering of snow o~ smothering 
by ice. Othe~ losses result from spring or summer droughts, 
hot winds, hail storms and severe wind storms. Like oth~ 
crops wheat is subject to attacks of fungous diseases which 
are t~emendously destructive. Heavy losses are caused by 
stem rust, leaf rust, stinking smut, loose smut, seedling 
blights, scab and mildew. Losses from stem rust alone have 
often exceeded 1oo,·ooo,ooo bushels in a single year in the 
United States. In the Pacific Northwest it was not unusual, 
prior to about 1932, fo~ one-third of the wheat to be 
degraded because of smut~r There are no specific remedies 
fo~ rust diseases, but black stem rust is less prevalent 
in areas from which the barbery host has been eradicated. 
·varieties of wheat differ considerably in thei~ suscepti-
bility to these parasites. By the selection of imm.U:ne kinds 
~f' 2, P• 540 
or the production of ~esistant hybrids the damage to c~ops 
may be checked o~ largely reduced. Anothe~ disease causing 
serious losses of wheat is bunk o~ stinking smut. Bunted 
grain is ~ecognized by the disag~eeable odor of decayed 
fish and is filled with a mass of black spores whicli are 
set free during the threshing process and thus become 
attached to the healthy grain. T.his disease is checked 
by steeping the seed grain in a solution of copper sulphate 
or other fungicides. Smut of wheat gains entrance to the 
plant through the flowers. T.he best form of control, how-
ever, is to breed varieties resistant to these diseases. 
16 
There are other enemies of wheat such as squirrels, 
rabbits and prairie· dogs. However, to an even greater ex-
tent insects are injurious to wheat, with the cinchbug being 
regarded as the most destructive insect in th~ wheat country. 
Jointworms which attach themselves to the joints ot the 
grain-stem have ~uined millions of pounds of wheat each year. 
Purples or pepper-corn is a disease of British wheat Which 
is caused by a small worm called the wheat-eel. The prin-
cipal enemies of European and Canadian wheat are the Hessian 
fly and the sawfly. In the United States during the 1930-
1939 period, invading armies of locusts caused crop damage 
at more than $400,000,000. Since 1934, Congress has appro-
priated money for grasshopper control by providing free 
bait mate~ials to the states.* In the Pampas of Argentina 
se~ious handicaps in wheat p~oduction have ~esulted f~om 
the swa~ms of locusts from the Chaco region which descend 
upon the wheat fields. 
Stored wheat suffe~s from the attacks of several 
I insects notably the grana~y weevil~ the flou~ beetle and 
meal worms, seve~al species of grain moths. These insects 
17 
feed.upon wheat in sto~age and after it is ~round. Cleanli-
ness and the treatment of bins and elevators with bisulphide 
of ca~bon or with hy~ocyanic acid are the prescribed 
~emedies for overcoming insect losses. 
H. Hybridization 
Vwieties of wheat are innumerable and plant 
b~eeders are constantly developing new ·ones through hybridi-
zation. Much has been accomplished by breeding veJ:'.ie"ties 
resistant to the various diseases and insects ment:t:oned 
above. For example, plant breeders of the Minnesota Agri-
cultural Experimental Station and the Federal Bureau of 
Plant Industry combined the stem-rust resistance of adapted 
bread wheats and produced Thatcher, ~stem-rust resistant 
variety of bread wheat that is very well suited to ,growth 
in Minnesota, the Dakotas and adjacent Canada. Wh~n the 
' 
Thatcher variety was distributed to a few farmers ~n Minne-
sota in 1934, it proved so popular because it largely 
~to 2, P• 562 
eliminated losses from stem rust that it was grown on 
some 17,000 1 000 acres in the United States and in Canada 
by 1939. Once stem ~ust was controlled in the spring 
wheat region, then losses from leaf rust, which is caused 
by a different organism, became apparent. To counteract 
this loss Newthatch was developed. Smut losses in the 
Pacific Northwest have been reduced to a small amount by 
developing early-maturing smut resistant varieties. In 
western Canada a variety known as Red Fife was extensively 
introduced. This wheat possessed very high milling and 
baking qualities as well as being a good yielder~ However, 
its chief defect was that it matured too late to escape the 
early frosts toward the end of the season. It, too~ was 
quite susceptible to smut. After many years of research 
, at the Dominion Experimental Farm the variety known as 
Marquis was introduced in 1892. This was the outcome of 
twenty-three experiments in crossing an early maturing 
variety from India, known as Hard Calcutta, with Red Fife. 
Its chief virtue was its ability to mature from si~ to ten 
days earlier than Red F2fe along with its non-shattering 
qualities and strength of straw. Its introduction ~nto 
Canadian agriculture was an event of great economic1 impor~ 
tance. Today it has practically replaced Red Fife.'' Not 
only did the Marquis variety result in a general increase 
18 
in the wheat yield of western Canada but has greatly 
extended the area in which wheat could be grown success-
fully.~'" 
The introduction of Garnet wheat in 1926 marked 
another advance. This variety was the product of several 
crosses, a good yielder and an early ripening wheat~ 
Another variety known as Reward~ produced from a cross 
baween Marquis and Prelude~ has also proved to possess 
excellent qualities although it is not as early ripening 
as Garnet. Durum wheat which is grown in certain Pro-
vinces is particularly suited to the districts which suffer 
from heavy losses caused by rust.~I-?1-
Varieties of wheat that are resistant to the 
Hessian and saw flies and adapted for growing in certain 
areas in the hard red winter and spring wheat regions 
have been developed and are being grown quite extensively. 
I. Conclusions 
It is sig~ificant to mention that although wheat 
is raised where environmental condi tiona are favorable 3 
economic competition may relegate it to at~condary place 
even in favorable regions. Again~ economics may give 
wheat precedence in other areas not suited to it geographi-
cally. These facts together with the contributions of 
* 56, P• 28 
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biological and mechanic~l inventions to the wheat indust~y 
have extended its ac~eage and inc~eased its yields beyond 
measu~e and a~e essential ~acto~s to be considered in 
studying the world wheat situation and its subsequent 
p~oblems. 
C~PTER III. Background of Control Schemes in Wheat 
A. The Social Background 
1. Social Patterns in Cereal Use 
People eat more Wheat only when it is economi-
cally possible. Thus~ When incomes are ~educed the de-
mand for Wheat is curtailed; conversely~ with praperity 
comes an increased demand for wheat and wheat flour. 
Consumption of wheat per capita increased in 
the world over a long period of years. This was es-
pecially true of the United States because of the country's 
increasing prosperity1 abundance of cheap Wheat~ improved 
milling and baking processes and the increasing population 
in the cities where bread was largely used in a somewhat 
restricted dietary •. During the war period1 urged bn by 
patriotism~ Americans valiantly sacrificed their normal 
consumption o£ wheat to feed their hungry Allies by pro-
ducing more and consuming less of the precious gra~n. 
To fulfill this obligation to the Allies nWheatless 
Wednesdays" were observed by the conservation of wheat 
and the subsitution of other cereals.- In the post-war 
period~ however, Americans consumed only about 4.2 bushels 
of wheat per capita annually as compared with 5.1 bushels 
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before the war. To this day per capita consumption of 
Wheat in the United States has never risen to its former 
pre-war level.* 
The world's demand for Wheat increased ~apidly 
from 1920 to 1929, partly due to the recovery of purchas-· 
I ing power in many of the European countries, but tAe rate 
of increase in the demand for wheat slowed down in the 
years that followed until about 1939, When World War II 
ushered in significant changes in the unbalanced world 
wheat situation.# This inelastic demand for Wheat for 
human consumption in most of the important wheat-consuming 
countries is a fact of vital consequence to the world 
wheat economy. Even moderate changes in supply, due to 
whatever causes, can exert totally disproportiona~e effects 
on wheat prices which, in turn, produce serious r~percus­
sions both in producing countries and in the general econ-
omy of the world. This was probably due'to the fact 
that the growth of population following the war period 
was at a retarded rate with little promise of a stibstan-
tial renewed upward movement in waeat consumption trends. 
The wide-spread rise in the standard of living further 
augmented the situation. By 1930 this was obvious not 
'* so, p.8 
# For continental Europe as· a whole, wheat constit.utes 
65% of the human consumption of cereals •. 
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only in the United States but also in the United Kingdom 
and France. 
As was mentioned above, falling per capita 
Wheat consumption was accompanied by a steady decline in 
the growth of the wheat-consuming population. On the 
other hand, owing to improved hygiene and living c'ondi-
tions the rice-consuming population expan~ed rapidly and 
where rice was the traditional diet, nutritional programs 
and a rise in the living standards and urbanization led 
to an increased demand for Wheat. Thus, wheat's super-
iority over, rice as a food slowly··had become an accepted 
fact in China arid Japan. This preference continued and 
exercised considel'able influence on the social dev,elop-
ment of nations in Asia and also Australia by rest'oring 
.a e. 
wheat cultivation Where it had been surrendered. 
I While bread still was· the ttstaff of lifen in 
most countries man depended upon it far less than 'When 
the adage was coined.. More and more the aristocrat of 
grains was taking a lesser position in the diet o~ 
countries despite the excellence of this primary product 
of agriculture. Along with the many changes affecting 
modern methods of living, our dietary habits. changed. 
This had a definite influence upon the consumptio~ of 
p.660 
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wheat and wheat flour. More money was being spent on 
a greater variety and better quality of foods. Fruits, 
vegetables and dai~y products were available· at all 
times and in fresh condit~on as a result of the greater 
production of truck-crops near cities, refrigeration, 
improved transportation facilities and cold storage. 
Progress in agriculture through the use of automotive 
tractors and motorwdriven harvesters and other machines 
displaced large numbers of human laborers. Developments 
both in the fields of agriculture and industry resulted 
in increased income and generally improved economic 
conditions ~ich~ in tur.n, influenced the food habits 
of the people and caused them to pass from a restricted 
vegetable and cereal diet to one with much more variety. 
In such instances ttbread remained in the backgroundn.,* 
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Dietary changes significant with higher general 
prosperity stimulated the popularity of the pleasant-
tasting meat products and high-protein foods soon dis-
placed the basic foodstuffs. At times, too, false pride 
prompted changes in diet. Families feared the loss of 
social prestige if they did not buy the more popular 
foods and bread became a trifling accesory to the'diet. 
oil-" 43, p.54 
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These changes were greatly reflected in the marketing of 
flour. During the ensuing twenty-year period there was 
a marked decrease in the making of home-baked bread and 
a consequent increase in the consumption of baker's bread. 
The multitude of small stores demand for wheat flour was 
lessened and the flour manufacturer depended more and 
more upon the commercial baker's demand for his flour. 
False propaganda against white bread also contributed to 
the decrease in the use of wheat ~lour. 
2. Competition of Cereals 
Despite dietary changes it is significant to 
note that wheat always retained a competitive position 
among the various cereals. This is probably due to 
the fact that palatable bread can be made from no other 
material as a base than wheat flour. As was mentioned 
previously, rye can b e used-but only to a limited extent. 
Bread cannot be made from barley, corn or oats alone 
because each lacks a glutinous content. Despite the 
merits of the various cereals, of them all, wheat is the 
most important and has the widest use of anycereal in 
the western world. This food, so rich in proteins, con-
tains a large amount of all the necessary nutritional el-
-
aments for the body. The price of proteins in Wheat is 
lower than in any other food. Not only does wheat 
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supply flour for bread and pastry but it is widely used 
in the manufacture of semolina. 
No competent substitute for wheat bread has been. 
found. The wartime use of cereals other than wheat in 
bread-making was limited to the capacity of the Wheat flour 
to be mixed with foreign materials without serious impair-
ment of the binding properties of the wheat gluten. Any 
undue attempt to conceal the presence of' corn, oats or 
barley in bread mixtures is most undesirable; it would be 
better to curtail the consumption of Wheat than to do 
without it altogether. The German Govermment made every 
possible effort to find substitutes for wheat flour and 
bread. In fact, it was announced that German nutrition 
chemists had found a substitute that would supply the 
body with 2,000 calories daily and 60 grams of protein, 
thus making bread unnecessary. (The calories were•· to 
come from chemically treated straw, sawdust and wood pulp 
and the proteins were to be yeast-made.) The whole plan 
was a clumsy scientific camouflage and the indigestible 
calories and the proteins from indiscriminate sources 
failed to fill the place of bread. Thus, the war"· empha-
sized the high value of good bread as nothing else could 
have done and the return to good white bread was pne of 
the blessings of peacel 
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While the world consumption of wheat had been 
increasing over a long period of years~ as was di~cussed 
2.7 
in a previous section~ after World War I the tendency was 
for the consumption per capita to decline in some countries. 
This is especially true of Germany~ Italy and Fra~ce 
Wherein restrictions,upon imports were imposed in order 
to reduce Wheat consumption in favor of substitutes. 
Early,in the 1930's in the European countries 
in which per capita consumption of Wheat had been growing 
at the expense of rye, corn and other foodstuffs, high 
tariffs continued to be levied on Wheat flour and other 
regulatory measures were in effect in the importing 
countries to check the expansion of wheat. Such action 
practically rever~ed the situation by making wheat rela-
tively expensive in a per.Lod of business depression When 
economies were necessary. 
When the income elasticity of demand for live-
stock products~ particularly pigs and poultry, wa~ relatively 
high the feed use of wheat increased in these periods of 
prosperity but always accompanied by strong competition 
from the cheaper coarse grains. There was large ,scope ·· 
for increased consumption of livestock products in the 
lower income groups which might have led to the increased 
use of wheat as feed but the economic depression retarded 
any such development in the 1930 1s. 
The use of Wheat in Latin America by the upper 
and better-paid strata of society, and those of European 
descent, was correlated to price. When the world price 
of wheat fell in the thirties the more prosperous Latins 
abandoned their cornmeal tortillas and cassavo cakes for 
the possession of true bread made from wheat flour. 
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Thus, wheat competed with rice and maize and manioc flours 
in importance in the diet of Latin American peoples. Only 
in the wheat-exporting countries of Argentina, Chile and 
Uruguay was wheat the chief food cereal. However~ with 
the continued shift of population from the rural to the 
urban areas the shift away from other cereals to wheat 
resulted. Through contact with European habits and the 
distribution of commercially prepared flours and breads 
through the various trade channels the taste for wmat 
was easily developed. On the other hand, the rural 
regions retained the ancient custom of consuming maize, 
the original native cereal. Even in the Orient, the 
better classes of people preferred their rice boiled 
and their bread white. Rice flour was consumed only by 
the poorer classes. In Germany, Scandinavia and Russia, 
however, the principal breadstuffs were rye and barley. 
When wheat is refined much of the mineral and 
vitamin content is lost un~ ss it is salvaged through 
the consumption of bran. The most important funct'ion of 
cereals is to furnish the body with heat and energy. At 
low cost these essentials are fqund in liberal amounts 
in the carbohydrate content in wheat. The carbohydrates 
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form an inexpensive, easily digested foundation upon Which 
to build health, accompanied by other more expensive foods 
to supply flavor and other nutritives besides calories. 
When a diet must be limited in cost the whole grain is 
particularly necessary. In a varied diet Which cqntains 
plenty of fruit, milk, vegetables and eggs it probably 
makes little difference whether one eats wbite bread, 
whole wheat or refined breakfast foods. 
The people of Great Britain and France depended 
upon wheat to furnish them with the greater percentage 
of both calories and proteins in their diet. Here again, 
however, the amount of proteins consumed varied with the 
wealth and social position or the various groups of 
consumers. 
The general composition of wheat is: 10-12% 
water, ~0-12% protein, 72~89% carbohydrates, 2% mineral 
matter (phosphoric acid and potash), .5-8% fat;· besides 
these elements wheat contains Vitamins B and E. Perhaps 
the most nourishing medium of wheat is its gluten content 
I 
which accounts for ten-twelfths of its protein value. 
Vitamin B exerts a stimulating action on the functions 
of the digestive tract and is found only in the ge'rm of 
the bran. While it is absent from mite flour it is 
present in adequate amount in white bread. Vitamin E~ 
which is found in whole wheat and in the wheat germ is an 
accessory factor which ensures normal growth and t.herefore 
should be present in an adequate amount in the dietary.* 
* 2~ p.47 
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~. The Economics of Surplus and Deficit 
Wheat Production 
31 
The supply of and demand for Wheat must be con-
sidered in the terms of surplus and deficit countries# 
and the latter ~ust be divided again into countries 
which produce no Wheat of any account, and those which 
produce some Wheat, but Whose production is insufficient 
for the needs of the population. 
tt:Agriculture throughout the world has exhibited 
the most .extreme manifestations of the phenomena 
of overproduction and redundant capacity Which 
were previously regarded as essentially indus-
trial phenomena. The severity of the world 
agricultural depression is no.doubt largely 
attributable to special circumstances which 
represent the aftermath of the war. But taken 
in conjunction with othe r factors, namely, the 
decline in the rate of growth of population in 
the western world and the rapid growth of tech-
nical productivity in agriculture, it s~ggests 
that an important change is taking place in the 
fundamental conditions of the world's economy. n~~ 
Thus, of.all the agricultural commodities, wheat including 
flour has·.been the subject of the most extensive govern-
ment legislation throughout the world in recent years. 
In one·way or another governmental action to restrict 
imports, increase exports or grant special aid and assist-
ance to domestic producers was taken in practically every 
country which produced wheat. Such action explains the 
important role that Wheat growing# flour milling# and 
* 40# p.31 
domestic and foreign trade in wheat continued to 
play in the general economy of many countries. Wheat 
is commercially grown in more than 50 countries a~d is 
one of the top agricultural enterprises in a score more. 
In the volume of international trade, wheat is a leading 
food product since nearly every country is either'' an 
importer or exporter of wheat or flour. 
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The artificial and governmental controls in the 
wheat industry in the surplus and deficit countries respec-
tively, depended upon general factors such as: the relative 
and potential importan~e of the wheat in the economy of 
each country, and on th~ attitude of the governments in-
volved, relative to protection and assistance for the 
wheat producer. The financial position of each country, 
especially during the depression when measures were 
necessarily taken to promote foreign trade, was another 
important factor. In the importing countries, especially, 
the scope of governmental control had been greatly magni-
.fied by the growing economic nationalism following 
World War I. 
The forms of contr~ adopted fell into three 
groups, namely,thos~ measures directly restricting imports 
which existed in one form or another in nearly all the im-
porting countries, those measures directly aiding exports 
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which existed in several exporting countries and even in 
a few of the deficit areas, and act~ons Which indirectly 
affected trade in taking steps to aid domestic production 
and thereby increase the producers' net income. The latter 
actions operated in the surplus regions particularly. 
The most important types of direct government 
intervention in the wheat and flour trade in the importing 
countries were:· tariffs, milling quotas and mixing re-
strictions, licensing systems, import monopolies, minimum 
domestic prices, production subsidies, preferential 
treaties, clearing agreements and controlled fore·ign ex-
change. However, in some of the surplus countrie·s preferen-
tial treaties, clearing agreements and depreciated foreign 
exchange also proved an aid to exports. On the other 
hand, the types of direct government intervention that 
aided Wheat exports were: export,bounties, premiums and 
dumping schemes. Domestic production was greatly supported 
by the effective use of production bonuses, fixed prices., 
credit extension, remitted taxes, reduced freight rates and 
laws which affected the competitive products of wheat and 
flour.* 
~. Surplus Areas 
The distinct areas of surplus wheat production as 
*128, pp.2-3 
related to consumption are Canada, the United States, 
Argentina, Australia, the Danubian countries of Europe 
34 
and Russia. In the main, these producers supply practically 
all of the world's exports. The latter two at times have 
been non-important as surplus producers. Before World 
War I, Russia was the world's leading producer and exporter 
of wheat with an annual export average in 1909-1913 of 
164 million bushels which represented nearly one-quarter 
of the total world trade in wheat and flour. ~r World War I 
eliminated Russia as a w4eat exporter, and for a number of 
years she was on a deficit basis, having to import appre-
ciable quantities of wheat up to the early thirties •. 
During this time the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
was tra~sformed from a free economy, organized in large 
private estates with large numbers of small peasant holdings 
attached, to a collectivized and planned economy based on 
large-scale state and collective farms with modern techni-
cal resources. Agricultural economic policy under the Five 
Year Plans was directed toward achieving a great ,expansion 
in the area under wheat cultivation. Plans were :launched 
to distribute resources and encourage wheat production in 
the north and east with a view to reducing the deficiency 
areas. An example of the significant increase in crop 
~~ 12, p.173 
production within period under the new economy is the 
difference between 66 million tons of wheat produqed in 
1928 as compared to 118 million tons in 1939. From 1933 
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onwards there was a definite tendency for the area under 
rye to decline at the expense of increased acreage sown to 
wheat in certain areas. Similarly, with the increased 
wheat acreage from 74 million acres in 1909-13 t-o 96 million 
acres in 1934-38 there followed an increas~ in domestic 
consumption of Wheat owing to the growth in population. 
Average per capita consumption increased from 247 pounds 
per capita, the average for the years 1924-29, to an 
average 401 pounds per capita for the years 1934-39. * 
Almost all the increased production was absorbed. Perhaps 
the only factor that would put the u. s. s. R •. in a temporary 
position to resume exports would be the reaping of a partie-
ularly bountiful harvest. Despite all the Soviet economic 
plans for greater wheat production, Nature was still the 
dominating factor in determining the level ar gr~in yields. 
The Danubian countries withdrew from the surplus wheat 
scene due to social and agrarian reforms that adversely 
affected whe~t production. 
J With the disappearance of Russia and India from 
the world export markets and the reduced export surplus of 
* 1a, PP· 179-183 
the Danubian countries the main bulk of the increased 
European wheat trade went to the remaining four ~eading 
exporting countries, namely, Canada, United States, 
. ·' 
Argentina and Australia. 
Stimulated by the high war prices resulting from 
the increased European demand for wheat the acreage under 
wheat was rapidly increased in the United States, Canada, 
and eventually in Argentina and Australia. In fact, wheat 
growing was a very profitable undertaking on the fertile 
lands which were continuallr b~ing opened in the surplus 
countries. Even though the price level from 1920-1939 was 
below the high le~el of the war years, the tendency of 
~ 
prices to fall was offset by the decreased costs of produc-
tion resulting from the increased use of mach~~ery and ap-
plication of scientific methods of production. 
Of the really important grain exporting areas 
of the world, Canada was probably the most important ih the 
sphere of world wheat. ·Production increased steadily since 
I 
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1919 and its average yield per acre far exceeded that of 
any other exp~ting country. Most of the export grain busi-
ness being handled by 3g companies While nine of these com-
panies controlled 50% of all the business •. About 90% ·of _ 
Canada's wheat is grown in three provinces, n~ely, Alberta, 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba. The United Kingdom was the 
principal customer fqr Canadian wheat , absorbing almost 
65 per cent of her annual exports. Next in line was the 
United states Wh~ch was interested in Canada's wheat 
mostly for blending purpos~s or for milling and then sub-
sequent export •. 
I 
Canadian wheat exports more than doubled in 
importance due to the cultivation of large tracts of vir-
gin land and a conversion program of intensive cultivation 
for previously used land. In contrast, the United States 
was becoming less important as a wheat exporting nation. 
Consumption on the domestic level absorbed most of the 
.American meat crop, and left only less desirabl.e grades 
and types for export.. Vfrlile shipments from Argentina 
were only slightly increased, it led to significant gains 
for that country; the same is also true of Australia. 
Argentina became an important factor in the export market 
because of its potential productivity and low density of 
population. 
Comparing the ~e-war period with the five-year 
period 1924-1928, the increase in new wteat expor~s from 
the United States, Canada, Argentina and Australia are 
shown in the following table.: 
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TABLE,! 
COMPARISON OF NEW WHEAT EXPORTS FROM THE UNITED STATES 
~;;.;....,.;=~;;.;;.. - .-.......-.- - - --
Count~:y 
United States 
Canada 
Argentina 
Australia 
CANADA, ARGENTINA AND AUSTRALIA 
-. -
Prewa~ and 1923-1928 Pe~iods 
(Annual Average) 
Period 
1909-1914 1923-1928 
109 
95 
84 
55 
(Million Bushels) 
172 
293 
142 
90 
-Total • • • 18 • • • • • • 343 697 
Sou~ce: United Nations Food and Ag~iculture Organization~ 
·commodi t:y Se~ies ~ Washington~ D. C., Government 
Printing O.f.fice~ March~ 1947~ P• 9 
38 
When the U.S.S.R. emerged from its .first five-yea~ plan 
which included the pe~iod from Octobe~ 1, 1929 to December 31, 
1933, its hu~e supply of exportable grain was made possible by 
the spplication o.f machinery to agriculture. The Soviet Govern-
ment was ready to ~econque~ its place on the world grain ma.rket 
which it had occupied be.fo~e the war of 1914-1917 at any and 
every expense. The most effective weapon used in the sales 
campaign was a state monopoly of foreign wheat trade. The 
response was gratifying. Both in 1930 and in 1931~ the U.s.s.R. 
expo~ted almost 94 million bushels o.f wheat~ a quantity l~ger 
than Aust~alia shipped all during the middle twenti~s. The 
wheat-growing countries of "the Danubian Basin recovered .from the 
ravages of war and subsequent controls with increased 
production from an average of 287 million bushels in 
1924-1928 to 353 million bushels during 1934-1938. 
2. Deficit Areas 
The wheat deficit areas of the world are to 
!• 
be found in Western Europe, Nor~hern Europe, the Medi-
terranean area of Europe, tropical Central and South 
America, the semi-arid and semi-frigid areas in Asia .. 
It is these areas that gave rise to the world market 
demand for wheat. 
Prospects for political agreements that would be 
quite favorable to those European countries Who w,ere 
anxious to strengthen their influence on wheat prices 
were brightened with the increasingly weak trading position 
of the four important exporting countries. These! countries 
were buying less in the importing countries than they 
sold to them with the resultant unfavorable balances. 
Thus, Germany, Italy and France renewed their tarlff pro-
tection schemes, intensified their domestic production 
and to·ok a defensive position in the ttbattle of wheat~". 
It was becoming more evident that the large count·ries 
producing grain on the continent were not going h.o expose 
themselves to unrestricted foreign competition any longer. 
TABLE !f 
AMOUNT OF PRODUCTION INCREASES AND IMPORT 
Items 
PRODUCTION 
G~ain 
Wheat 
NEW IMPORTS 
Wheat 
. - ----
DECREASES BETWEEN 1924-1928 and 1933 
(In te~ms of 1~000 sho~t tons) 
F.r>ance & 
Ge~many FI>ench No~th 
Africa 
f625 /442 
f278 f273 
-220 -116 
Italy 
1151 
f262 
-217 
Sou.!'ce: Taylo~, Hen~y C. and Ta11o~, Anne Dewees, Wo~1d 
T~ade in Ag~icul tu~a1 Pl'loducts_, New Yo~k, 
Macmillan Company, 1943, p. 114 
The table above shows a comp~ison of the ye~ 
1933 with the five-year pe~iod 1924-1928 Telative to the 
increases in production and decreases in impo~ts in the 
major wheat-importing countTies. 
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In the period 1924-1928, the nbig fourtt wheat giants, 
namely, Canada, Argentina, United States and Australia 
together supplied 84% of the world's exports. During this 
time the United Kingdom imported some 22l. million bushels. 
Continental Europe., e.=ltcluding the U.. S. S. R • ., to0k 414 
million bushels, of which Italy and Germany took the 
greater portion. Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Austria and Czechoslovakia took some 52 million bushels. 
The colonial empire of France, namely, the North African 
countries and Indo-China, made up for French deficits by 
producing important surpluses. It is quite evide~t from 
these figures that only a small part of the foreign wheat 
' 
requirements of Europe was covered in Europe itself .. 
In the period 1934-38, the Latin American wheat-
deficit countries imported an average of 60 million 
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bushels of wheat and flour. Argentina was the chief supplier 
for the wheat-importing countries, exporting 60-70% of its 
neighbors' import requirements before the war. About 20-
30% of Latin America's Wheat and flour came from the u. s~ 
and the balance, chiefly in the Caribbean Area, from 
Canada. Supplies from Australia were negligible. 
One of the chief purposes behind the various types 
of artificial control and governmental intervention in the 
deficit countries was to develop self-sufficiency. The 
war taught several belligerent and some neutral countries 
I' 
the disadvantage of depending upon distant lands +or Wheat 
supplies in time of war and made them determined to reduce 
this dependence by increased domestic production. Buying 
at home instead of abroad became the general practice. 
Through the application of various artificial controls even 
a ttsurplus problemtt! was created in some of the deficit 
countries. By so doing, the market for the exporting 
countries was steadily diminished and this restriction of 
natural markets resulted in political and economic pressure 
which exerted itself in a retaliatory manner. An example 
of this is illustrated in the case of France's attempt to 
achieve self-sufficiency in her wheat supplies. A wheat 
law was promulgated on December 1 1 1929, which empowered 
the Ministry of Agriculture to fix and establish a maximum 
percentage of foreign wheat destined for the manufacture 
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of flour.* Domestic production was encouraged by' subjecting 
imports first to a tariff, then to a license system and 
finally to a milling quota, topped by a minimum price system~ 
By 1933 1 a "surplus problemn was created within the country 
that necessitated the government's purchase of wheat to 
support the market.~~ The United States Department of 
* 6l., p.66l 
i~* 28, p .. 35 
Agriculture received the following familiar surplus 
country report from its representative in France in 
1934:: 
tt~s it is, both the government and the wheat 
trade live in the hope that the 1934-1935 
crop will be short and the surplus thus re-
moved. This same hope has been entertained 
but has failed to be realized for the ~ast 
three years.tt-3~ 
It would seem that the first-aid measure to safeguard 
the domestic market for French wheat producers and 
reinforce her tariff system resulted in a problem rather 
than a desired solution. 
3., Conclusion 
While wheat was produced in practically all 
the temperate zone countries we have seen that th~re 
were very distinct areas of surplus and deficit produc-
tion as related to consumption. The United State's which 
had long been a major exporter of wheat and flour was 
rivalled only during the pre-war period byRussi~ and in 
the post-war decade by Canada. Prior to the depression, 
the exports of wheat and flour in the United States 
averaged about a fourth of the nation's crop and repre-
sented a fourth of the total international wheat trade~ 
Of necessity, wheat continued to be one, of the 
commodities most subject to government~l control., Wheat 
~E-l28i , p • 4 
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production was carried. on almost everywhere on compara-
tively small-scale operations by numberless farmers. The 
market for the distribution of supplies was highly competi-
tive and the gigantic task of production and consumption 
control was confronted with many difficulties. 
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c. T.he Historical and Economic Setting 
1. Pre-World War I 
World production of wheat steadily expanded through 
the nineteenth century and with this e4pansion in Europe, 
land became more scarce and the labor supply increased. 
Intensive cultivation on small-scale holdings was the only 
means of increasing production. Costs of production con-
tinued to mount despite the application of new techniques. 
By contrast# the New World ~ncouraged the development of 
wheat production with its abundance of cheap and plentifUl 
land. The f~mers could take advantage of the numepous 
machines then on the market to aid them in the production 
of wheat. Despite the low yield per acre and the high 
price of labor# the costs of production in the New World 
were substantially lower than in Europe. At this time 
markets that were comparatively unrestricted were available 
for exporting surplus stocks. As transportation facilities 
improved, the costs decline and export trade in wheat was 
greatly encouraged. The following table shows that world' 
wheat net exports, which were less than one-seventh of world 
production in 1885-1890# doubled in volume and were, more than 
one-fifth of world production in 1909-1913: 
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TABLE ill 
WORLD PRODUCTION AND ~.EXPORTS ~WHEAT 
Pe:tt;tod Wo:ttld Production World Net Exports 
1885 - 1890 
1909 - 1913 
2,400 
3,140 
(Million Bushels) 
330 
680 
Source: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, 
Commodity Series, Washington, D. c., Government 
Printing Office, March, 194?, p. 3 
Two-thirds of this increase in world exports was 
accounted for by the expansion of exports from the Vnited 
States, Canada, Argentina and Aust:ttalia. vVh;tle exports to 
non-European countries, particularly China, began to 
increase, Europe in the 1909-1913 period was still respon-
sible fo~ five-si~ths of the total world imports. 
As long as the consumption of wheat kept pace with 
the increased production and the flow of trade was not subject 
to governmental interference, the t:ttend of wheat prices 
remained quite stable. This was due to the work of the highly 
organized grain markets in the important producing and con-
suming cente:tts which, under conditions of relative financial 
stability throughout the world, were able to provide ample 
facilities fo:tt hedging and fo:tt ~bitrage operations. 
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It iS also true that from the time North American 
competition became important some European countries imposed 
import duties; however, these were levied more from motives 
of political security then economic motives. These duties 
were considerably moderate ranging from fifteen cents per 
bushel in France to thirty-two cents per bushel in Germany, 
thereby not hampering the smooth operation of the wheat 
market to any great extent. Thus, the price of wheat for 
export in the 1885-1914 period represented a world market 
price which differed from domestic prices only in respect 
of transportation charges and occasional custom duties. 
The protectionist policies of France, Germany and Italy not 
only had little effect upon the expansion of world wheat 
exports but also had little effect on their own imports as 
can be seen from a study of the following table: 
TABIE lY 
A COMPARISON-OF NEW IMPORTS OF WEEAT INTO EUROPEAN 
- --- - ----
. COUNTRIES, ANNUAL AVERAGE FOR THE YEARS 1885-89 
--
!ill2. 1909-1913 
Countl':y: 1885-89 1909-13 
FREE TRADE COUNTRIES: 
Uni_ted Kingdom 
Belgium 
Netnel!.":tands~ 
Denmark 
PROTECTIONIST COUNTRIES: 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
(Million Bushelsf 
147.7 
20.6 
11.4 
37.5 
13.2 
30.9 
2lq.4 
50.3 
22.0 
6.2 
43.3 
68.3 
53.3 
Source: United Nations Food and Agricultul'e O!'gani-
zation~ Commodit:y: Series, Washington, D. c., 
Gove!'nment Printing Office, March, 1947, p.4 
In the 1909-1913 period the annual average of 
wo!'ld wheat exports reached a total of 680 million bushels 
of which Europe absorbed five-sixths. ·Russia was the 
d 
leading exporter followed by the United States and the 
Danubian gl'oup of exporting countries. The figures in the 
following table suppol't these statements: 
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TABIE y 
COMPARISON QE WORIJ) NET EXPORTS OF WEEAT 
Annual Average ~or the Years 1885-89 and 1909-13 
Country 
Russla 
United States 
Danubian Countries 
Canada 
A:rgentina 
Aus tl:lalia 
India 
Wol:lld Total. • • • • • • 
Period 
1885-2889 1909-1913 
(Million Bushels) 
98o8 
116.1 
76.1 
2.9 
5.5 
2.9 
31.9 
338.0 
164 
109 
110 
95 
84 
55 
50 
678 
Source:. United Nations Food and Agl:liculture Organization~ 
Commodity Sel:lies, Washington, D. c., Govel:lnment 
Printing Office, Mallch, 1947, P• 5 
2. Wol'ld Wall I and Food Administl:lations 
The importance of wheat in the world economy made 
the appl:loach to control schemes not only pl:lacticable but 
almost inevitable. With a challenging and daring spirit 
countl:ly aftel:l country, accol:lding to its position in the 
"wheat bat·t1e 11 ~ inaugurated restrictive or incentive 
measul:les to cope with the prevailing economic cl:lisis. Per-
haps the most _flor~eful factor that exerted tremendous 
pl:lessure for immediate govel:lnmental action was the "call to 
armsn in August~ 1914. Patl:liotism and militarism both 
sought channels through which the various segments of 
society might be united. The Wall of words was on simultaneously 
with weapons, and slogans appear on every horizon. 
One of the strongest appeals ~ound expression in the 
.American : s£ogan, "Food Will Win the War." How substantially 
~ood did contribute to winning the war is quite obvious~ 
Nevertheless, be~ore victory became reality, food (especially 
wheat) was to be subjected to diverse controls, some economic 
and others political. 
For thirty-two months Eu!lope was at war and. during 
that time the supply of breadstuffs caused the countries of 
Western Europe grave concern. Bread, so basic to t~e diet 
of the Europeans, was needed in plentiful supply and at a 
moderate price. It was imperative that the "staff of liferr 
should not be denied to either combatant or non-belligerent. 
As was previously shown, in the pre-war years, the 
average world production of wheat totaled about 3,5GO,OOO,OOO 
bushels of which l,Soo,ooo,ooo bushels was consumed by the 
I' deficit countries in Europe. The deficit countries themselves 
produced about 1,3oo,ooo,ooo bushels and imported about 
5,ooo,ooo,ooo bushels of wheat. Of this amount 3,ooo,ooo,ooo 
bushels o~ wheat were imported from countries off the cam-
tinent of Europe, namely, the United States, Canada, Argen-
tine, Australia and India. By the Spring of 1917, the 
Central Powers, entirely cut off from sources of suwply by 
blockade, were desperately in need of wheat. European 
neutrals had to resort to intensive bread'rations as wheat 
and flour imports were reduced to a minimum. The United 
50 
Kingdom, France, Italy and Belgium were the chief importing 
countries but due to the prolongation of the war their 
wheat stocks were greatly reduced. The average wheat pro-
I duction of the Western European Allies ~or the five pre-war 
years, 1909-1913, was about 575,000~000 bushels, supple-
mented by average imports of w~eat and flour amounting to 
364,000,000 bushels. The 1917 crop, however, was less than 
60% of the average pre-war crop and it wa~ necessary for them 
to import nearly 600,000,000 bushels of wheat in order to 
,,. 
maintain an adequate bread suppl~.n This meant that the 
normal aver·age. amount of wheat which Europe .zaequired f.zaom 
across the seas was almost doubled. The strain of meeting 
this need immediately became the task of the United States 
and Canada because submarine activity restricted shipments 
of wheat from India and Aust.zaalia which produced good crops 
in 1917; and Argentina lacked exportable wheat su.zapluses to 
share with the Allies as a result of severe weather. 
During the war the g.zaeatest single crop demand on 
the United States was for wheat. Since the economy of 
G.zaeat B.zaitain was adjusted to indust.zay rather than to ag.zai-
culture it was only natural that la.zage shipments of wheat 
and flour to England from the United States should be normal. 
?f 44, P• 17 
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In fact, t~oughout the centuries Great Britain had been 
the greatest importer of wheat and, as a result, assumed 
that wheat fields throughout the world were ploughed and 
sown each year for her. Liverpool, the greatest port of 
entry for wheat supplies, became a great factor in fixing 
the world price of wheat. Practically every newspaper and 
financial bulletin in t~e world began its daily st~tements 
with the "Liverpool Cables". It even went so far that New 
Yor.k State once regarded British prices of wheat as a 
barometer of' farming prosperi tjl'1~~ Thus, when Great Britain 
began buying heavily on the United States market prices 
soared upward with incredible speed. The wildest day ever 
witnessed on the Chicago Exchange was the day that war was 
declared in Europe. Within four months of that day, wheat 
was twenty-three cents higher than the preceding year, 
despite the bumper crop. By Spring ~915, wheat prices 
fluctuated between $1.25 - $1.40 a bushel and sales per 
month approximated ~~55, 000,000. The wheat stage set with 
heavy demand and high prices caused an expans~on of sowing 
in the Fall of 1914 and Spring of 1915 to more than 
60,000,000 acres with a consequent yield of over a mdllion 
bushels--the greatest yield ever recorded up to that time 
and for many years to come. As a consequence of this 
abnol:'mal yield the world wheat price dropped to the pre-war 
* 45, PP• 212-214 
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level of less than $1.00 a bushel and remained at that 
level until the spring of 1916.~1-
The 1916 crop, rather deficient because of an 
epidemic of black rust and the curtailment of acreage to 
offset the previous excessive h~vest, dropped to a total 
of 636,000,000 bushels with the 1917 crop doing only 
slightly better with a total of 650,828,000 bushe~s. 
For the pre-war years, 1909-1913, the average production 
had been 680,000,000 bushels with an exportable surplus 
of 105,000,000 bushels after the net consumption of 
585,000,000 bushels were deducted. By December 1916, 
wheat prices increased to $1.60 a bushel and it was pre-
dicted that if there should be another short crop the 
price would rise to $3.00. War demands continued and the 
price responded so that by April 1917, wheat rose to $1.80 
.. 
a bushel. 
It was at this time when great discontent was 
apparent in the United States, because of the rise in 
living costs, that the country ensred the war as a bel-
ligerent. Acting on public demand for governmental con-
trol of foods, a food control bill known as the Lever 
Act# was submitted to Congress and passed on August 10, 
1917. Under the authority of this legislation the Presi-
dent was empowered "to fix a reasonable guaranteed price 
* 47, PP• 90-91 
# See page J24for further provisions of this Act. 
53' 
fo~ wheat to be not less than $2.00 a bushel for the 
1918 cropn. This guaranteed p~ice was not to exceed 
eighteen months and the p~ice was to be whateve~ he 
deemed necessary to ensu~e p~oduce~s a ~easonable p~ofit. 
The Act carried an app~op~iation of $150,000,000 to main-
tain this guaranteed p~ice fo~ wheat • ..;~ It was unde~ these 
terms, also, that He~be~t Hoover became Food Administ~ato~ 
and devoted himself to the encouragement of intensive 
food p~oduction. True to form, the American public unde~ 
the di~ection of the newly formed Food Adminis·t;ration 
complied in a genuinely patriotic spi~it to the dnastic 
economies aimed to reduce home consumption of.wheat and 
flour in o~de~ to make the sac~ificed grain available 
fo~ export. Within a year, under the prog~am directed 
by the Conse~vation Divi~ion of the Food Administration, 
ove~ 138,000,000 bushels of wheat were rep~esentative of 
the savings of the American public. 
Canada,· with he~ low density of population and 
a normal wheat consumption averaging about 100,000,000 
bushels per year harvested a bumper c~op of 234,000,000 
bushels in 1917, as compared to the previous five ·yea~s' 
ave~age of 197,000,000 bushels. This made approximately 
234,000,000 bushels available for export £~om the 1917 
c~op. \~ile these cont~ibutions seemed quite liberal 
they we~e far sho~t of the 600,000,000 bushels needed fo~ 
~~ 44, P• 19 
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the Allies.' Russia and Rumania withdTew their export-
• I 
able wheat from the market because of domestic demands 
increased by the war. Argentina, India and Australia 
could supply only small ~antities of wheat. T.hrdugh 
the process o~ elimination the burden of supplying every 
possible bushel of wheat became the burden of the 
United States and Canada. Under such circumstances, 
without adequate control, prices hit the ceiling, .specula-
tion became prevalent and an insufferable crisis developed. 
At the same time the wheat farmer received very little 
increase in income from the highly speculative prices 
bacause the wheat had already passed into the hands of 
the speculators and distributors. 
The American market felt the effects of the cru-
cial wheat situation before its actual declaration of war 
on April 6, 1917. The Allied countries were fully aware 
of their critical position with reg~d to th~ supply of 
breadstuffs and began to take protective measures. As-
suming the position of individual buyers and bidding 
directly in competition with each other, representatives 
of the Allied countries entered the American market and 
bought all the available cash wheat and flour during the 
months of February,· March and April, 1917. ~en they 
turned to heavy purchasing in the May futures on the 
Chicago Board of Trade demanding consequent delivery. 
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Such competition in the face of rapidly declining 
supplies forced the price of export wheat from §~1.'80 a 
bushel to $2.40 a bushel, while the price of flour went 
irom $9.00 to $15.00 a barrel, an increase over sixty-
five percent. With the Chicago wheat market cornered, 
prices shot upward to an unprecented level. By May 11, 
red winter wheat sold in the Chicago market for $3.45 
per bushel in the wild scramble of the 11 shorts 11 tC? cover 
their sales. On May 12, the Chicago Board of Trade was 
forced to suspend all May futures operations in order to 
fulfill the outstanding contracts at agreed upon prices.~~ 
It was absolutely necessary in the face of this situation 
to do something to protect the American public from this 
unscrupulous speculation which resulted from the upward 
spiraling of prices. T.he law of supply and demand was 
completely broken down due to the small crop and the 
urgency of war requisitions for wheat. Centralization 
of control in overseas buying was necessitated more than 
ever with the shortage of ocean tonnage .• 
As early as October 1916, the British Govern-
ment had appointed a Royal Comndssion on \v.heat Su~plies 
I 
to inquire into the supply of wheat and flour in the 
United Kingdom. It was also directed to purchase, sell 
and control the delivery of wheat with a view to maintaining 
* 44, P• 22 
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the p~ope~ flow of wheat supplies. In November 1916, 
the Allied count~iea cognizant of the absolute need fo~ 
consolidated buying activities met in Pa~is to discuss 
the wheat situation. As a ~esult of this meeting the 
I 
Wheat Executive Ag~eement was ~awn up and signed by 
~ep~esentatives of the United Kingdom, France and ,Italy 
on Novembe~ 29, 1916. According to its tenets, a .rep-. 
~esentative of each of the signato~ies was to ~emain in 
London, and in accordance with the limits of the !Und 
established, to buy, allocate and transpo~t the wheat 
and flou~ require~ents of each respective count~y. 
While the B~itish Government assumed the ~esponsibility 
of .making all payments for these commodities with the 
p~omise of reimbursement by the Allied Powers at a 
later date, each country was to be responsible for the 
transportation of its own wheat and flou~. Thus, with 
the Royal Commission on Wheat Supplies acting as the 
chief executive agent, branches were immediately opened: 
one in the United States, incorporated under the laws 
of the New York With the title, Wheat Export Company, 
Incorporated, located at 27 Beaver Street in New York 
City and the other at Winnipeg, Canada, under the title 
vVheat Export Company, Limited. By this agreement each 
party surrendered its claim to purchase wheat in the 
cheapest market. This particular agency also did much 
to assist G~eece, Portugal and Belgium in maintaining 
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their wheat stocks during the war period. During 'the 
January~ 1917 to August~ 1919 period the Wheat Export 
Company, Incorporated and Limited, were responsible for 
the purchase of more than 1,000~000,000 bushels o~ wheat 
from the United States and Canada. 
Similarly, the Comision Interaliada para 'la 
Compra de Cereales was organized in Argentina with 
branch offices in Buenos Aires and Montevideo, Uruguay. 
In 1917, the French and British Governments negotiated 
a loan of $195,000~000 for the purchase of Argentinian 
wheat. T.he entire Australian wheat crop was taken over 
by the Commonwealth Government which sold over 5,500,000 
tons to the Royal Commission on Vi.heat Supplies. Unfor-
tunately, much of this grain was completely destroyed 
by mice and weevil because of the dearth of ocean tonnage 
and the lack of proper storage facilities. In India~ a 
Wheat Commissioner was appointed by the Central Govern-
ment to act as correspondent of the R~l Commission~ whose 
duty was to regulate exports of wheat and flour in order 
to protect its own requirements and prevent an increase 
,, 
in world prices which would result if the supply com-
pletely diminished.* 
With the armistice on November 11, 1918, the 
European demand for American wheat continued and the cr.op 
condition improved so that the President raised the minimum 
* 44, P• 30 
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price to $2.26 per bushel. The 1918 harvest totaled 
approximately 921~000,000 bushels of which 187~000,000 
were shipped overseas. With the continued support of 
the government's price guarantee, farmers sowed over 
75,000,000 acres of wheat in 1919. An all-time record 
in American history was reached when this acreage yielded 
more than 967,000,000 bushels of wheat making it possible 
to export over 220,000,000 bushels.* Quite inopportun&ly 
the American farmer thought this would continue and made 
little effort to curtail production either by abandoning 
marginal land or shifting to other crops. As a result, 
the 1920 harvest consisting of 833,000,000 bushels had 
neither a wartime market or European demand to sustain it. 
Thus, at midnight on May 31, 1920, the United Stat.es Govern-
ment removed the price guarantee on wheat and prices 
' 
spiraled downward to a record low level. This gav~ rise 
to much agitation for ~arm relief and general dissension 
prevailed among the American wheat farmers. 
In summary, then, the Great War left the 'orld 
in' a state of instability and it seemed more feasible 
and desirable to resort to direct governmental intervention 
and artificial control schemes in order to re-establish 
equilibrium more speedil~ and effectively. Men be.came 
more impressed with the role of government in economic 
* 44, p.34 
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affairs and conceded to the yontrols which dominated 
agriculture in the following post-war years in effect 
to restore reasonable prosperity. 
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3. Post-World War I Developments 
In the first year and a half following the war 
many of the wartime forces continued to operate in the 
wheat industry. T.he depleted and devastated fields of 
Europe were the reason for ~ profound shift in the sources 
of supply moving in international trade. 
Economists predicted a brilliant period of wheat 
prosperit~ in America for at least ten yeS!' s after· the 
war. Because nwe would have to feed Europen the prospect 
in the spring of 1919 had been for a record-breaking crop 
of wheat. Congress appropriated one billion dollars to 
carry out the terms of the price guarantee. Unfavorable 
growing conditions failed to_ achieve the expected yield. 
Nevertheless~ farmers bought high-priced cars~ trucks and 
tractors. War-time prosperity had passed on to a post-
war boom. In spite of large crops~ prices mounted. 
Inflationary forces remained active and their effe.ct was 
soon reflected in the advancing wheat prices. 
Toward the close of May~ 1920~ a prominent New 
York financial writer in a newspaper interview predicted 
the continued rise of food prices. "Assuming a free 
market, 11 he said, 11 I should not be surprised if wheat 
sells as high as $5.00 a bushel on the Chicago Board of 
:: 
Trade during the coming twelve-months". rn April~ 1921~ 
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months later, the spot price of contract wheat on the 
Chicago Bo~d reached a low point of $1.23 3/4. After 
slight recoYery during May and June the downward movement 
was resumed, touching $1.00 1/2 in November, 1921.1* 
" The boom period had terminated and the long 
' . 
depression in wheat ~griculture be~an. With the disappear-
ance of the government guarantee on wheat, the pri-ce 
de~line gathered momentum as the 1920-1921 abunda~t 
wheat crop poured on the market. 
By the end of 1920 we had changed £rom a 
"selle:r»s' market11 to a "buyers' market". In the f'ace of 
. . 
continued heaVy wheat production, domestic buyers were 
~ore than amply suppli~~ and fo:r»eign demand had t~pe:r»ed 
. 
off for financial reasons. American credit had fostered 
. . . 
the heavy purchases by.E~~ope in 1919. When this c:r»edit 
was withdrawn the wheat trade in Europe depended upon 
~ 
industrial power of the importing countries to produce 
.w ~ .. ... 
and export surplus industrial goods to pay for their 
.. 
wheat imports. It was painfully evident that Europe 
was unable to liquidate.their impo:r»t credits as they 
matured. In addition to this situation inflatiob ,,and 
unfavorable balances of trade had seriously disorganized 
the exchanges. 
Our failure to adjust the supply of wheat to 
the prevalent curtailed demand was due to favorable weather 
* 31, PP• 68-74 
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conditions. T.he high production ~evels of the 19~8-1920 
period were Stl.rpassed by three moJ?e successive years of 
good growing weather in 1921-1923. 
Enlarged wheat supplies and weakened purchasing 
power~ particularly in Germany~ France and Italy~ in 
addition to the increased volume of wheat trade r~sulted 
in depressed wheat prices at the level of the weakest 
buyers. Ruinous prices persisted as affairs went from 
bad te worse in Europe. 
The decontrol of the wheat trade in the United 
Kingdom took place gradually over a period of a year or 
more. VerY. large purchases of wheat were made by the 
ro~al commission during the months of May~ June and July 1 
I 
1920. On July 29~ the heavy purchasing suddenly ceased 
and th~ commission wi tJ:Ldrew from the market. England 
was apparently "overbought". Commenting on this ps.rticu-
la.r situation before a committee of the Americm Farm 
Bureau Federation on November 5, 1920, Julius R. Barnes, 
former director of the United States Grain Corpo~ation 
said: 
"Not one of the importing countries of 
Europe has been-able to return the over-
sea grain trade to private merchants. 
Great Britain, France~ Ital~~ Belgium; 
Holland~ Germany, Switzerland~ Spain~ 
Portugal--all of themmade their overse~ 
pu~chases through official agents whose 
buying policies are influenced by financial 
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or other home considerations which 
may, and often do, entriely defeat 
the ordinary considerations of sup-
ply and demand alone. n·if-
B1 September, 1921, ~ance had abandoned her 
·wartime regulations of the price of wheat, flour ahd 
bread and the amount of wheat substitutes to be used in 
wheat. Farmers were again permitted to have their flour 
ground at any mill they chose and bakers might se:lect 
the mills from which they bought their flour. The free 
temporary admission of wheat, imported with a view to 
re-exportation after being manufactured into flou~ and 
other wheat product~, was reestablished. The Frebch 
milling industry was fully released from government 
regulation. The general world wheat price decline in 
1921 was not reflected in French flour prices because 
of the government price control which absorbed a part 
of the cost through what amounted to a bread subsidy. 
France drew about one-fifth of her needed imports from 
its North African possessions whose wheat was admitted 
duty-free. By 1927, the ~e-war tariff rate of 37.3 
cents per bushel of wheat was restored.** 
T~e ch~ge from a wartime government wheat 
monopoly to freer trade practices was carried out in 
*ll.7, p. 20 
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Italy gradually and cautiously. The wheat proble~ in 
Italy had been complicated by government promises given 
to wheat producers and consumers. A guaranteed fixed 
price plus an additional premium for wheat produced in 
the southan provinces and islands was assured the 'wheat 
producers. Free imports of foreign wheat would be a 
menace. Permits had to be secured from the Ministry of 
F1nance for the temporary importation of soft and hard 
wheat. The Ital~an Council of Ministers approved a 
measure for the importation of wheat free of duty during 
the period December, 1921 to :March, 1922. By 192.5, 
Italy had placed a tariff of 39.4 cents per bushel on 
wheat. Its cultivation was intensif~ed and improved 
in every possible way. Approximately one-hundred-fifty 
grain importers in Germany had formed a cartel and 
purchased wheat in foreign markets through one single 
agency. The government retained control of wheat 
exports and imports well into the summer of 1922, 
through a price which was f1xed for two-sevenths of the 
wheat crop. The price was about thirty-three cents a 
bushel or less than one-third of the 1921 world price. 
Germany imported wheat to the &mount of two-sevenths of 
the crop and sold it at twenty-two cents per bushel. 
Since exports were prohibited the German government 
q5 
sales agency controlled all sales in the German wheat 
market. The German farmer was allowed to sell the 
remaining five-sevenths of the crop for all he could get •••• 
of course, not for more than the Government's selling 
price • .zc- Germany established a tal"iff of 32.4 cents 
per bushel of wheat by the end o~ l924. 
By an embargo, effective November 8, 1921, 
further importation ·or wheat into Spain was prohibited. 
Wheat imports were considerably heavy during September, 
. ,, 
1921. The reason for the embargo the government stated 
was "to compensate living costs by reverting to price 
regulation of ceJ:Itain food products including ••••• wheat 
and flour u • *-l~t-
With the strengthening of tariff protection in 
the mid-twenties, a period of rather high prices, it w~s 
clear that the great countries on the continent of Europe 
did not intend to expose their wheat production to unre-
.stricted foreign competition. 
As was mentioned in an earlier section, not only 
had India and the D~ubian, cou11tr-ies withdrawn from the 
world wheat market during the war but Russia, too, 
' 
withdrew its substantial con'tribution of _approximately 
. *117, P• 28 
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160~000~000 bushels to the consuming wheat pool. This 
amount had to be ~eplaced mainly by the United States, 
Canada, Argentina and Aust~alia. With an additional 
demand fo~ expo~table su~pluses, g~eate~ expansion of 
wheat ac~eage ~esulted. The fou~-yea~ 1918-1922 post-
w~ average p~oduction of the four non-Eu~opean count~ies 
showed an inc~ease of mo~e than 380,000,000 bushels or 
33.7 per cent compared with the pre-war pe~iod. By far 
the largest increase occu~~ed in Canada which exp~nded 
its average p~oduction of these years by an increase of 
l6l,OOO,OOO bushels or 81.7 per cent. This inc~eased 
p~oduction gave keen competition to the United ~tates. 
The average production in the United States inc~aased 
133,000,600 bushels o~ 19.2 pe~ cent. In spite of 
smalle~ acreage, Argentina's p~oduction showed an ave~age 
inc~ease of 50,000,000 bushels or 33.6 pe~ cent • 
. •' 
Aust~alia increased its average output by 36,000,000 
bushels which was 40 per cent more than its ~e-war 
average. India, on the other hand, showed a decl~ne of 
11,000,000 bushels in its post-wa~ average production as 
compared with the pre-war period. Russia's production 
was about 380,000,000 bushels less than fo~merly or a 
decrease of nearly 58 per cent. Such a comparison shows 
that the world post-war production was practically ten 
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ten per cent above the pre-war five•year a~erage. The 
non-European countries more than adequately compensated 
for the loss in Russian production. 
Rapid technical progress contributed greatly to 
the ove~expansion of wheat production. The-~troduction 
of tl:'actors .and combines particularly favol:'ed the _pl?o-
duction o~ wheat in the semi-al?id regions of the Great 
Plains of the United States, as well as in Argentfna 
and Austl?alia. By 1926, pl?ogl?ess in plant bl?eeding con-
tl?ibuted to the expansion o~ wheat raising in arid 
.,~ l?egions ..... 
The pl?oduction of wheat in the countries of 
Eul?ope ~ollowing the war had been below the pl?e-wal? 
: pl?oduction and ther.efo_re necessitated heaviel? imports. 
These incl?eased imports by no me~s bl?ought the avail-
able supply up to pl?e-war figures~ Substitution of 
potatoes and ethel? cel?eals fol? a part of the wheat 
·ration had a marked influence on Eul?opean wheat l?equire-
ments. 
The United States em~rged fl?om the wal? as a 
cl?editol? nation while Canada, Argentina and Australia 
were still debtol? nations. This fact had a distinct 
effect upon the movement of oul? wheat in intel?national 
* 48,- P• 561 
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trade as compared with those of the other countries. 
The United States had no international debts to settle 
with wheat. In fact, it was our export of capital, 
expenditures of American tourists and immigrants' 
remittances· to Europe that made possible a good portion 
of our export wheat· trade. On the othe·r hand, Argentina 
and Australia had international obligations to settle. 
. . 
Payment of interest and principal was made largely with 
wheat supplies. In order to meet these 'obligations 
each debtor country had to purchase foreign exchange in 
large amounts ~nually. These purchases tended to depress 
the value of the 'debtor's currency in terms of foreign 
money. An importer could purchase the debtor's currency 
at the lower or depressed value and use the cheaper 
money to purchase wheat. The effect on the United States 
was exactly the opposite. Since foreign countries were 
completted to purchase our money in order to make payments, 
this made our currency more expensive. Foreign sales of 
wheat often turned on a fraction of a cent per bushel. 
T.he difference in the cost of the foreign exchange was 
often sufficient to bring about a sale. Since Canada, 
Argentina and Australia had to mrure foreign paymehts of 
approximately $350,000,000, the purchase.of foreign 
exchange to this amount was sufficient to influence the 
money market. This tended to make it easier for these 
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countries to sell their wheat in a closely competitive. 
world market. 
The violent fluctuations in the exchange rate 
of the various European countries greatly offset the 
effect of these influences. When world conditions became 
more stabilized our international trade balance placed 
the United States at some disadvantage in exporting 
wheat as compared with the position of debtor nations. 
The.peace treaties which fostered a general 
tendency toward self-sufficiency further augmented the 
wheat situation. In many instances these treaties 
lacked sufficient economic and political foresight. 
Countries faced with new burdens were driven to adopt 
programs of general rearmament. As one author has aptly 
described the consequence: 
''Armaments con,stitute a danger of war, 
the danger of war provokes measures or 
self~sufficiency; and self-sufficiency 
means bu;ing at home and not from 
abroad. n 
By 1924, the European countries had rapidly 
increased their wheat output and similarly became more 
self-sufficient. Agricultural protectionism was pro-
nounced. Custom barriers mounted and soon the principal 
exporting countries were left with large wheat stocks 
on their hands. The wheat market in Europe was narrowed 
. {} 11, p. 53 
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by the resulting expansion of their domestic production. 
The volume of wheat trade between nat.ions simultaneously 
decreased. Unemployment and general material distress 
became apparent. The exporting countries, anxious to 
dispose of their surplus wheat, threw it on the m~rket 
at any price. Many of the European countries erected 
higher tariff walls to protect their domestic markets 
I 
from being swamped with low-priced wheat impo~ts. As 
wheat prices declined less instead or more wheat entered 
the importing countries. The return of men from the 
armies and the erection of protective duties resulted 
in a rapid recovery in production irmnediately following 
the war~ The acreage of wheat in Europe, outside 
Russia, was enlarged greatly. 
The factors of supply as well as the contraction 
in demand were important elements in stimulating wheat 
I 
expansion in the post-war years but the constraction ib 
- -
demand also played an important role. Diet wants shifted 
from the consumption of bread to the consumption of 
' 
' fruit and vegetables and thereby decreased the per capita 
consumption of wheat in some of the importing countries. 
It was mainly the population growth of western Europe 
which required greater imports of wheat from the overseas 
countries. The slow growth of population immediately 
7]. 
following the war was about 4.5 per cent. Between the 
1925-1929 period the population of Europe, excluding 
Russia, increased only 2.9 pel? cent. Even without' 
protectionist policies the amount of wheat ~mports~ was 
necessarily limited. This inelastic demand resulted in 
an oversupply of wheat stocks and a consequent dec'line 
in price. In 1926, Canada through the 11 orderly marketing" 
of Canadian wheat by the wheat pool postponed the decline 
in wheat prices. Such an artifici-al manipulation of the 
wheat market was responsible for the keeping of surplus 
wheat stocks off the market and for the sustenance of 
high prices. The easy existing c11edit conditions ,during 
the years 1925-1928 were used to finance the carry-over 
of wheat stocks and tended to keep prices above th,e level 
which corresponded to the true !1elationship of supply 
and demand. 
It was appa11ent by 1928 that the latent disequi-
librium'in the wheat industry due to the return of Europe 
to its pre-war pattern of agriculture together with the 
great expansion o~ wheat areas in the non-European 
countries would make itself relt. Standards o~ living 
in the war-devastated nations had improved and varied 
diets were popular again. Increased wheat supplies 
mounted. One good world harvest could produce an ~nman-
" 
ageable surplus. Such a crop occurred in 1928-1929 when 
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the world wheat acreage exceeded the ~e-war figure by 
over twenty-five per cent. The sharp decline in wheat 
prices provided an incentive for the absorption of wheat 
for feed and food. World wheat exports in 1928-1929 
reached a record high of 921 million bushels. Europe 
increased its wheat purchases mainly for ~eed in .order 
to meet the rising demand for livestock products. For 
the first time, non-European importers took nearly a 
quarter of world exports. As will be seen in the 
following section, the world accumulation of wheat stocks 
during the several years of prosperity was a major cause 
of the crisis of 1929 rather than a consequence of the 
economic crisis. 
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4. Wo~ld Dep~ession, 1929-1932 
When the economic c~isis b~oke in 1929, huge 
wheat stocks had accumulated and the wo~ld wheat position 
j 
was among the most vulnerable elements in the economic 
st~uctu~e of the wo~ld. Fo~eign lending ceased and most 
countries we~e faced with fo~eign exchange difficulties. 
To meet their obligations it was necess~y to cut down 
wheat imports. Unemployment increased and purchasing 
power dec~eased. There was a general fall in commodity 
prices which had been more ~apid than in any yea~ since 
1921. Many farmers burdened with fixed debts endeavored 
to increase their wheat output in order to prevent a 
~eduction in their income. Wheat p~ices fell acutely 
as a result of the new output. As the crisis and price 
decline continued, the wheat situation became dominated 
I 
by the attempts of governments to protect thei~ w4eat 
producers from the worst effects of the depression. The 
importing count~ies turned to increased domestic production 
of wheat in orde~ to ease up the difficulties of foreign 
exchange. Such measures naturally restricted the 1free 
flow of wheat and huge surpluses mounted. Wheat prices 
. 
were doomed to hit the lowest level ever known to exist 
J~ in the industry.· 
*lrue, PP• 80-88 
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In June~ 1929~ in the face of declining wheat 
prices the United States Government set up the Federal 
Farm Board under the Agricultural Marketing Act. ~is 
agency granted loans to rarmers to hold their wheat off 
the market pendi.ng a restoration of the price level. 
This was nothing more than wishful thinking because world 
prices continued to fall. The Farm Board was compiled 
to take over the farmers wheat stocks. Its efforts to 
stabilize the position of the ·wheat farmers who we,re 
suffering from the calamity of very high operating costs 
were not successful. When the Farm Board ceased purchas-
ing operations in the summer of 1931~ it had accumulated 
330 million bushels of wheat at a price that was higher 
than the current world prices. Prices immediately spi-
raled dowbward from the 51.9 cents per bushel in June~ 
1931 to rock-bottom level in December~ 1932~ when wheat 
sold for 31.8 cents per bushel.?z. 
In Canada~ private controls of marketing wheat 
through cooperatives were sufriciently established. This 
was particularly pertineh t to the Prairie Provinces. 
In 1924~ the provincial cooperatives merged to for..m the 
Canadian Wheat Pool which handled more than 60 per cent 
of the Canadian wheat crop~ or one-fifth of the total 
international trade in wheat. Its main function was to 
render efficient marketing service and dispose of the 
* 12~ PP• 199-201 
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In 1928, after the sharp decline in prices, the Pool 
started holding supplies in storage in an attemp~ to 
hold Canadian wheat from the world market until prices 
improved. Stocks on hand increased rapiqly. The Pool 
sought further to strengthen prices and purchased a few 
million bushels in the futures market in the earl~ part 
of 1929. By August 1, 1929 1 it carried over nearly 50 
million bushels of unsold wheat. T.he practice of the 
Pool to allow wheat growers an advanced payment o~ a 
dollar a bushel caused serious financial difficulties 
when prices fell from 56 cents a bushel in 1930 to 38 
cents a oushel in December, 1932. The Canadian-Govern-
ment had to guarantee the pools' borrowings and offered 
to buy all wheat at a fixed price.* 
~ 
In 1929, the Australian Government undertook 
a price-fixing acheme to stimulate production. In· 1931, 
the Wheat Bounty Act was adopted which provided for 
direct subsidies to increase production in the 1931-
1932 season. The subsidi~s were provided partly from 
a tax on flour and from general revenue. At the end of 
the 1932 season a preference was received by Australia 
along with the other British Empire countries in the 
United Kingdom market. Similarly, the market reports 
* 27, P• 40 
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from Argentina stated that wheat prices had declined to 
the all-time low of 40 cents per bushel by Decembe'r, 1932. 
It is little wonder then that on Decembe~ 20, 
1932, under the influence of sharp competition between 
Canada, Argentina and Australia that Liverpool wheat 
?~ prices dropped to the lowest level since 1588. 
These factors wrought havoc upon the wheat 
farmers and their general plight was further augmented 
by the influence o~ the artificially increased domestic 
production in the European-importing countries. The 
tremendous problem of dealing with surpluses raced the 
wheat growers and their governments. 
A direct !'elationship existed bemveen the. 
attempts to increase domestic production and the currency 
policies of the countries involved. Debtor nations such 
as Argentina and Australia had to ~ind means by which 
they could move their wheat stocks in order to mee,t their 
financial obligations and in turn to stabilize the~r· 
national currencies. The accumulation of immense wheat 
stocks could be more easily financed by the U.nited States 
and Canada. The former had emerged f'rom the war as a 
creditor nation and Canada had grown prosperous fr.o~ her 
grain trade during the war. The currency policy i~ the 
United States and Canada was not favorable toward exports. 
* 12, P• 201 
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The Canadian dollar did not depreciate as much as 'the 
pound sterling be .fore 1933 when the United States ''dolla:ra 
was devaluated. Besides, as was mentioned previously, 
governmental measures held wheat of'f the market in the 
face of' declini~g world prices. 
Argentina and Australia abandoned the gold 
standard in 1929. The Argentine peso declined in value 
immediately. It was stabilized at only one-half' its value 
in 1931 and depreciated again in 1933. At this last date 
the Argentine Government of'f'ered to buy wheat at a fixed 
price above the world market price. The Government bought 
wheat from producers at prices higher than the world mar-
ket price with the profit which accrued .from the price 
differentials .from £oreign exchange. In the early part 
of' 1931, Australia devaluated its pound and kept it 20 
per cent lower than the devaluated pound sterling. 
The .first wave of' economic nationalism followed 
World War I when devastated a:raeas were being rehabilitated. 
Dependent countries felt that they had learned a ~esson 
in preparedness for the future. The economic depression 
continued to give impetus to the second wave of' self'-,, 
sufficiency developments. Importing countries raised 
their tariff's on wheat to levels that were twice as high 
I 
as in the late twenties. Tariff's were imposed on imports 
which had previously been allowed in free of' duty• Other 
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measures were resorted to among which were special taxes 
on wheat, import quotas and licenses~ milling quotas, 
pre£erential treatment and barter and clearing ar~angements. 
As a result the export of United States wheat since the 
1928 harvest was the lowest ever known. 
In 1930, through the e££orts taken to alleviate 
pressure on domestic prices, a great contraction took place 
in the volume o£ wheat exports. Even though continental 
Europe planned an increase o£ 150 million bushels a year as 
part o£ its sel£-sufficienc1 program a substantial contri-
bu·liion to this con traction was· made by Nature. Surplus 
countries were cursed with short crops while the deficit 
countries were blessed with more than generous crops. 
Protective measures were adopted by the three most important 
wheat-importing countries on the continent o£ Europe, namely, 
Germany, Italy and France. Wheat tariffs were increased early 
in 1929 and expressed in cents :r:ar bushel, the rates reached 
the £ollowing levels: 
Year 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
TABIE Yf 
vVEEAT TARIFF PER BUSHEL 
Germany 
32.4 
42.1 
5'7.3 
162.1 
Italy ,France 
39.4 3'7.3 
'73.5 53.3 
84.1 62.'7 
106.3 85.3 
Source: Taylor~ Henry c. and Taylor, Anne D., World Trade in 
Agricultural Product, New York, Macmillan, P• 112 --
79 
By November, 1932, less than 19 million bushels of wheat 
were exported from the United States. It was a new 
experience for us to have other countries raise such 
drastic tariff barriers against our wheat. These tariff 
increases helped to prevent a complete depression of 
wheat export prices. Domesti-c millers in these countries 
were compelled to grind a certain percentage of domestic 
wheat. Ninety-five per cent of flour in Italy had to be 
made from wheat grown in Italy. Stock-holding was 
encouraged by subsidies and government purchases of wheat 
supplies. Price-fixing and control of wheat purchases 
and sales was inevitable. France refunded the export 
tariff after the abundant crop of 1929. Further restric-
tions were established in 1933, when the three countries, 
due to favorable weather conditions reaped crops that 
beat an all-time record level. 
France furnished further illustration of the 
change in the wheat market situation. In the 1929-1932 
period more than 1200 American combine harvester-
threshers were purchased. These went principally into 
her North African possessions. These countries, similar 
to our Great Plains areas~ were adapted to dry farming 
of durum wheat. France developed these lands through 
low-cost tractor-farming methods. By setting high 
80. 
domestic p~ices ~o~ wheat. France also encouraged he~ 
~armers to shi~t ~~om other c~ops to wheat. By 193'4, 
these measures produced a wheat surplus in France. 
Prices were maintained despite complaints ~rom consume~s. 
The war department erected enough concrete elevators to 
i 
hold 20 per cent of the 1932 crop. The government bought 
20 per cent o~ the 1932 crop at a domestic price behind 
the high tari~~ wall and charged the ope~ation to 
"military preparedness". 
The ~all of wheat prices in 1929, led to the 
concentration o~ export monopolr into the hands of the 
Ge~man cooperatives. The Rentenbank-Kreditanskalt took 
o.ver the German Grain Industry. Through the combination 
o~ cooperatives the largest milling and grain deale~s 
I 
corporation was established under government control. 
By March, 1930, wheat-milling obligations were placed 
upon German millers and the bread law became e~~ective. 
I 
This definitely was a trend toward the socialization of 
consumption. The demand ~or domestic wheat was increased 
at the expense o~ the bakers and the public. Tari~~s 
.were increased and wheat imports swindled. Germany could 
boast o~ having passed the greatest amount o~ legislation 
a~~ecting the wheat trade in the world depression per·iod.~t-
* 19, P• 118 
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In 1931, Belgium subjected imports and transit 
trade in wheat to a licensing system. The £ollowing year 
import quotas wel'e established, millers were ordere,d to 
'I 
use domestic wheat and to pay subsidies £or the expansion 
o£ wheat acreage. The Netherlands introduced f'ixed. 
prices and compulsory milling quotas in 1931. Two years 
later this country monopolized grain importation and 
exacted monopoly £ees. Even Denmark began to levy tari£fs 
al ifhough they were low • .;r-
The free-trade policy of'.the United Kingdom 
underwent drastic modi£ications in 1931. Following; the 
Ottawa Agreement in November, 1931, two shillings per 
quarter were levied on foreign imports. Imports from the 
British Empire were allowed to enter duty-free. Su.ph 
. 
pre£erential treatment was a definite blow to the £pee-
wheat market. This meant that Canadian wheat shipped 
£rom United States po~ts, in order to be granted.immunity 
from the tarif'f, had to bear proof' o£ through-consignment. 
As a result o£ this regulation, two separate price 
·schedules were used. One price was set on Empire wheat, 
the other on non-Empire wheat. With reg&rd to flour, a 
ten per cent ad valorem rate was imposed on all non-Empire 
imported flour. In May 1932, a wheat act~s passed grant-
ing a bounty to wheat growers by means o£ a minimum price 
* 2'7, P• 38 
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gua~antee. Payments we~e made out o~ the proceeds o~ a 
tax on ~lou~. The 1932 c~op bonus to the p~oduce~ was 
55 cents pe~ bushel. This bounty was at the ultima,te 
expense o~ B~itish consume~s o~ ~lou~. 
With these drastic ~est~ictions in ope~ation 
almost all ove~ the wo~ld~ dispa~ities existed between 
domestic p~ices and wo~ld p~ices. Free markets dwindled 
and p~oduction ~emained ra~ in excess o~ actual world 
abso~ption. The idea o~ national or inte~national 
cu~tailment o~ wheat production seemed ~a~ ~rom ever· 
being conceived. Control of wheat acreage and production 
appeared to be too di~~icult to control. 
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5. Recovery and Rehabilitation~ 1933-1938 
The .huge VD rld stock of unsold wheat which had 
accumulated by 1933 had a disproport·ionate depJ:tessing 
effect on wheat pJ:tices. Production costs of export~d 
wheat added to tJ:tansportation cha:J:tges exceeded the selling 
price. In other words~ such a small amount of money 
J:teached the farmer that in most cases it did not give 
him a margin of pJ:tofit.· In turn~ the wheat farme!' could 
not pa~ his taxes~ rent, moJ:ttgages and pther debts. Low 
wheat prices fostered cuJ:trency depreciation. Depre'ciated 
curJ:tency reduced these fixed costs and increased t~e 
prosperity of the wheat business for a short while. 
Farm distress in the United States was atr its 
worst and wheat prices at thei!' lowest during the months 
preceding the change of administrat; ion on MaL" ch 4, 1933. 
Dissatisfaction with the failu!'e of the Federal Farm 
BoaJ:td to stabilize pJ:tices led to demands fo!' new fa~m­
relief measures and the reorganization of agricultu~e 
in the United States. In his campaign add!'esses, Franklin 
. ' 
D. Roosevelt practically committed himself to the ·gigantic 
task of bringing oJ:tde!' out of the existing chaotic 
agricultuJ:tal conditions. The landslide victory of .the 
new administration gave it a free hand to try out measures 
that distinctly bJ:toke with tradition and expeJ:tience~ On 
May 12, 1933, after consultation with representatives of 
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the various farm organiz&ions the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act of 1933 was signed. This Act approved tpe policy 
.of Congress to u give agricultural commodities a pul?chasing 
power with respect to articles ~armers buy, equivalent 
to the purchasing power of the agricultural commodities 
¥• in the base period 1909-191411 • ' 
The disastrous effects o~ the low prices on 
farm economy and on the ·national economy could not be 
ovel?looked. · Low prices had led to intensive culti vsJ:; ion 
which in turn brought about ~oil erosion and loss of 
soil fertility. Such destl:'uction as this pointed to the 
need fPl:' soil conservation measul:'es. Valuable fol:'eign 
markets were lost, at least temporal?ily, and this prompted 
production control. The existing maladjustment of agri-
culture with industry pointed to the need of some kind 
' of government-~armer partnership if farm recovery was 
to be achieved. Unity of action in the interests of a.ll 
farmers and the country must predominate the agricultural 
pattern. Farmers would simply have to work together if 
they wanted to correct the mistakes of the Federal Farm 
Board's l:'egime. Only united action could bring about 
price stabilization and orderly wheat marketing. ~e 
problem of unsalable surpluses had to be solved. To move 
forward such a goal was facilitated by the authority of 
* 3, P• 37 
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the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act. This Act rep:re-
.-
sented a comp~omise between the demands or politicians 
/ 
and the demands or farm leaders who sought adjustments 
of agriculture to changed conditions. Henry A. Wallace 
became the new Secretary of Agriculture. ~. Wallace 
gave a simple but clear description of the wheat situa-
tion and its effect upon business throughout the wh9le 
world when he said: 
11 The story of wheat extends to the wheat 
milling centers, the Chicago wheat pit, 
the kitchens and the dining rooms of 
our homes, and out over the world. It 
is a dramatic story all the way. In 
the United States, the wheat industry 
is one of the main cogs in our economic 
machine. Go back and :read the sto:r~ of 
the nation-wide depression of '31 and 
'32 and of the recovery that began in 
1933. You will :r.t nd plainly written 
there the story of the fall and :rise of 
wheat prices and wheat income. The 
latest news about the production and 
price of wheat head-lines the market 
pages. It is scanned carefully by 
business men, investors and farmers. 
Today, when American business men are 
wondering about the rutu:re, they are 
asking themselves, 'What about wheat 
in the ye~:rs just ahead?' Wheat is 
the barometer of' business. Wheat is 
the commodity most widely produced 
and consumed. One might say that . 
wheat, more than any other commodity, 
binds the economic system of' our 
world together."?~ 
It was all these reasons that must have induced 
the different government to bring about the one and only 
?,f. 16, pp. 34-35 
intel~national governmen·tal agreement concerning an agri-
cultural. commodity up to this time. 
· The International Wheat Agreement concluded in 
London,· in August 1935, at a con~erence of both wheat~ 
exporting and wheat-importing countries. This agreement 
provided for export quotas, acreage reduction, and the 
promotion of consumption as well a.s.~r measures in an 
effort to support wheat prices. The exporting countries 
adhering to the Agreement included the four major ex-
porters, the Danubian countries and the Soviet Union. 
The four major exporters agreed to limit· their exports 
to a certain quota and to reduce production. An export 
quota was set for the Danubian countries but none was 
reached for the Soviet Union which gave no pledge as 
to its wheat production. Canada ~d Australia jointly 
enacted legislation for the control of exports but none 
to reduce acreage or production. The United States 
had already had machinery for production control in 
the newly adopted wheat adjustment program. Argentina 
alone, of the four major exporters, had high yields in 
1933-1934 and it alone exceeded its export quotas. 
Owing to the inability of the delegates to come to :an 
agreement on Argentina's quota for 1934-1935, the Agree-
ment became inoperative by 1935, having had but little 
influence on the improvement of the wheat trade or the 
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level of prices. The continued decline of world exports 
during the following years was the result of the various 
I' 
wheat policies operating in the individual countries and 
* of abnormal weather conditions. 
From 1933•1936 the principal feature of the 
farm policy in the United States was one of production 
control. To adjust production and supplies of wheat more 
closely to the demand the Secretary of Agriculture 
resorted to a number of effective methods. Among them 
were contra.cts with producers, commodity loans, mar+-ceting 
quotas and marketing agreements, export subsidies, and 
d~rect purchases of price-depressing surpluses. 
If the wrreat farmer decided to adjust his 
acreage and signed a contract to do so, the Secretary 
paid him cash benefits in return. If the grower did not 
want to adjust his production there was no obligation to 
do so. A program such as this warranted cooperation. 
From the funds that were available proper calculations 
had to be made for the fair rate of payment. The con-
tracting producers had to be assured o£ a total return 
at least as great as would have been receive~ had they 
not participated in the curtailment of wheat production. 
Benefit payments, therefore, were to offset any losses 
' 
the farmer would have suffered without these payments. 
* 47, P• 118 
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The bounties were to serve as an inducement to him to 
cooperate in reducing his supply and by so· doing, effect 
a raise in prices. In the case of crop failure"the 
benefit payment acted as a relief measure. Payments were 
financed on the proceeds of a tax levied on processed 
wheat. T.he tax was equal to the dif£erence between the 
1, 
market price and parity. Subsidies were paid on exports 
of white wheat from the Pacific Northwest ports. 
On January 6, 1936, in the Butler case decision, 
the Supreme Court invalidated the processing tax proVisions 
of the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act on the ground that 
the Act controlled agricultural production. It held 
that Congress had no power to enact such a law since 
such power was not delegated to it by the Constitution. 
The power of Congress to levy taxes and appropriate 
money for the general welfare did not include the power 
to tax one group of people, namely the processors of 
wheat, for the benefit o£ another, the farm~s. The 
effect of this decision was to stop all production ad-
justment programs that depended upon contracts with 
p~oducers. The problem arose as· to what could be done 
to help those farmers who had cooperated in attempting 
to carry out the program. To meet the situation Congress 
enacted the Soil Conservation and Domestic Act of 1936. 
* 3, PP• 40-48 
89 
This Act autho~ized an annual app~op~iation of 
$500~000~000. The Gove~nment could thereby make cash 
payments to fa~me~s to offset the expense incu~~ed in 
I 
following soil-conservation p~actices. Farmers were 
willing to work their land so as to min~mize erosioh 
and maintain fertility p~ovided thei~ income did not 
thereby dec~ease. I· 
It is difficult to unde~stand the exact role 
the wheat slump played in the wo~ld economic c~isis of 
1929-1932. It is likewise difficult to tell to what 
extent the jump in the wheat p~ice at the end of l9q6 
·Was ~esponsible for the gene~al ~ise of' prices in other 
ag~icultu~al commodities at that time. Speaking on this 
topic, M. Geo~ge Bonnet~ French Ministe~ of Comme~ce, 
decla~ed in May, 1936, his conviction that "Recovery is 
impossible while the buying power of the f~me~ remains 
so low, since the disposal of manufactured goods depends 
* chiefly on the wealth of the ~ural'·massesrr. The 
fa~me~s in the surplus count~ies justifiably claimed 
that if they must sell thei~ wheat cheaply then they 
must be allowed to buy cheaply. The fa~me~ said that 
his standa~d of living should not be dep~essed below a 
~easonable level. He was unwilling to accept prices of 
J,H6, P• 9 
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indust~ial goods ~aised against him by ta~iffs and othe~ 
means. Nothing was being done to b~ing about a propo~­
tionate adjustment of the p~ices of the wheat he sold. 
The £~me~ ope~ated in this unfavo~able position in most 
-
count~ies in early 1933-1934. Not until 1935 was the 
-dispa~ity between agricultural and industrial p~ices 
reduced. This movement was late~ reversed in 1938 and 
1939. 
Wheat prices shot upwards during 1936 and 1937. 
This price increase was supported by various tactor~, 
nanely, the failure of the 1935-1936 c~op in Argentina 
and four consecutive small crops in the United States 
and Canada, a very mediocre 1935-1936 c~op in Australia, 
two years of substantial ~mpo~ts by the United States, 
the poor crop in Germany, France, Italy and in sout~­
weste~n Europe in general. Tension in international 
political situations tended to pile up reserve stocks 
of wheat by several countries. While Civil W~ ensued 
in Spain, the Italian Gove~nment had a colonial army. to 
feed in Ethiopia. Such a combination of facts brought 
about the satisfactory wheat p~ice of this period wi•thout 
any international arrangements. Strangely enough it 
did not result in increased world ac~eage and production 
of wheat. 
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The combination of drought in 1936 and bu?iness 
recession and bumper crops in 1937 set the stage for the 
1938 Agricultural Adjustment Act. T.his legislation 
aimed at: minimizing violent fluctuations in supplies, 
marketings and prices of wheat, protecting consumers by 
maintaining adequate reserves of food and feed, and 
assisting farmers in obtaining a fair share of the national 
income. Contributions to farm income through the payment 
of parity amounts was authorized. 
Crop insurance for wheat was established and 
this gave the wheat farmers an additional means of pro-
, 
taction. The insurance covered losses from hail, drought, 
flood, wind, winter-killing, lightning, tornado, insects 
and plant diseases. Premiums were paid in advance in 
actual wheat or its cash equivalent. Premium wheat was 
stored by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation and 
included in the nation's reserves. Losses were paid in 
actual wheat or cash. Insured farmers were provided 
with wheat for sale and consumers with wheat for purchase 
in ye~s of crop shortage or failure. T.he amount of the 
insurance premium on each farm was determined by the loss 
records of that farm and the area in which it was located. 
For a coverage of seventy-five per cent of the normal 
crop the ~emium rate ranged ~rom one-half bushel per 
acre in low-risk areas to two-and-one-half bushels in 
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the high-risk areas. The stored premium wheat could not 
be marketed except to be paid out to cover crop losses 
or sold to Jrevent spoilage. T.he reserved wheat could be 
moved to another location but had to be replaced immed-
iately with other wheat. This reserve could not operate 
~~ 
as a threat to depress market prices.~ 
State regulation of the wheat market made 
further progress on the European continent during the 
five-year period 1934-1938. It was most comp~te in 
Germany which introduced minimum prices after the bumper 
crop of 1933. Exports were promoted through a modified 
system of import certificates. With subsequent smaller 
yields in the succeeding three-year period 1934- 1937 1 
Germany protected its consumers through fixed prices and 
margins of profit ~or the farmers. The tremendously 
high tariff was reduced to a lower rate during 1937 
and 1938 without exerting too much pressure on domestic 
prices. Another bumper crop occurred in 1938 and Germany 
produced an increase of 92 million bushels or 81.4 per 
cent more wheat than during the period before the crisis. 
With increased production of wheat in Italy, 
the government permitted an increase in prices. T.he 
compulsory milling quota for domestic wheat was raised 
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to 99 pe~ cent in 1933. By 1935~ wheat impo~ts wer~ 
subjected to licensing. With the reduction o~ the gold 
value of the lira in the autumn of 1936~ a ~ise in 
domestic prices was combated by a gradual reduction in 
wheat-import tariffs. More wheat was imported in 1937 
than in 1931. Heavy purchasing ceased in 1938 because 
of the abundant harvest of 301 million bushels of 
wheat. Huge exports of wheat flour had accumulated and 
awaited purchase by the Italian colonies. 
In France~ the wheat crops like the wheat 
policy had fluctuated greatly. Wheat yields were 
sm~ller than in the previous five-year period. The 
wheat policy was based on the fact that it.was necessary 
to combat a glut in order to maintain or raise prices 
in the inte~~sts of both domestic and colonial wheat 
producers. An abundant c~op in 1934 ef~ected the 
abandonment o~ minimum prices and grinding restrictions. 
An attempt was made to dispose of the surplus wheat by 
paying heavy subsidies ~or its use as feed and for 
export. These subsidies were ~inanced tbrQugh mill:trng 
taxes. By the summer of 1935~ prices almost ~ell td 
the level o~ an unprotected market and were finally 
~escued by the increased use o~ wheat ~or ~eed. With 
the new Popular Front Government gaining pow~ in 1936, 
a Wheat Office vas erected an au thol"ized to fix prices. 
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This agency was to dete~mine prices~ deliveries, stocks, 
imports and exports and to issue ro~eign trade ce~tificates. 
Prices were ~aised in 1937 and 1938 to include taxes 
necessa~y to finance the wheat policy. With the depre-
ciation of the franc in 1937 the fa~mers' income d~opped 
conside~ably. In the 1937-1938 period wheat prices: 
were lower than in Ge~man y o~ I tel y but highElr' than 
prices in the United Kingdom. In 1938-1939 an-expo~t 
surplus f~om a bumper crop was again subsidized. 
Thus in Germany~ Italy sn d France the whe~t 
economy was thoroughly state controlled. In all three 
countries the wheat crops in 1934-1938 ave~aged'consider­
ably larger than in the 1924-1928 period and net imports 
had become very small. In fact, wheat imports almost 
ceased in Czechoslovakia, Portugal and Sweden and were 
greatly reduced in Austria and Finland. Belgium became 
the greatest wbeat importer on the continent of Europe. 
The deficit in Europe, excluding the U.S.S.R., 
' ' . had dropped from 354 million bushels to 261 million bushels 
and finally down to 124 million bushels. This Eu~opean 
deficit was even smalle~ than that of the British Isles, 
where in 1934-1938 it amounted to ap. average of 216" 
million bushels. Expo~ts from the continent increased 
and to a small extent there were occasional surpluses 
in the importing countries, especially France. Danubian 
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wheat was favored by clearing agreements with countries, 
especially Germany, and found its way into export 
'l< 
channels. 
Imports into eastern Asia decreased. Japan 
imported only one-half as much in the 1934-1938 period 
as in 1924-1928. By 1938, Japanese imports almost 
ceased. China's wheat imports suffered violently from 
fluctuations during the years of price collapse. Chinese 
imports dropped from 74 million bushels in 1933 to 7 
I 
million in 1937. In the Near East, Egypt had become 
self-suf~icient in wheat. A few countries took more 
wheat than before. Among these were the Netherlands 
Indies, the Philippines, British Malaya, Peru and Brazil. 
By 1938, Brazil ranked third among t~e importing countries 
following the United Kingdom and the Belgo-Luxemburg 
Customs Union • ..z~ 
The ~our great surplus countries would have 
~ound the shrinkage of export outlets difficult to bear 
if their own production had not declined. Stocks in the 
four countries were at a record low in July, 1937 and 
reached almost a record high in 1939. However, in ~937, 
the combined wheat output of the four countries increased 
~rom 1,208 million bushels, on the average, for the 1934-
1938 period to 1,451 million bushels in 1937. This 
* 90, PP• 56-60 
96 
increase was due to an abundant crop in the United 
States where stocks had already begun to accumulate. 
I' 
This ~igure reached 1,826 million bushels in 1938 as a 
I 
result o~ bumper crops in Argentina and the United 
States. Canada, at the same time, had produced the 
largest c~op since 1932. 
Disposal o~ the surplus had again become a 
problem o~ great concern •. In the United States. wheat 
I 
loans were combined with export subsidies on wheat and 
I 
flour. The Federal Surplus Commodities Corpor~tion 1 sold 
wheat abroad at less than cost. Canada and Argentina 
promoted wheat exports and reestablished minimum prices 
to producers. Despite the huge increa~e these combined 
exports remained far below the pre-depression level. 
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6. Conclusions 
Wo~ld W~ I p~oduced t~emendous dislocations 
and inc~eased uneconomical p~oduction. Technical facto~s 
added to the p~oblem. To prevent either huge capita~ 
losses or increased unemployment, wheat p~oducers main-
tained their new wheat areas by means of artificial'state 
aids. These aids varied according to the significance 
. 
of wheat growing in the economy of the respective nations 
affected. Economic nationalism became excessive and 
su~pluses mounted on the North American continent. With 
the gradual s~inkB:ge. of world markets and world pr~ces, 
drastic readjustments became necessary. 
Twenty-five years of mounting c~isis between 
World War I and the eve of Wo~ld War II created competi-
tion for the wheat fa.:rmers. Step by step the c.:risis 
developed until it became expedient fo~ the government 
to step in and to give the farmers the necessary support. 
The major factors which contributed to this problem of 
competition we~e the incentives .fo~ inc~ease'd production 
in the expo~ting count.:ries and the protectionist stand 
taken by so many of the impo~ting countries, notably, 
Germany, France and Italy. 
The panacea for the ills of the wheat industry 
began to take form in proposals for world agreements to plan 
wheat production with agreed allocations for each producer. 
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CHaPTER IV 
PRINCIP-AL PROIXJCING AREAS AND THEIR CONTROL SCHElV~S 
A. Evolution of the United States Wheat Program 
1 •.. The Lever Act - Legal Framework for Control. 
In the United States, prior to the crop of 1917 
~ ~~-~ 
and before our declaration of war, there was serio.J,l,s.z. ~/_~ ... 
~~~~""­
discontent because of the increased cost of ~v:ing·. =. Thii'~ .=:,-.r~.._ ~ ~ ~ 
':"$;o ·" :;:- ~ 
food situation was fast getting out of cont.:ifoi an~tflere ~ 
.:.tl~~ ~ ..:. f -?~ ~ ,- ~ 
was immediate and imperative need for some J.:-jl1t_erve~t~9n. !_ 
:;9 .. 't.~ ~ 3.. .:~~~ 
:i ~-..... ~··-- ~ ~,.;; ~ 
The general public felt that the high prices ~w?~~~~~~~ 
t...~"' ~ 
......_ -t 4 ~ 
result of deliberate extortion and speculation preCipitated 
by the uncontrolled heavy Wheat purchases of every parcel 
of cash wheat or flour which the Allied and Neutr~l 
countries could secure. Such buying before the war 
naturally decreased the supply of wheat and hastened the 
advance in prices. The war did not so much open ~p a new 
type of market for American wheat abroad as it did accent~ 
uate an already existing market. It wa·s necessary for the 
government to step in and thwart any furtbe r disturbances 
in order to relieve the burden being carried by domestic 
consumers. 
!~ter our entrance into the war, we were duty 
bound to share our supplies with the other Allied nations 
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because we were all working for a common cause. In 
1917-1918, the guarantee of adequate food supplies was one 
of our more important contributions to winning the war. 
The slogan, ttFood will win the wa.rtt, was aptly phrased. 
It was the supply of American food to the Allied nations in 
1918 which carried them through those long dark day~ of 
battle. The chief instrument leading up to the final 
' 
collapse of the German Empire was the shortage of fqod 
supplies. 
In the words of Mr. Hoover, the situation is 
lucidly explained: 
11By our entry into the war we arrived at two 
issues: First, the issue we must have con-
fronted in any event, the control of our f'iood 
so as to ameliorate prices, for unless we :can 
do so, we must meet a rise in wages with a'll 
its vicious circle of social disruption a~ a 
time when maximum efficiency is vital to o~ 
safety; Second, that we may also meet the 
increased demands of our Allies that they may 
nAr. remain constant in the war. •• 
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Shortly after our declaration of war the President 
asked Herbert Hoover, who had achieved distinction bW his 
organization and administration of the Commission tor 
Relief in Belgium, to return to the United States. His 
experience and expert knowledge in handling war-time food 
problems was sorely needed. He arrived home early in 
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May 1 1917 and set about drafting legislation to provide 
for the control of the production, distribution and con-
sumption of food in our own country. Hoover's concept 
of national food control was to meet the problem of food 
shortage by encouraging and increasing production through 
direct assistance to the farmer. The farmer's interest 
was to be further protected by means of the servibe func-
tions of a food administration. He recommended the elimi-
nation of wasteful food practices and unnecessary consump-
tion.! Wherever possible substitute foods would be used. 
In his plan the .consumer1 too, was to be protected through 
the regulation of the various channels of distribution, 
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and the enfcrcement of the principle of reasonable profits. 
He believed that by means of direct Governmental action 
Wheat prices could be stabilized and speculation eliminated. 
In the effort to support the market it would be necessary 
for the Food Administration to keep an eye on the American 
consumer whose reactions to price increases could effect 
strong political repercussions. 
The House Committee on Agriculture was concurrently 
considering'legislation on food control early in April. 
' 
" After very careful consideration on June 11, 1917, a bill 
was introduced o~ the Committee Chairman, the Hondrable 
A. F. Lever, and passed by that branch of Congress on 
June 23~ 1917. In the Senate thi~ bill met with great 
opposition because of. the "revolutionary character of the 
measure in relation to its injection of the Government 
into the possible control of business· and the broad powers 
granted to the President."* Finally, after prolonged 
debates~ the Senate passed the bill on July 21~ 1917, with 
amendments and the bill was approved by the President on 
August 10, ~917, and thus became a law~ more commonly 
known as the Food Control Act. On this very same day the 
President issued an Executive Order creating the United 
States Food Administration and appointing Herbert Hoover, 
United States Food Administrator. 
The principal provisions of the Lever Act as it 
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pertained to wheat were aimed at: eliminating speculation~ 
maintaining adequate supplies of wheat for ourselves and 
the ~llies, guaranteeing the price of wheat, and establish~ 
ing a fair price that would ensu~e producers a re~sonable 
profit. However, neither leg~ation nor presidential 
price fixing could control the.weather and the total harvest 
for the year 1917 was almost the same as that for 1916-
some 650 1 828,000 bushels. It was quite evident that the 
price fixing had come a little too late for all farmers 
to receive the high return which the President had. set 
for them. With such a low yield our exports were 1 held 
down to 138,000,000 bushels, the greater part of which 
was made possible by drastic economies at home. With an 
improvement of crop conditions in 1918, the President 
used the authority granted him by the Lever Act to raise 
the minimum price to $2.26 per bushel. The harvest re-
sulted in an unusually high figure, some. 921,000,000 
bushels. Of this crop, 287,000,000 bushels was shipped 
overseas.* 
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Despite the Armistice of November 11, 1918, the 
European demand for American wt.eat continued on through 
1919 and the government continued its price guarantee to 
the farmers. Over 967,000,000 bushels were harvested and 
more than 220,000,000 bushels were exported. Strangely 
enough the farmer assumed that the wartime wheat boom 
would continue indefinitely and made little effort to 
curtail production either by abandoning marginal land or 
by shifting to other crops. Thus the Wheat yield of 1920 
was 833,000,000 bushels. But the wartime market and the 
European demand Which sustained such yields continued no 
longer. "at midnight on May 31, 1920, the government 
guarantee on the price of wheat was re~oved, the wheat 
~ 
price dropped precipitately, thus laying among wheat 
farmers firm foundations for an era of discontent. tl~~ 
2. The Grain Corporation, 1917-1920 
One of the first subordinate organizations of 
the Food Administration was the Grain Corporation estab-
lished for the purchase of wheat, flour and other supplies 
for the Allies and for the United States Government. 
As early as July 10, 1917, Herbert Hoover sent 
a letter to President Wilson in which he briefly reviewed 
the statistical position of wheat and pointed out l'that 
while the consumer had been paying exorbitant prices for 
flour, an insignificant portion of the price was reflected 
in the farmer's net income. He felt that the increase in 
margin between the producer and consumer was due not only 
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to speculation but also to the margin of profit demanded 
by all distributors of wheat in order to protect themselves 
from the dangers of price fluctuations.~~ Mr. Hoover pre-
dieted the inherent danger of the power invested in the 
Allied Wheat Executive as the sole buyer of Wh~at for 
export. The problem of the shortage of tonnage demanded 
a spread-out in export wheat distributed throughout the 
year. This being the case he felt the need for more 
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protection for the farmer~ saying: 
nThe net resuit of this situation is 1 that 
unless some strong and efficient Government 
action is immediately settled and brought 
into play1 the American producer will face 
a slump in wheat, and in any event 1 the 
price of export wheat will be dictated by 
a single agency and the American consumer 
will be faced with a large part of the 
essential breadstuff having passed into" 
the hands of speculators, for someone must 
buy and hold not only this normal flow 
from the farmer but this probable glut as 
well."* 
Herbert Hoover suggested a plan for government 
control of wheat which provided for the creation of a. 
special governmental agency. This agency was to purchase 
at a definite price all the wheat offered it. Protection. 
would thus be afforded to both the farmer and the consumer 
and the Allies would be provided with such surplus as could 
be accumulated. The President approved this plan and be-
lieved it to be the panacea for world wheat maladfes. 
It was further decided that this agency should be organized 
as a private corporation. The capital stock of $50~000 1 000 
would be owned by the Government and pa~d for ou't pf the 
appropriation granted it under the Food Control Bi·;:Ll. In 
so doing 1 the Government agency carried on active trading 
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operations by working through the well established marketing 
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machinery of our country. 
Section 2 of the Food Control Act authorized 
the President \trto create and use any agencytt. • • • while 
Section 11 authorized him n from time to time to purchase, 
. to store, to provide storage facilities for, and to sell 
for cash at reasonable prices, wheat, flour •••• n Thus, 
by an Executive Order on August 14, 1917, President Wilson 
created the Grain Corporation as an agency of t~e Govern-
ment for the purpose of buying, selling and storing these 
I 
wheat products. The corporation was incorporated 1 under 
the laws of the State of Delaware to endure for five years. 
The capital stock was held for the use and benefit of the 
United States. Four of the seven members of the Board 
of Directors named were: Herbert Hoover, Julius H. Barnes, 
Gates W. McGarrah and Fraru{ G. Crowell. Each of the 
officers had toswear that he had completely divorced 
himself ,from the grain trade and had no pecuniary ''interest 
in the trade whatsoever. The officers ~erved without pay 
and in a purely voluntary capacity. 
The United States was divided into fourteen 
grain zones. ·Each zone contained one important terminal 
and seaboard market to which either wheat was shipped or 
on which the Wheat price was based. In each of these zones 
the Grain Corporation established a buying agency, , . 
maintained by a second Vice-president of the Grain 
Corporation, who was the governmental purchasing agent 
at that termin~l. He stood ready at any time to buy all 
the wheat offered for sale at the established price 
announced for that market. It was decided that govern-
mental ,purchases would take place only in the terminal 
markets with a control of the stocks that were carried 
in the country elevators. By limiting the amount of 
Wheat which any concern could carry to thirty days' 
supply and by making voluntary agreements and securing 
the grain and milling trade, it was believed that a fair 
reflection of the terminal prices could be secured at 
every buying point. The country elevators were left in 
tact and allowed to act as usual. The commission firms 
which largely financed the operatio~s of the country 
elevators were protected by the refusal of the Grain 
Corporation agencies to receive direct shipments except 
by making a charge for the extra labor and care involved. 
This allowed the commission houses to perform thefr 
usual functions. The country elevators were assured of 
reasonable handling charges and were al~owed a fair 
recompense for storage, insurance·and interest if the 
governmental agency instructed them to retain all ·or 
a portion of their accumulated stock. The terminal 
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elevators were allowed to operate as usua~ except that they 
were~prohibited from mixing government wheat with the 
object of improving the grade and making a profit therefrom. 
Elevator and warehousemen were required to make reports 
of their operations revealing the stocks on hand to the 
governmental purchasing agent in whose zone they were 
located. The direction of all shipments from elevator 
operators who had ertared into these voluntary agreements 
and all supplies of wheat to mills were directed by the 
zone agent. Purchases of flour and all wheat export sales 
were handled from the general office at 42 Broadway, 
New York City. No longer were private shippers and re-
ceivers permitted to handle wheat. By turning these 
functions over to t he government the grain and elevator 
trade sacrificed its business as a contribution iri the 
public interest. 
This hearty cooperation achieved great success 
and at a meeting of over one hundr·ed representatives of 
the grain and elevator trade at Washington on August 15, 1917, 
the following resolution was unanimously adopt eru 
t~ealizing that the operation of Government 
control of wheat • • • is essential under present 
war influences in order to adequately pr.otect 
our home supply and furnish our ~lies with 
the aid we owe, and realizing what the 
establishment of an efficient government plan 
of operation means to all of us curtailment 
of our business and to some of us actual 
retirement from active business during such 
period,,- we do express our pride in the 
character of service tendered by the grain 
trade in the sacrifice by these men of 
ability who are placing their experience 
and energy at the service of our Government 
and that we approve the general plan of 
operation • • • as being sound 1 workable 
and necessary 1 and in its general lines it 
appears to us as being the most efficient 
and just plan of operation which we can 
. ,.~~ conce~ve. •• 
Through a press release from the Food Adminis~ 
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tration on August 22~ 1917 the general outline of the plan 
of control of wheat~ flour and bread was announced. In 
this statement it was pointed out that the guaranteed 
minimum price of $2.00 per bushel in the princ.ipal interior 
terminal markets for the 1918 crop as stated in the Food 
Control Act did·not apply to the 1917 crop then b~ing 
harvested. It explained ·this action by stating that: 
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"The result of this situation is that the 
normal price-making machinery is entirely 
broken down unless some efficient Government 
action is brought into plan. Either (a) the 
American producer may face a slump in wheat, 
possibly ~elow his production cost, and (b) 
the export price of wheat which ultimately 
determines the real price, is at the will of 
a single agency, (c) someone must·buy the 
surplus wheat at any given moment and if the 
surplus passes into speculative hands it will · 
be held for higher prices later in the year. 
(d) Without stabilized prices, extra hazards 
are introduced into all distribution links 
Which must be paid for by the consumer. It 
must be evident that the United States .Govern-
ment can more justly deal with the s~ tu,~tion 
than any of the agencies mentioned.tt"'• 
Stabilization of the price of wbeat by the 
Government meant a great deal to the farmer. At this 
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time~ August~ 1~17~ there was one of the largest surpluses 
of wheat which the world had ever carried from one crop 
to the next. These surpluses were located chiefly in 
Russia~ Australia, and India. All of these countries were 
inaccessible to the Allies. However~ should there have 
been a change in war or transportation conditions this 
surplus would have bee~ thrown on the market and the 
stabilized price would have very great and material mean-
ing to the ~erican wheat farmer. The first thing needed 
was a definite buying price which the Grain Corporation 
would pay. This price was detezmined by the 11Fair Price0 
committee at $2.20 per bushel for the 1917 crop. I' 
This guarantee by the United States Government 
was a very real and attractive insurance. In return for 
this guarantee the Grain Corporation secured the right to 
direct the retention in the elevator of any or all of the 
vheat stocks and the permit to direct the shipment and 
delivery of such wheat. The Corporation agreed to' pay 
storage, insurance and interest on the Wheat at the rate 
of one-fifteenth cent per bushel per day. The ~le¥ator 
operator was expected to reserve any empty storage space 
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for the use of the Grain Corporation whenever requested •. 
Naturally, such an agreement was attractive to the elevator 
proprietors. Within the first month of this agreement, or 
at the end of the 1917 crop year, more than 15,500 elevators 
and warehouses were under agreement with the Grain Corpora-
tion. 
By this agreement the Grain Corporation also 
gained some advantages. It gained control of contracted 
Wheat stocks waiting for access to the terminals and this 
prevented the draining of country supplies which was 
· needed by local mills. This agreement with the country 
and terminal elevators gave force to rigid control over 
the distribution of the 1917 crop. Such voluntary 
cooperation with the trades was made easier by reason 
of the fact that the Food Administration had each 10f these 
elevators and mills, as well as others, under its license 
and had the powerto enforce such regulations as it, saw 
fit. 
All transactions of the corporation were on a 
cash basis. Certain banks in each terminal city were 
I 
selected and corporation funds deposited with them to 
the credit of the purchasing agent to carry on current 
business. Every purchase of wheat by the zone officer 
was paid for at the time the warehouse receipts were 
turned over. A sight draft with bill of lading attached 
was drawn for every sale of wheat whether made to a 
mill, to another zone agent or to the New York oftice 
for export •. Through such a method, each agency kept 
its funds liquid, except for the stocks it accumulated, 
and rendered the methods of accounting much simpler than 
would otherwise have been the case. Each agency purchased 
the wheat in the terminal at the fair price specified for 
that market and for that particular class and grade 
of wheat. It stood ready to purchase at all times ~11 
wheat properly evidenced by warehouse receipts. 
The commission men in the terminal markets 
performed the functions of placing the grain in storage, 
having it graded and securing the proper warehouse re-
ceipts. Whenever the Grain Corporation performed these 
functions there was an additional one per cent charge for 
the services rendered. 
By the Spring of 1918, the food situation of 
the Allies was in serious straits and it was advisable 
to offer inducements to stimulate greater production of 
Spring Wheat. On February 21, 1918, the President issued 
a proclamation price of $2.20 which amounted to an in-
crease of from eight to ten per cent for No. 1 Spring 
Wheat and equivalent grades at Chicago with differentials 
for other grades and other markets over the price guaran-
teed by Congress. The total acreage for the 1918 harvest 
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amounted to 65, 177,000 acres, the largest ever recorded 
up to that time for the United States and twenty-eight 
per cent larger than the pre-war average planted acreage. 
The harvest totaled 921,438,000 bushels of wheat, the 
second largest ever harvested up to'that time. 
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Another basic element in the control o~ the 1917 
wheat price was the voluntary agreement between the Grain 
Corporation and individual millers by which they agreed to 
. 
maintain their buying at the fair price level in r,eturn 
for certain protection and services •. This milling control 
was not too desirable because with the more abundm t 
harvest it was not necessary to maintain Euch vigilant 
scrutiny of supplies. The agreement with the millers 
terminated on June 30, 1918. The Grain Corporation was re-
leased from the agreement to supply mills 'nth a quota of 
grain. Less exercise of control of Wheat stocks which 
had not reached the terminals was nece~sary. The grain 
trade was then more abie to operate on such margins more 
easily as they could secure and pay such prices for wheat 
as they saw fit. Still they had to compete with the 
Grain Corporation as a constant buyer and seller. More 
elements of competition in the milling industry were made 
possible. The range within which wheat·prices could 
fluctuate was definitely limited. The Grain Corpo~ation 
had absolute control of the export outlet and sales 
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of wheat. 
The whole food situation changed once more when 
the Armistice was signed on November 11, 1918. World trade 
began to shift back to normal when active warfare was ter-
minated. This was dangerous because the large reserves of 
wheat in ~ustralia and Argentina would come on the world 
market and we would face a serious loss in maintaining 
·our price guarantee. There was no further need for strict 
food conservation measures. The Food Administration, on 
November 1·2, 1918, repealed all rules and regulations re-
quiring the wheat trade or consumers to purchase substi-
tute flours or meals along with purchases of wheat flour. 
All rules regarding minimum flour extraction, the :pro-
duction of mixed or victory flour were repealed and storage 
rules for mills and elevators were extended to cover a 
penod of ninety days instead of thirty days. 
Immediately after the Armistice there wa>s much 
agitation throughout the country to relax all regulations. 
I 
Such demobilization was dangerous. The public needed some 
protection from possible profiteering. License rules and 
regulations were gradually repealed. The Government was 
faced with the problem of maintaining its guaranteed 
price until May 31, 1920. Relaxation of all regulations 
rendered price maintenance impossible. For example, 
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it would be impossible to permit the reopening of' future 
trading in wheat on the boards of trade and the consequent 
speculation, as long as the guarantee was in existence. 
Some regulation of the activity of elevators and even of 
mills and the control of imports and exports had to be 
t . * con ~nued. 
On December 19, 1918, by proclamation the 
President repealed most of the license rules and ~egula­
tions affecting flour mills. The ninety-day grai~ storage 
rules were not enftrely repealed until February 1, 1919. 
The domestic demand for wheat increased as a result of 
this decontrol of the milling indus try and this rerlease 
of consumers·from war~time restrictions. People were 
tired of corn bread and inferior flours and a heav,y demand 
for better grades of wheat. 
Wheat marketing in the Fall of 1918 was very 
heavy. This enormous movement of wheat in the early 
months of the crop year would have driven the price 
far below the guaranteed figure had it not been £or the 
stabilizing effect of the Grain Corporation. Such heavy 
marketing of wheat at this time resulted in a severe 
strain on the resources of the Corporation. The Grain 
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Corporation was granted an incr~ase in capital stock 
to $150,000,000 by the President on June 21, 1918~ 
Even this was not sufficient to finance the purchase 
of wheat and flour which the Corporation f·ound it 
necessary to buy. ~t the minimum price, this money 
would only purchase some 70 million buShels of wheat 
while at one time in October, 1918, the Grain Corpora-
tion found it necessary to have on hand approximately 
200 million bushels or its equivalent in flour. In 
order to finance these heavy stocks, the Corporation 
resorted to private borrowing from banks and elsewhere 
to the total of 385 million dollars or more than twice 
J.!. its total capital." 
By proclamation the President made the guaran-
teed price of the 1919 crop $2.26 for No. 1 Northe,rn Wheat 
at Chicago with definite differentials for other grades 
and other markets for wheat harvested in 1919 and marketed 
before June 1, 1920. The great fear that the wheat stocks 
of the southern hemisphere would be thrown on the market 
when shipping was released and a consequent drop in the 
world price of wheat below our guaranteed level was 
apparent. 
The experience of two harvests marketed under 
* 44, p.124 
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the Government guarantee, with exceptionally profitable 
returns to the farmers, resulted in a greatly increased 
acreage for the l919 crop. In the Spring of 1919 ,, the 
prospects were for a record harvest. As late as June, 1919 
the estimated yield of the new crop was 1 1 236,000 'bushels, 
but unfavorable weather in the latter part of the season~ 
especially in the spring Wheat region reduced the crop 
to 968,000 1 000 bushels. Nevertheless this proved 'to be 
the second largest crop ever harvested in the United 
States up to that time.* 
The Wheat Guarantee Act of March 4, 1919·, 
provided authority for placing practically the Whole of 
the wheat and flour trade under license to be secured 
from the Wheat Director. Julius H. Barnes was sp pointed 
to the position of tne United States Wheat Director. 
The President conferred upon him the necessary powers to 
carry out the 1919 wheat price guarantee. This Act 
carried with it an appropriation of one billion dollars. 
All records and files i'rom the United States Food 
Administrator were transferred to the new Whe~t Director 
after June 1, 1919. The Food Administration Grain Cor-
poration ceased to operate and a new corporation, the 
United States Grain Corporation was for.med. Both the 
*44, p.l49 
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Food Control Act and the Vflleat Guarantee Act provided 
authority ror the President to enter into voluntary 
agreements in order to accomp~ish the objectives of 
these acts. 
The Viheat Guarantee Act provided: "After 
cTune 1, 1920, neither the President nor any agenc1y act-
ing for him shall purchase or contract for the purchase 
of wheat or fJ.our.tt On that date, it was necessary to 
relinquish all control and to return the wheat m~rket 
to commercial channels. No commodity in this country 
had ever been subjected to such stringent and pro-
longed control by the Government. Grain Corporation 
official gave much attention to the serious problem 
of how to return this trade to its nor.mal channels with-
out causing grave and chaotic conditions. 
On May 7, 1920, the Wheat Director call~d a 
meeting in Chicago of the grain and milling trades to 
discuss the measures which should be taken for the re-
sumption of future-trading in wheat which had been sus-
pended since August 25, 1917. It was finally dec'ided 
that future-trading might safely be resumed on cTuly 15, 
1920, based on December as the month for·delive~. 
It· was believed that with the heavy voltime of gra:'in which 
would be moved after the harvest there would be little 
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danger of extreme fluctuation or manipulation of lthe 
market. 
The Grain Corporation ceased buying eitner 
wheat or flour at midnight on May 31, 1920. At ~hat 
time it had on hand 7,197,133 bushels of wheat and 
3,188,925 barrels of flour. It had to dispose of 
this quantity during the succeeding months. Practi-
cally all of these wheat supplies were sold for export. 
The last of the Corporation grain was sold i~ September, 
1920 and the final lot of flour was disposed of in 
January, 1921. These transactions close4 one of the 
j 
largest operations in any commodity ever conducted 
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under a single head. Since its existence on September, 
19~7, the Corporation pu:qchased 492,000,000 bushe'ls of wheat 
and 57,000,000 barrels of flour, equivalent to a total 
of approximately 751,000,000 bushels of wheat out of the 
three crops. T:b.e total value of all wheat produc~·ts 
purchased by the Corporation during those three years 
amounted to some $3,735,000,000.'~" 
The Grain Corporation succeeded in accomplish-
ing the purpose for which it had been created. I·t carried 
out its functions in a th~rougnly business-like ~ay. 
When the operations were closed, it returned to tbe 
Government not only the entire capital furnished to it 
~t-44, pp.l67-168 
by the Treasury but also interest on that capital while 
in the hands of the Corporation plus a small additional 
profit. The Corporation books were at all times audited 
by a recognized firm of chartered accountants and fully 
certified reports on the operations were made to Congress 
at regular intervals. Throughout its vast operations 
there was never a suggestion of graft or misapplication 
of funds nor had there been any since the close of its 
operations. 
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3., The Agricultural Marketing Act of' 1929 
In June~ 1929~ the ~~ricultural Marketing Act 
was passed, which provided for the establishment of' the 
Federal Farm Relief Board with an appropriated fun~ of 
500 million dollars. This Act made it the declared,, 
policy of Congress ttto protect, control and stabilize 
the currents of inter-state and foreign commerce in 
the marketing of agricultural comm.oditiesn. The Federal 
Farm Board was authorized to accomplish this objective by 
preventing and controlling surpluses in WheatP especially~ 
through an orderly system of production and distribution. 
By maintaining advantageous domestic markets, it was 
hoped that surpluses would be prevented and consequent 
f'luctu~tions or depressions in the price of Wheat would 
be arrested. The Board did everything within its ppwer 
to encourage ·cooperative marketing associations, and to 
improve their efficiency. 
United States wheat exports in 1930 were the 
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lowest since the end of World War I. The Farmers' National 
Grain Corporation continued to support the domestic market 
by purchasing as much wheat as possible but this device 
soon proved insufficient. The Farm Board recognized the 
Grain Stabilization Corporation as the official purchaser 
of wheat supplies upon the recommendation of the Wheat 
Advisory Committee. This corporation was organized for 
the express purpose of attempting to stabilize prices and 
to prevent wheat surpluses. ~e Stabilization Corporation 
supported the market by buying all the available cash Wheat 
and May futures at market prices. This operation checked 
the severe break in Wheat prices for only a short while. 
Not until April, when world prices began to advance, was 
the Stabilization Corporation able to reduce its hoidings. 
It achieved this reduction through export channels. Within 
a few months the net returns on the sales decreased Farm 
Board obligations by approximately one~fourth. 
Prices again declined when the new crop was 
placed on the market in June and the,Corporation discon~ 
tinued the sale of Wheat except to a few needy millers. 
At this time in June, 1930, it had in storage over q5 
million bushels of cash wheat and futures contracts. The 
Corporation's net holdings during 1930-31 were reduced 
II 
only slightly. During the operation of this program the 
farmers took advarlage of payments received for holding 
wheat from the market. Instead of curtailing consequent 
production they were encouraged to produce more Wheat and 
further augmented the surplus problem. 
The business crisis of 1929•1932 and the 
important bank failures at this pima intensified the plight 
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of the farmer. Wheat which had been pledged against loans 
,, 
from banks and other lending agencies was forced on the 
market. Cooperative associations holding wheat were faced 
with ~a~~ruptcy. An acute emergency existed Which the Farm 
Board believed could be met only by heavy stabilization 
purchases. Wheat buying during November failed to hold 
the market. as a result, the Stabilization Corporation 
was authorized by the Board to acquire as much wheat as 
was necessary to prevent further declines in the price of 
the 1931 crop. These stabilization purchases continued 
until April of 1931, when domestic ·prices of vheat were 
within a narrow range of two to three cents a bushe~ as 
compared with Liverpool prices which had dropped about 
fifteen cents per bushel. This situation made our prices 
in the domestic wheat market higher than those in comparable 
foreign markets. Exports of both wheat and flour virtually 
,j 
ceased. I Since the price of wheat during 1931 was pegged, 
huge stocks of wheat accumulated. To relieve some bf the 
congestion Congress in March, 1931, directed the Farm 
Board to release about 40 million bushels of the stabili~ 
I 
zation wheat to the American Red Gross for charitable uses. 
Again in July, another donation of 35 million bushels of 
wheat was made available to the American Red Cross. The 
,, 
bottom fell out of the American wheat market when prices 
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declined and reached the lowest figure in history -
21.8 cents a buShel. The Federal Farm Board dissolved 
May 26, 1933 and was supplemented by the Triple A wheat 
.;J. program .. "' 
4. Wheat and the !~ricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 
The wheat situation in the early mon~hs of the 
,, 
new change of Administration was responsible in large 
measure for many of the features of the Farm Act of 1933, 
first passed on May 12, 1933. The Agricultural Adjustment 
Act was contained in the first section of this new piece 
of legislation and was a gigantic attempt to cure the 
wheat maladies of the time. This act was formulated vdth 
the idea of subjecting wheat, an international commodity, 
to both price and quantity controls. The Act made further 
attempts to adjust the wheat program by a series o~ benefit 
payments to the wheat farmers to induce a curtailment of 
Wheat production. An attempt was made to secure interna-
tional cooperation in solving the world wheat problem and 
to stimulate exports by means of the authorization of a 
huge subsidies program. ·A Surplus Relief Corporation was 
established to buy surplus Wheat supplie.s. 
The Commodity Credit Corporation was organized 
in 1933 under the Triple A program and made commodity loans 
*18, pp.90-l03 
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and purchases which totaled three billion dollars by 
1939. In making the loans to the wheat farmers, the CCC 
used essentially the same procedure as its ill-fated prede-
cessor, the Federal Far.m Board. One marked signifi?ant 
difference was that the Far.m Board started its loan~ opera~ 
tions as prices were being pulled down by the great depres~ 
sion. The CCC had the strong current of rising prices in 
its favor. The ~~ resisted pressure for stabilization 
operations in wheat as much as posible. Crop shortages 
which followed the severe droughts of 1934-36 aide~ the 
Corporation. 
The steps taken ~y the Corporation were the 
purchase of a limited quarlity of wheat and wheat futures 
to support the major wheat markets in October to January, 
1934, at the e.xpense of the Federal Emergency Relief 
Administrator and the subsidizing of a limited quantity 
of exports from the Pacific Northwest with AAA funds.· 
The crop-control features of the AAA·were safeguards to 
ceo operations and held production in check when reserve 
stocks became too large. In spite of these advantages, 
the COO had accumulated excessively large wheat s~ocks 
(519 million buShels) as loan collateral and was in a 
critical position at the time World War II started .in 1939. 
The major objective of the Triple A was to 
restore the farmer's buying power by establishing prices 
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at the pre-war level. Under the wheat program of the Triple 
A, American Wheat agriculture was definitelyheaded toward 
a new type of nationalism. Since we were geared to world 
markets, a tremendous problem faced the farmers when they 
had to curtail wheat production to meet domestic needs. 
Speaking before a grain dealers' national meeting in 
Chicago, in November, 19~3, Secretary of Agriculture Henry 
A. Wallace used these significant words: 
l1For the time being our people are profoundly 
nationalistic, and as long as they are 
.operating on that basis we should go at it 
whole-heartedly to put our internal economy 
on a nationalistic basis. • • • We are, .for 
a time being, through the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration helping to build 
a bridge toward a nationalistic economy 
tHl-
• . . . . 
The Act g~ve extraordinar.f powers to the 
Secretary of Agriculture. Price control was exercised 
through bounties paid to wheat farmers for the curtailment 
or reduction of acreage. The money paid to the farmers 
for cooperating with the program was secured from a. pro• 
cessing tax levied upon wheat when it was milled in~o 
flour for consumption purposes and was applicable only to 
that flour used for domestic consumption. It was the 
processing tax which finally led to the decision of the 
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Supreme Court in 1936 that the Agricultural Adjustment 
of 1933 was unconstitutional. Congress did not have the 
power to tax one group at the benefit of another. 
" A device used by the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration to cope with the depression was that of 
wheat acreage allotments. Under this system acreage limits 
were established for each farm growing wheat. Certain 
benefits were offered as incentives to arouse the cooper-
ation and interest of the wheat farmer. 'Necessary adjust-
ments of the wheat crop were made. From time to time the 
~ checked on those farmers who actually participated in 
the program and made payments for their assistance. 
The purpose of these assignments were threefold: 
first, to curtail production and consequently raise wheat 
I 
prices, second, to reduce the misuse of the soil and third, 
as a basis for making governmental payments to farmers for 
cooperating with the program in the 1933-1935 period. 
In order to administer such a program each wheat-
grower who volunteered to participate in the plan was 
assigned an allotment expressed in bushels of acreage to 
be sown in wheat. The total allotment f'or each of the 
wheat-growing areas was broken into state and county 
allotments. This figure was based on the average wheat 
production during the 1928-1932 crop years. It represented 
fifty-four per cent of the wheat produced which was, 
127 
domestically consumed as human food. The allotment was 
tied to the land and not to the individual wheat farmer. 
The agreement for the control of wheat acreage was bindQ 
ing on the land for the period of the contract regard-
less of ownership or operation. 
The wheat farmers who signed the voluntary 
acreage reduction contracts pledged a 15 per cent reduction 
• 
of the estimated 1934-1935 crop. For this future promise 
they were paid thirteen dollars for each acre of abandoned 
land. No. other cash crop was to be grown on the vacant 
land. The horizontal reduction of wheat acreage was set 
at a maximum of ten million acres. The bonus paid to the 
farmers was not to exceed $1301 000 1 000. This was met by 
a sales tax on bread which was initiated as a processing 
tax of thirty cents on all wheat that was milled for 
domestic consumption.~" Operating under such a program, 
we were pursuing nationalism to the utmost, as ten ~illion 
acres of wheat were left unplanted. How strange it must 
have appeared to the wheat farmer to'be told that he 
would increase his wealth by actually destroying his wealth~ 
The vv.heat contract provided for adjustment pay~ 
menta on the 1933 1 1934 and 1935 wheat crops, under certain 
*53, pp.29-30 
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specified conditions and as a return for acreage restric-
tion. Once the contract was approved by the Secretary or 
Agriculture provision was made for the ·payment of twenty 
'I 
cents per bushel on the 1933 crop in consideration of 
acreage reduction for the 1934-1935 crop years. Th~ second 
payment of nine cents per bushel allotment was to be paid 
not earlier than June 1, 1934, and then only upon proof 
of compliance with the acreage reduction plan for 1934. 
Local organization and qperation expenses were deducted 
from the second pa-yment. These adjustment payments were • 
made only on the amount of the far.m allotment Which repre-
sented the domestic taxable consump~ion fraction of't?e 
wheat produced during the 1930~32 base years. This amount 
did not include a payment of parity prices on all the 
I 
wheat that the farmer produced. T.nese payments were 
definitely fixed and depended upon the compliance with 
the acre.age control provisioll:s of the contract.· They 
were not related to the yield of wheat on the acr~age 
sown or harvested, or to the amount marketed from each 
year's production. The farmer was still free to se~l 
* his wheat when and as he chose. 
As was previously mentioned, to finance the 
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adjustment payments and the administrative costs of the 
program, a tax was levied on the processing of all wheat 
used for domestic food consumption. T.hat wheat which was 
processed for the farmers' use, their households and 
employees was exempt from the tax. So, too, was all wheat 
used for charitable purposes. The processing tax was de-
clared by the Secretary pf Agriculture and fixed at 
. 
thirty cents a bushel. The order was signed by President 
Roosevelt and released on June 26, 1933. The tax was 
assessed at the first processing of the wheat and not 
before that time. The Bureau of Internal ~avenue collected 
' 
the processing tax. and paid it into the Treasury of' the 
United States for the Aqcount of the Triple A. Monthly 
returns and payments were required of all wheat processors; 
Over three thousand firms made returns each month. Inven-
tories of all floor stocks of Wheat products, whether of 
the first or second processing, included all varieties 
of flour made from wheat. Inventories also included pre~ 
pared flour varieties, cereal preparations, breads and 
other bakery products, different preparations of goods 
made from flour such as macaroni, noodles and paste. The 
rate for white flour was $1.38 a barrel of 196 pounds. 
A specific individual rate was fixed for other wheat 
products. While wheat prices were raised the entir.e 
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burden was bor.ne by the consumer. If any part of the 
wheat was exported the tax on that portion was rebated. 
Unprocessed wheat could be exported without being taxed. 
Unfortunately~ domestic reduction of wheat crops 
did not reduce world supplies of wheat. On the contrary, 
it stimulated production abroad because we had made an 
outright gift of our former foreign markets to other 
countries. We~ also, stimulated production abroad by 
our mere threat to raise the prices of wheat artificially. 
No customer like to be forced to wait for his co1mnodity. 
One step in control was bound to lead to further controls. 
Whenever the government made a mistake it proceeded to 
make another. This pyramiding of mistakes was bound to 
reach a peak and to snap under the tension of artificial 
support .. 
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5. The Grain Exchange Regulation and Codes 
Regulation of the domestic wheat market was 
introduced in July, 1933, followed by agreements between 
the department of !~riculture and the Grain Exchanges. 
The general purpose of these agreements was to improve 
the conditions of wheat marketing thro~ the temporary 
regulation of the grain exchanges and codes for grain ex-
changes, as well as for the regulation of country and 
terminal elevators. 
On July 19 and 20, 1933, the grain market col-
lapsed from a speculative boom, wheat futures dropp'ed by 
as much as 31 cents in two days, and prices of other 
commodities and corporation stocks broke concurrent.ly. 
The collapse of prices was the consequence of the specu• 
lative operations of both professional and amateur ·specu-
lators. Because the wheat carryover was underestimated, 
bad crop news and expectations of ·a raise in price were 
circulated and the actual depreciation of dollar buying 
was heavy. 
Rumors of the possibility that the .MA wheat 
program with its domestic allotment plan and proces.sing 
tax stimulated heavy mill purchases and flour production 
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in the spring of 1933, followed by advance stocking up by 
consumers led to a decline in milling activity after the 
processing tax became effective on July 9. Such action 
as this contributed to the price increase and at the 
same time withdrew support for the market as it rose to 
its final peak. A further influence on the situation was 
the statement made by Secretary Wallace on July ]{1 , 1933 
when the market was at its peak, that the 11Wh.eat production 
centro~ plan is imperative.n-lr Furthermore, on July 20, 
the Department of agriculture reinstated its regulapion 
that was suspended on October 22, 1932, by Secretary Hyde., 
requiring current reports of all large holdings of grain 
in contract markets. 
By order of the Chicago Board of Trade, with 
other boards following suit in other centers, the grain 
future markets were closed on July 21-22 to give ·time 
for drawing up plans to check panicky selling and t.o 
settle the large and highly vulnerable accounts. The 
Board on July ?1 ~et limits on the daily fluctuations 
in wheat prices at 8 cents from the closing prices :or the 
preceding day. No sales were permitted beyond thes·e 
limits or below the closing prices registered on July 20. 
To carry on code negotiations with the Govern-
~r8, p.208 
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ment 1 a national·grain conference was called for Monday1 
July 24, to consider possible ways to maintain fair and 
stable grain prices for farmers. Administrator Peek 
realized the need for curtailing any activity which 
permitted such speculative crises, saying:. 
"we are not going to superimpose something 
on the grain trades until after they have had 
an opportunity to work out their problems 
themselves ••• .Abuses exist in the grain 
trades. The trades, acting as the marketing 
medium of the farmers, should carrect these 
abuses. If they do not succeed, then the 
government will act."* -
Facing the need for changes in their regulations, the 
various representatives of the exchanges re·commended: 
fixing price limits on Wheat at 5 cents to be in e~fect 
only during the emergency and removed as soon as market 
conditions improved, setting limits on daily price 
fluctuations and margin requirements, and elimina~ing 
trading in "putsJt and "calls". These limits wer~ effec-
tive July 28, and on July 31 the closing prices were 
established as the minimum prices for the August 1-15 
period. 
On August 9, a draft code for the grain ex-
~ 
changes was submitted to the AM dealing mainly with 
trade practices. Trading in indemnities, except those 
. 
good from one da~ to the close of trading on the next, 
*8, p.209 
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was to be abolished. Minimum requirements were to be 
forced on all open contracts except hedging or sp~eading 
trades. Existing daily limits on price fluctuati9ns 
were to continue in force. For the enforcement of' 
these code provisions each exchange was to authorize 
its board to take disciplinary action on any violations. 
A few ~ignificant changes providing tor greater govern-
ment authority with respect to administration reports 
and business conduct committees were made after the 
draft code was formally submitted. It was ~ovember 16 
before the revised draft was considered at a formal 
public hearing. The Secretary of' Agriculture was em-
,. 
powered to secure information and have access to all 
books and records. Although~the code supervisory· 
committee of seven, appointed by the Grain Committee 
on National Affairs, was to a~inister the code, it 
was still subject to review, disapproval and regulation 
by the Secretary of Agriculture. Each exchange 
was to have a Business Conduct Committee Rule that 
would govern the selection of such a committee to· be 
made up of exch~nge menb ers. The members were not to 
be financially interested in speculative future 
trading and would have the power to investigate t·ran-
sactions of any member by examining all books, records, 
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accounts and papers of the member and to require re-
ports on transact ions • ~'" 
At the code hearing on November 27-28 it was 
quite evident that the exchanges wanted more self-
government and argued in favor of each exchange having 
more of a voice in its administration. Amendments to 
the code were intm duced by writing the rules and, regu ... 
lations·of the exchanges into the codes and thus putting 
federal authority behind the regulations. Amendm,ents 
proposed to limit open futures accounts to two million 
bushels and to give the Secretary of Agriculture the 
power to govern the time and place of deliveries on 
future contracts. Cooperatives were to be allowe¢1. the 
same exchange privileges as those enjoyed by other 
members. No member of the grain trade proposed amend-
ments at this hearing. The trade proponents of the code 
naturaliy'opposed all the major amendments submitted 
during the hearing. 
After a long delay~ on March 20, 1934, the 
President signed the grain exchange code which became 
effective March 31. The only changes in the November code 
were on speculative transactions in Which the margin re-
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quirements were placed at 10% on all open contracts up 
to 2 million bushels with a 15% additional margin on 
anything over that amount and the barring of trading 
in indemnities. Administration of the code was left 
as proposed. 
The code was accepted with some misgivings. 
The President of the Chicago Board of Trade said: 
ttrt is so drastic that many of our people 
honestly believe its provisions will not 
permit the market sufficient facility of' 
operation to distribute the grain to the 
farmer r s adva.mtge. tt* 
Likewise, the Vice-president of the same organization 
said:. 
• • .The Chicago Board o~ Trade intends to 
abide by and live up to, the provisions of 
the code to the letter, and to enforce the 
provisions against its members in the moSt 
complete good faith ••• This, however, i~ 
not the same thing as saying that we all 
have confidence that the provisions will 
accomplish the results which are looked 
for and hoped for by officials of the 
Department of Agriculture Who asked, and 
indeed, in some cases insisted~ that they 
be iD;corporated in the code. U'*'l* 
T.he American Farm Bureau Federation condemned the 
code for its failure to recognize grain cooperatives 
or to reduce speculation in grains. The Farmers' , 
I Union and National Grange were likewise dissatisfied. 
*8, p.214 
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The code in operation did not ·prove too much 
I, 
of a burden on the markets. Trading in n job lotst.t 
increased somewhat probably due to the damage done to 
the wheat crop by the ensuing drought. Small specula-
tors, including farmers, were influenced to speculate 
in the hope of a rising market. To control speculative 
eAcesses the margin requirements were most important, 
and to some extent they reduced the size of holdings 
and curtailed operations by foreign traders. By so 
doing, the volume of trading was reduced but not 
enough to affect the market because ample hedging. 
facilities had been provided. Some commission houses 
even benefited from the margin requirements because 
losses, previously incurred on business accepted on 
inadequate margin, were reduced. 
In ~ractice, administration of the code was 
handled by the code authority to the satisfaction of 
the government. Each exchange set ~p a comprehensive 
system of supervision of margin requirement provisions 
and no serious complaints or cases were received. The 
code very definitely had a wholesome and construc,;ti ve 
influence on futures trading and on the markets i~ 
general. T.ne expenses of administering the code ~ere 
small ••• the budget for one year ending May 31, ~1935, 
!38 
was only $13 1 400, all of which was borne by the principal 
,_, 
exchanges. •~"" 
As of December 24, 1934, the terminal grain 
elevator industry was brought under the grain exchange 
code, on the ground that most of its members were also 
members of the grain exchanges. This code and other 
codes more o~ less affecting handlers and processors of 
wneat took effect somewhat later. After the Supreme 
Court decision of May 27, 1935, operations ceased under 
most of these codes, but some features of the grain 
exchange code remained in operation through rules of 
the various exchanges. 
*33' p •. 95 .. 
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6. The Pacific Northwest Export Agreement 
. 
The Pacific Northwest is a distinct Wheat area 
which is separated from the rest of the country by economic 
barriers resting on geographic facts. It consists of the 
I 
states of Washington, Oregon and northern Idaho. Wheat 
growing is concentrated in the southeastern part of the 
State of Washington. In that section, wheat is grown 
on a large-scale by low-cost methods and high-grade effi-
cient farmers. The region produced less than ten per 
" cent of the United States wheat crop. Production so 
largely exceeds the region's own wheat requirements that 
more than one-half of the crop moves out. Most of the 
wheat is shipped to California or is exported to Europe, 
South and Central America and the Orient. Milling is 
an important industry and flour exports in this region 
exceed those of all the Danubian countries or Argentina. 
The Pacific Northwest produces white wheats 
which constitut~ about two-thirds of the crop. Among 
the white wheats produced are the hard white wheats 
valued for bread flours and breakfast cereals, soft 
white wheats excellent for cake and pastry flours and 
the white club Wheats which are not adaptable for use 
by millers in this country. Red wheats, both soft and 
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hard, are also grown in the region. 
The need for export aid to the Pacific Northwest 
in the summer of 1933 arose from the extremely low prices 
which prevailed in the area. Most of the farmers kept 
their wheat and used it for livestock feed. Government 
aid was necessary to finance exports bec~use of:. compe-
tition in the export markets, the high wheat carryover 
in July, 1933, and the new crop coming on the market with 
insufficient storage facilities. Producers were anxious 
141 
to get their wheat moving. Through concerted action among 
the cooperative marketing associations, stress was placed 
upon the need for prompt and effective action. A+l parties 
interested in the problem urged immediate adoption of 
some form of export subsidy. At the close of an informal 
me~ting in Portland, Oregon, on august 23, 1933, a 
committee of four, representing producers, exporters, 
millers and bankers, drew up a draft agreement and sent 
it to Secretary Wallace. In Washington, the drafp was 
revised and formally filed with the !AA on September 12, 
1933. The agreement was signed and became effective 
on October 11, 1933, and known as the Marketing Agreement 
for Disposal of North Pacific Wheat Surplus. A related 
agreement was also negotiated between the Secretary of 
of Agriculture and the National Republic of China. This 
particular agreement defined the terms on which the Chinese 
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Government might use the funds loaned by the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation to buy wheat and flour under the 
marketing agreement. 
The primary agreement specifically stated that 
the arrangement was not to be interpreted as a form of 
policy by the Secretary but ratre r only as a .means of 
solving the critical condition which existed in the Pacific 
Northwest region. The contract was binding between the 
Secretary of Agriculture and a non-profit corpora.tion 
established under Oregon laws known as the North Pacific 
Emergency Export Association. Its membel.,ship was, open 
to any producer or association of wheat producers in 
Washington, Idaho and Oregon. 
Under the related agreement the Orient took 
nearly three-fourths of the Wheat sales which totalled 
2185 million bushels. The Chinese Government took 
about half of the total under its loan. Even with the 
subsidy, the Northwestern millers found great difficulty 
in competing with the Chinese, Japanese and Australian 
millers in the North China markets. About 212 million 
-bushels were sold as flour to the Philipp~ne Islands, 
where Americru1 flour entered duty-free. Sales tq Europe 
were in the minority. South American, Central Amerina 
and the West Indies took about 18 per cent of the wheat 
sold during the period of the arrangement. The total cost 
~~ 
of the subsidy approximated 6.5 million dollars.~ 
As a result of the export subsidy operations in 
the Pacific Northwest area~ exports of wheat and flour had 
increased, the carryover was smaller and the feed use was 
. 
decreased. Both farm and market prices in the region 
increased. If the subsidy had not been adopted~ prices in 
the Northwest region would not have netted the producers 
as substantial an advantage. Even though prices did not 
increase greatly, each producer ~ealized about six cents 
advantage per bushel of wheat. The major complaint about 
the agreement was its complicated clerical work. This work 
involved a sizable expense that could be passed along to 
the producers in the form of profits only if they aill~ered 
to the original simpler form o~ keeping sales records. 
Northwest millers were disappointed in the volume of flour 
moved. T.he Chinese Government bought almost no flour until 
July and then only used 28% of the loan quota which was ear-
marked for flour. The millers in the Southwest and South-
1 
east areas of the United States, as well as some of the 
exporting countries, criticized the arrangement as being a 
device for ndumping". These millers wished to retaliate 
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by invoking an anti-dumping clause until it was clea~ly 
explained to th~m that this ~rangement was st~ictly an 
eme~gency p~og~am. Eve~y p~ecaution was taken to keep the 
sale p~ice of wheat on a pa~ with p~ices of othe~ wheats in 
.fo~eign m~kets. Even with this subsidy, the net expo~ts 
fell within the fixed quota of the inte~national wheat ag~ee-
ment. 
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Ea~ly in August, 1934, sales of wheat by the export 
association we~e suspended. Many No~thwest Pacific p~oduce~s 
we~e eager to secu~e a ~enewal of the agreement, bu~ Secretary 
Wallace opposed furthe~ subsidies to expo~ts f~om that area 
because the eastern states we~e importing wheat for food and 
In Febru~y, 1935, weste~n railroads reduced thei~ 
rates on c~-load shipments of cracked soft-white wheat in 
sacks to be moved from the Northwest Pacific ~eas into drought 
regions. A furthe~ plan to facilitate disposal of ~urplus 
. 
wheat of the Pacific Northwest was considered in Portland, 
Oregon, in M~ch, 1935. In view of the poo~ prospects fo~ the 
1935 crop, the plan for subsidizing wheat fo~ feed use was 
* rendered ineffective. 
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7. The F~m Act of 1938 
The major purpose of the 1938 Farm Act was to 
conserve the nation's soil resources and to use them more 
efficiently. This act hoped to assist in the more 0rderly 
marketing of wheat for domestic consumption and export. To 
minimize violent fluctuations in wheat supplies~ m~~ tings 
and prices, this Act also provided for the regulation of 
interstate and foreign co~rce of wheat. Consumers were 
protected by the provisions for maintaining adequate wheat 
reserves for food and feed. Farmers were satisfied because 
they were assured of a fair share in the national income. 
To achieve these objectives, the means authorized 
by the Act were soil conservation on a nation-wide scale 
and the continued use of acreage allotments to help stabilize 
production. Loans were provided to enable wheat f~mers to 
hold larger carry-overs in surplus ye~s. Mar~ting quotas 
for surplus control were also established for times of emer-
gency and crop insurance for wheat was authorized. Through 
the authorization of parity payments a substantial contribu-
tion was made to farm income. 
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Planting within his acreage allotment was the means 
by which the wheat farmer could prove his cooperation with the 
allotment program. Production was stabilized by means of this 
system of acreage allotments. As was discussed pre~iously, 
national allotments were worked out according to f'or,mulas 
determined on the basis of' national wheat supplies and the 
probable demand f'or domestic consumption and expo:r>t. The 
ac:r>eage allotments we:r>e voluntary and the f'arme:r>s who kept 
' 
their wheat plantings within the s~cif'ied allotrmen~ ~uali­
f'ied f'or benef'it payments under the conservation progrrum. 
Penalties were assessed f'or planting b~ond the acre~ge allot-
ments. These penalties were collected by means o~ deductions 
f'~om benef'it payments and the loss of' eligibility f'or maximum 
commodity loans and parity payments. 
Ac:r>eage allotment proved to be neithel:' a guarantee 
against su:r>pluses nol:' an insulation against low prices caused 
by the su:r>pluses. A device was needed to enable the f'armer 
to hold the larger carryovers in years of' low prices. The 
Farm Act of' 1938 provided such a device to meet this need in 
the ~ol:'m of' Commodity Credit Loans. The Commodity Credit 
Corporation, a gove:r>nment corporation, had been chartered f'or 
this purpose and authorized to make loans on wheat wp.en 
supplies rose above or f'ell below specif'ied levels. Loans 
were of'f'e:r>ed the cooperating wheat f'a:r>mers if' their July crop 
was in excess of' a normal uear's domestic consumption or if' 
the price on June 15, or any time during the market~ng year 
thereaf'ter, f'ell below 52 IB r cent of' parity. Such a range 
permitted loans high enough to prevent prices from collapsing 
and yet not so high as to keep the wheat f'r-om competing f'or 
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export markets. Loans we~e also available to non-cooperating 
wheat ~armers but on11 when marketing quotas were in e~~ect. 
Such loans would be computed as so much o~ the commodity as 
would be subject to penalty i~ marketed and at 60 per cent o~ 
~£­
the rate applicable to cooperators. 
The governments investment in these loans ~as p~o-
tected by marketing quotas which prevented the dumping o~ 
surpluses and the wreckage o~ prices. :Marketing and storage 
quotas became e~fective ~or wheat only when the supplies 
exceeded normal by a de~inite speci~ied amount. The, supply 
I 
level had to be exceeded be~ore quotas were put into. e~~ect 
and this level inc;tu.ded reserves and carryovers larger than 
usual. Sales in excess o~ marlreting quotas were subjected to 
a penalty per bushel. This penalty plus the loans on the 
stored wheat protected the wheat ~armers who desired to hold 
·their products in storage when the markets were glutted and 
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a price collapse was imminent. Any wheat marketed in excess 
of the quota ~or any ~arm was subjected to a ~i~teen cents 
deduction on each bushel. Loans were o~~ered only ih the years 
when marketing quotas were declared to be necessary and were 
approved. 
The wheat ~armers had additional mea~s of protection 
through crop insurance. The Farm Act o~ 1938 created the 
Federal Crop::.Insurance Corporation which of'~ered such crop 
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insurance. This insurance covered losses resulting from 
hail, drought, flood; wind, winter-killing, lightning, 
tornado, insects and plant diseases. Premiums were paid 
in advance in actual wheat or in its cash equivalent. The 
wheat which was received in premiums was held by the Corpo-
ration as the nation's wheat reserve. Losses were paid in 
actual wheat or in its cash equivalent. This means of pay-
ment provided the insured farmers with wheat for sale and 
consumers with whe'at for purchase in the years of cl'lop 
shortage or failure. The amount of the premium for each 
farm was determined by the loss records of the farm and the 
I 
area in which it was located. For coverage of 75 per cent 
of the normal crop, the premium rate ranged from one-half 
bushel an acre in the low-risk areas to two-and-one-half 
bushels in the high-risck areas. Wheat received as premiums 
was stored by the ·Corporation and could not be marketed 
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except as it was paid out' to the farmers themselves to cover 
any crop losses. In order to prevent crop spoilage it was 
sometimes necessary to sell the wheat or to remove the reserve 
to another location. This transaction involved immediate 
replacement with other wheat. At no time could the reserve 
operate as a threat to depress market prices. 
More than 11,000 wheat farmers, whose 1939 wheat 
crops were damaged, collected indemnities of over 2,670,236 
bushels of wheat under the Federal Crop Insurance program. 
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In 1939, more than 170,000 all-risk policies were written 
insuring growers of either 50 per cent or 75 per cent of 
their average yield. More than 90 per cent of the policies 
were for 75 per cent coverage. Growers had pa~d premiums 
through the Corporation representing approximately 7,243,000 
bushels of wheat and the proceeds were invested in the.wheat 
Teserves in storage. Losses sustained by the insured growers 
were adjusted by state and county Triple A Administrators. 
After the claims were approved by the committees they were 
audited by the Corporation and wheat was sold from the 
reserve or delivered to pay the claim. 
The wheat export subsidy operated mainly to increase 
domestic prices rather than to lower world prices. Wheat is 
one of the relatively few commodities to which an export 
subsidy could be successfully applied. In the summer of 1938, 
prospects indicated that exports of w~eat during the 1938-1939 
season would not exceed 50-50 million bushels. A large surplus 
was created over and above domestic requirements and wheat 
prices were depressed again. The United States Government 
inaugurated an export subsidy program for wheat in the country 
and sold it to exporters or foreign importers at prices which 
permitted them to compete with other wheats in foreign markets. 
After the subsidy started operating, the United States exports 
in 1938-1939 exceeded the 100 million bushels goal which 
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Sec.'l:'etal'y Wallace announced in the beginning of' the pl .. og!'am. 
Tl'ade cel'tif'ica tes f'ol' pff¥ men t of' obligat~'on.s undel:' 
the 1938 Agl'icultul'al Conse!'vation Pl'ogl'am amounted to approxi-
mately 500 million dolla!'s. As longs as the govel'nment lo~n 
" . 
and expol't programs continued, wheat pl'ices in the United 
States .'l:'emained above export p~ity. By August 1, 1938, the 
United States wheat cl'op totaled 731 million bushels which 
was 20 million bushels gl:'eatel' than the avel'age dom~stic 
disappeal'ance of' wheat dul'ing the 1936-1938 pe.'l:'iod and ten 
J,{< 
million bushels above the 1928-1937 ave!'age. 
The ac!'eage allotted f'ol' seeding of' the 1939 wheat 
crop undel' the Agl'icultul'al Adjustment Act was f'if'ty-~ive 
million acres. Large seedings were discoul'aged by inducements 
of'f'ered thl'ough the AAA pl'ogl'am.s, a decline in wheat pl'ices 
dul'ing the summer of' 1938, and the genel'ally unf'avo~able wheat 
outlook at planting time in 1939. On Mal'ch 20, 1939, the 
De ];:B. rtmen t of' Agl'i culture announced the plan unde.'l:' w.hi ch the 
Fede!'al Su.'!:'plus Commodity Col'pol'ation would purchas~ all the 
wheat which was held under the 1938 wheat-loan p.'l:'ogl'am. The 
Commodity Ol'edit Corpo!'ation had taken title to this wheat at 
the matul'ity of' the loans. Pl'oducers we.'l:'e given the opportunity 
be~1een April 1 and June 15, 1939, to .'l:'edeem the new pledged 
and mol'tgaged wheat held under the loan pl'ogl'am. vVheat would 
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become the p~ope~ty of the CCC if it we~e not ~edeemed on o~ 
befo~e these matu~ity dates, o~ if the p~oduce~s had not 
obtained a loan extension as pe~mitted in ce~tain a~eas. 
This un~edeemed wheat was then taken ove~ from the CCC by 
the Fede~al Su~plus Commodity Co~poration. A total of 81 
million bushels was held by the CCC as secu~ity unde~ the 
1938 loan prog~am. Vfrleat pu~chases by the FSCC became p~t 
of the stocks available for future expo~t. 
By July 1, 1939, the United.States wheat supplies 
we~e 990 million bushels o~· 100 million bushels less than 
the 1938 crop o~ about the same as 1914. Domestic use 
re~ui~ed about 695 million bushels which left 295 million 
bushels fo~ expo~t o~ ca~~yove~. At t;he same tim~, world 
wheat supplies totaled about 5~ billion bushels. This amount 
was two billion bushels la~ger than the 1914 figu~e. Even 
with existing conditions of wa~, wo~ld ac~eage in 1939 did 
not change too much. 
On August 1, 1939~ the Federal Su~plus Commodity 
Corporation announced that ar~angements had been made for 
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the sale of 20 million bushels of United States wheat to be 
deli ve~ed to mills in the United :Kingdom. Deli ve~y of this 
wheat was made over a pe~iod of several months.. This t~ans­
action was c~~ied out unde~ the wheat-expo~t p~og~am announced 
by Sec~eta~y Wallace on August 29, 1938. The FSCC subsidized 
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the deal through American exporters. Wheat was of'f'ered the 
exporters at a price which would enable them to meet world 
competition in the United Kingdom. The United States Govern-
ment, on the other hand, took a loss of' 2! cents per. bushel 
i 
on this sale. The subsidies varied ~rom twenty to twenty•five 
cents per bushel. The total dealings with the United Kingdom 
cost the American Government close to six million dollars. 
Besides sales to the United Kingdom, sales of wheat were also 
made to Mexiqo, China, and Latin America. These sales in-
volved Pacific Northwest wheat principally. As of September 5, 
1939, the subsidies program was discontinued due to political 
developments in Europe. 
By November 14, 1939, the wheat-price situation in 
the United States was further complicated by various factors 
sL1ch. as the prospects for the 1940 crop,, general business 
conditions due.to the war, and the heavy wheat harvest in 
Australia and Argentina predicted for Decemb.er, 1939. 
8. Conclusions 
Farm policy since 1933, and on up to the end of 1939, 
w·ent through three stages of development. In all three phases 
the objective o~ increased :rarm income was the core of the 
program. The first program which operated during 1933-1936 
attempted to achieve this objective through payments f'or 
153 
controlling production and marketing. This program~ however, 
disintegrated because it lacked the basic element of consti-
tutionality. rn the second phase, which ran from 1936-1938, 
soil conservation pa:y.ments and wheat allotment assignme:nts 
were used to increase farm income. \~ile soil conservation 
payments were continued in the third phase, which began i~ 
1938, they were also supplemented by parity payments, price-
supporting commodity loans, and marketing quotas. It also 
provided for the ever-normal granary scheme so stro~gly advo-
cated by Secretary Wallace. 
All three phases were precipitated by emergency 
conditions. Economic collapse and ~rge surplus wheat stocks 
affected the 1933 AAA. Drought in 1934 and adverse Supreme 
0ourt decisions in 1935-1936 were largely responsible for the 
Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act. A combination 
of drought in 1936 and business recession and bumper crops in 
1 
1937, set the stage for the 1938 Agricultural Adjustment Act. 
The .price of the new nationalism was high and costly. 
In retrospect, it seems that the only accomplishments of the 
Triple A were the destruction of wealth, the contraction of 
employment, the stimulation of inefficiency and the creation 
of a redundant farm population. 
B. The B~itish Commonwealth's Cont~olled Viheat Economy 
1. Canada 
a. The Canadian Grain Act, 1900 
There was an accepted principle prevalent in Canada 
that the g~ading of wheat was the function of the g,bve~nment. 
The e~ly st~uggles between the p~oduce~s and buyers to per-
fo~m this service led to the passing of the Manitoba Grain 
Act in 1900. This Act had been radically amended in subse-
quent ye~s. 
The Canadian system classified wheat on the basis 
of variety, soundness, cleanliness, and the amount of moistu~e 
p~esent. The administ~ation of the service was und~~ the 
autho~ity of the Bo~d of G~ain Commissione~s. To allow fo~ 
the marked diffe~ence in the wheat produced, Canad~ was 
divided into two sections. The Eastern Inspection Division 
consisted of the Maritime P~ovinces, Quebec and the po~tion 
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of Ontario lying east of the city of Po~t Arthu~. The Weste~n 
Inspection Division included the city of Po~t Arthur, Ontario 
west of that point, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British 
Columbia. The Chief Grain Inspecto~ for Canada had his office 
in Winnipeg. The system was divided into.six sections: (1) the 
classification of g~ades, (2) Committees on G~ain S,~andards, 
(3) Sampling and Inspection, (4) ~e-inspections, surveys and 
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appeals, (5) official weighing and, (6) the tariff 9f Cha!'ges.~t-
This G!'ain Act oi' 1900 was the cha!'tel" of, the wheat 
industl"y in Canada and affected all its phases of opel"ations 
fl"om the time wheat was b!'ought by the p!'oduce!' to the o!"iginal 
shipping point until it finally left Canada. The Act established 
a Boa!'d of G!'ain Commissione!'s who we!'e charged with the inspec-
tion of all wheat produced in Canada. The appointed commissione!'s 
classified the wheat into grades according to ma!'ket values and 
issued certificates of grade. They regulated the ope!'ation of 
I 
all elevato!"s and had authority over the allotment oi' cars to 
the shippers. By establishing g!'ades for the Canadian wheat, 
this Board controlled wheat prices. It was this pa!'ticular 
control that caused so many stol"my sessions among the wheat 
farmers of the western Provinces. Methods by which grain might 
be s-tored in the country elevators we:re p!'escribed'. 
Wheat was shipped in ca:rloads to certain te:rminal 
points and then sampled. The smaples were inspected and g!'ades 
determined by the inspectors of the Board. Winnipeg and Calgary 
were designated as te:rminal points fol" the wheat that was des-
tined for the Head of the La~es or Vancouvel", respectively. 
The Gove:rnment also provided inte:rior terminal elevators at 
Moose Jaw, Saskatoon, and Edmonton whe!'e sampling was done. 
These elevators were used not only for storage of wheat in 
times of cal" shortage, but also for maintaining a stock of 
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wheat f'or use in domestic milling. By vil'tue of' the fact 
that the whole matter of' grading wheat was one of' individual 
judgment, in time of general economic discontent, the wheat 
farmers protested against the poor job done on grading. 
Bitter controversies ensued over the mixing regulations in 
f'orce in Canada. Mixing af'f'orded an opportunity of' prof'it 
under the system of' selling by of'f'icial grades. This was 
done by allowing a certain amount of' 16w-grade relapively 
cheap grain to be added to grades of' higher quality af'ter it 
had been cleaned or improved by treatment. 
Because of the number of disputes which had arisen 
between the country elevator operators and the wheat farmers 
delivering wheat, the procedure covering the recept~on of' 
I grain was carefully controlled and standardized by the Cana-
dian Grain Act. When a farmer decided to put his grain 
through the emvator, he had to determine on which basis it 
.should be handled. He could choose between a gradea storage 
receipt under which his wheat was subject to the inspector's 
grade and dockage or submit the grain specially binned. The 
graded storage receipt was the f'arm~'s claim upon the eleva-
" 
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tor company. It showed the details of' delivery-grade, weight, 
dockage, shrinkage, allowance and the net amount of' grain cal-
culated as cleaned to grade. It provided that a quan·ti ty o~ 
grain of' the same grade, kind and quality, would be delivered 
either at the elevator or in carload lots at a terminal 
elevato~ point, upon the ~etu~n of the receipt and the pay-
ment of ch~ges. 
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Under the G~ain Act the duties of the count~y ele-
vate~ agents we~e: to ~eceive, buy, sto~e and ship g~ain, to 
make out the p~ope~ tickets and keep the reco~ds of the house, 
to fu~nish repo~ts to his company, and to supply daily state-
ments to the ~ailway station agent of the total quantity of 
g~ain taken in store at the end of each day. Upon notification 
to the owne~, the G~ain Act gave the agent the ~ight to move 
g~ain in sto~age forward to the terminal to keep the elevato~ 
clear. 
With a view to ~egularizing the dist~ibution of ca~s 
at local points, the Manitoba G~ain Act established,what was 
known as the Ca~ O~der Book. The sections of the Act which 
dealt with ca~ supply we~e ~etained and expanded in subsequent 
~evisions. For example, in the Canada G~ain Act of· 1930, 
sections we~e devoted to the supply of ca~s and the Car O~der 
Book. It was fu~the~ provided that in the case of a· car 
shortage, the Boa~d of G~ain Commissioners had the power to 
direct the railways and thus make an equitable dist~ibution of 
empty cars among shipping points on any line of rai~way. In 
case of an eme~gency, th~ Board had the powe~ to distribute 
cars to take ca~e of an elevator which might be ,in danger of 
collapsing, where the g~ain was insufficiently housed. This 
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particular phase of the Act eased the problems that previously 
had arisen from a car supply and distribution shortage. With 
the disappearance of the Ca~adian Northern Railway and the 
organization of the Canadian National System, there was an 
increase of more than 15,000 cars. The problem became acute 
again when the immense crop of 1928 was harvested under 
excellent weather conditions with t;he aid of mechanU.zed 
combines. 
The law provided that at each station where there 
was a railway agent, and where grain was shipped und.er the 
supervision of the agent, an Order Book for cars should be 
kept in which applicants for cars had to write thei,r orders. 
In the absence of a railway agent, a custodian of the Car 
Order Book was appointed by the Board. To prevent ,error or 
abuse of the regulations, the Act further provided the 
precise detailed form of the order and required the signature 
of the station agent. This book was to be open for public 
inspection at all times. The use of the Car Order Book was 
enforced by heavy penalties ranging from twenty-five dollars 
to five hundred dollars. ?r 
b. Western Vf.heat, Lifeblood of the Provinces 
The Canadian attempt to control wheat is best 
understood in the light of the place that agriculture holds 
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in the Canadian economy. Although agriculture has a universal 
cha!'acter and importance, in Canada tri t has special features 
of its own, for it affords more employment than any· other 
single indust!'y and stands first in the list o~ wealth 
I 
produce!'s. rt is the stronghold of individualism i~ enter-
pl"ise and yet has led the way to cooperative organi,zation, 
both in time and scope. It has given birth to potent and 
enel"getic political pal"ties. In the variety of its develop-
ment it has been called, 'a way of li.te', for it is more than 
the specialized functions of the citizens who take part in 
. t u-3~ l. • 
' 
c. ~/heat Board Activities, 1918-1920 
I 
In the latter yea!'s of World War I, as was mentioned 
in an earlier section, the British Gove!'nment purchased the 
entire Canadian expo!'table surplus wheat through a single 
bureau and at a price set by the Canadian Governmen.t.. This 
coincided with a period of high prices and the wheat fa!'me!'s 
we!'e quite satisfied with the !'etu!'ns fl"om this sys•tem of 
selling wheat. As a result, when the Wa!' had ended, the wheat 
farmers demanded that the system be continued unde!' the 
auspices of the Canadian Government. The Wheat Bo~d was, 
therefol"e, established. This Boa!'d consisted of a commission 
empowe!'ed by the Government to pu!'chase and dispose:. of the 
whole Canadian c!"op. High pl"ices continued to prevail dul"ing 
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1919 and until sometime after the abolition of the Board in 
1920. Wben prices began to decline rapidly, the farmers 
began to demand a renewal of government control. But, even 
in countries devoid of wheat board activities high wheat 
prices were found. Deflation might have been less sudden 
and affec·ted a smaller area had the Board con tipued,, to 
function. 
Unable to obtain satisfaction from the Canadian 
Government, the farmers were left dependent upon the United 
Grain Growers, Limited, and the Saskatchewan Coopel''ative 
~r.. Elevator Company, Limited, fol' the sale of their wheat." 
Perhaps it was to the advantage of the wheat 
farmel's that the Wheat Board was abolished. The· success 
achieved under war conditions was due mainly to the, fact 
that purchases and sales dul'ing that time were contl'olled 
by a single body. This situation· implied the suspension of 
intel'national competition fol' the time b;aing and pl'ices 
could easily be fixed by agreement. If such condi t'ions were 
carl'ied ovel' to pl'eace times, gl'eat disaster might 'have been 
wl'ought upon the Canadian wheat industry as a whole. 
d. Cooperative Wheat Marketing and the Wheat Pools 
1iUhen the Government withdrew fl'om the scene of 
wheat marketing and the vVheat Board was not revived through 
~to 45, pp • 144-149 
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subsequent legislature, the farmers .continued to search for 
better means o~ marketing their wheat. The demand for a 
much larger and more powerful sales organization of a true 
16]. 
cooperative type took form under the pressure of serious 
need. By the la. tter part of 1923, the Alberta Pool was 
functioning. Saskatehewan and Manitoba were not completely 
organized until the 1923 crop was harvested. 
The organization of the three Provincial Pools in 
such a short time and the setting up of the Central Selling 
Agency was phenomenal. The pools were organized an,d operated 
in essentially the same manner. They were farmer-owned 
cooperative institutions made up of membe~s who signed 
individual contracts, enforceable in the courts, to deliver 
all the wheat produced to the pool elevators or to othe~ 
elevators assigned by the pool. The farmer still r~tained 
control over the marketing of his wheat. The contracts were 
all the same and ran for a period of five years with the pro-
vincial pool empowered as the sole agent of the farmer for the 
sale of his wheat. The Central Selling Agency was ·a joint-
stock company incorporated under Dominion Letters-P.atent. 
The pools we~e non-profit institutions. ~e benefit 
to the farmer was supposed to take form in the bette~ net 
price for his wheat rather than that of a dividend payment. 
Each farmer had a small share of capital in the pool but 
depended upon loans made against the wheat in store for 
I 
~inancing each yea~'s c~op. The ope~ational expenses we~e 
deducted ~rom the wheat price and amounted to about one-hal~ 
cent pe~ bushel. In addition, one cent pe~ bushel was 
deducted to ~o~m a reserve and two cents per bushel deducted 
to p~ovide ~unds to construct the necess~y elevators. The 
pools were administered by Boards o~ Directors chosen by , 
delegates ~rom the va~ious districts. The Central S~lling 
Agency owned a seat on the Winnipeg Grain Exchange and had 
agencie·s in the important cities th~oughou t the world. Pay-
ment ~or sales o~ the wheat was made to the membe~s in 
instalments, the ~irst instalment was the expected minimum 
price ~or the ye ~ 's crop and the remainder was that o~ 
necessa~y adjustments to the actual price received •. 
The objectives o~ the pools were: to market their 
members' wheat in a more orderly ~ashion, to avoid the dumping 
o~ the entire crop on the world m~ket, and to make possible 
a substantial payment to the ~armer ~or his c~op wtthout 
waiting to sell it at a suitable time. The pools ~urthe~ 
p~oposed to imp~ove the quality and reputation o~ Canadian 
wheat, to ensure a more ~air system o~ grading and dockage, 
to eliminate speculation and unnecessa~y middleman handling 
and, in the ~inal analysis, to sell wheat crops at a better 
• ~f-
p~J.Ce. 
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e. Canadian Wheat Pools 
The Canadian Wheat Pool came into existence e~ly 
in the twenties through the merger of the activities of the 
Alberta Pool~ which had started operations in 1923~ the 
Provincial Wheat Pools of Saskatchewan and Manitoba~ and the 
Ontario Grain Pool~ which was the business unit of the 
Farmers Cooperative Company~ Limited, of Ontario. T.he name 
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given to the pool was the Canadian Coope!'ati ve Whea,t Producers 
Limited. The po0l had a high degree of success from its 
inception until the year 1928. During this period it con-
trolled and marketed slightly more than fifty per cent of 
the Canadian wheat crop. The price of wheat had be~n main-
tained on a fairly stable basis, rising from approximately 
$1.20 a bushel in 1923 to a peak of approximately $2.10 a 
bushel early in 1925~ and gradually declining to slightly 
~1. bette!' than $1.20 a bushel in the late months of 1928 ... 
The yea!' 1928 ushered in a pe!'iod of uncertainty 
'I 
for wheat. The world acreage mounted with wo!'ld p!''oduction 
and each was destined in 1928 to reach a new high for the 
post-war period. Price of wheat, which had averaged approxi-
mately $1.20 to $1.65 a bushel in the Spring of 1928, had 
fall-en to approximately $1.20 a bushel early in .i929. In 
order to meet this condition and avoid any chaotic fl~ctuations 
or major disturbances in the market, the Canadian ~eat Pool 
~f 48, p. 550 
began to withhold quantities of wheat from the market and 
to place these stocks in storage against future demand. 
The belief was seemingly widespread that the 1928 crop 
was unusually bountiful and. would be offset by a ve~y 
small yield in the next year or two. The attempt was made 
d 
also to stabilize the price by purchases in the future 
market. As a result of these activities, the Canadian Wheat 
Pool on August 1, 1929, had a carry-over of approximately 
fifty million bushels. 
"The wheat situation in 1929 was more 
vulnerable than it then appeared. The 
world crop of 1928 had been somewhat 
underestimated, and the extent to which 
it had finally disappeared was over-
estimated. The world carry-over in 
1929 was consequently much larger than 
was realized, for much of it, notably 
in Europe and Argentina, was in posi-
tions not covered by statistics or 
readily susceptible to estimate. Con-
tinuance of the marked uptrend in 
world wheat consumption, if not in 
wheat exports, was commonly taken for 
granted or definitely predicted. The 
crop of 1929 was regarded as very 
short, and the general expectation in 
North America was that the surplus.~.. 
stocks would be readily absorbed.n"'• 
This feeling with regard to possible absorption was shared 
by the Canadian Wheat Pool. 
In the meantime, the Canadi~n \~eat Pool ~ad set 
a price of $1.00 a bushel as the initial payment to its 
*li.l2, P• 83 
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members. This price represented a decrease or discount of 
33 1/3 per cent on the current market price in September. 
With the drop of the market price to $1.25 a bushel, the 
banking institutions, which had loaned large sums to the 
Pool, were becoming increasingly interested ip the safety 
of such loans and the action that would be necessary to 
retrieve these loans at, or close to, their full vaaue. 
In the conference of the Pool executives with the b~kers' 
representatives, the former sought assurance that the banks 
would not force a sale of wheat at low prices. Such assur-
ances were not forthcoming, and the Pool was forced' to seek 
aid from the Provincial Governments of Alberta, Saskatchewan 
and Manitoba. The individual government guaranteed the out-
standing loans, and guaranteed also any new loans that were 
necessary prior to August 1, 1930. 
The prices of wheat continued to fall and rapidly 
passed from a high of ~~1.00 a bushel to a low of $0,,.55 a 
bushel. As a result of this sudden drop, the final~ liquida-
tion of the 1929 crop holding of the Pool brought a return 
that was $23,000,000 greater than the sum advanced to the 
,, 
wheat farmers at the initial price of $1.00 a bushel. "The 
provincial governments met this loss mostly by issu~ng state 
bonds to the banks, on the security of mortgages on:~ the eleva-
tors owned by the pools, which agreed to pay them O';f.'f ove.'l:' a 
"" period of years out of' the ear.nings of the elevators. n' 
~~- 38, P• 69 
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The activi·ties of the Canadian Wheat Pool became 
fu~the~ involved with the continuing decline in wheat p~ices. 
'I 
The bU~den r'"apidly became too heavy for the P~ovinctal 
Gove~nments and it became necessary for the Cent~al Gove~n­
ment of the Dominion to step in and take ove~ the activities 
and the a.~rangements which had been planned by the Pool. 
The guarantees to the banks at this time we~e: Saskatchewan 
I 
$12,400,000, Albe~ta $6,284,000 and Manitoba $3,491,000. 
The downfall o~ the Canadian.1Vheat Pool is well summed up 
in the statement that "although the Canad:i,a.n Wheat Pool 
neve~ followed a holding policy, i·t sha~ed the bullish 
viewpoint of practically the enti~e wheat ma~keting· world 
and failed to app~eciate the full significance of the severe 
drop in wheat p~ices which occur~ed at the time.fl7~ 
In taking ove~ the activities of the PooL and the 
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position of the P~ovincial Governments, the Dominion Gove~n­
ment was insistent upon having a definite voice in the manage-
ment of the Pool since it would necessarily have to1 advance 
financial assistance. As a ~esult of this ag~eement, a 
gene~al manager was appointed and given dictato~ial powers 
ove~ the wheat situation. The man appointed, Mr. John I. 
McFarland, was a wheat t~ade~ whose activities and inte~ests 
were more in the di~ection of the independent b~oker than 
toward the coope~ative pool. As a result of his leanings, 
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the techniques and mechanics of handling the Canadian wheat 
crop, especially its marketing ab;road, was changed to a very 
considerable degree. ~om this time onward the private 
nature of the Pool was doomed and it became, in fact, a 
govern~ental control agency. 
t; Government and the Wheat Grower 
The Government of Canada has always rende~ed 
e~cellent service to the wheat growers. In the Prairie 
Provinces, where wheat if the ver.y essence of economic life, 
these services were more highly developed and especially 
valuable. Complete technical service and supervision of 
grain grading were furnished. T.he service of most benefit 
to the Canadian wheat farmer was that rendered by the 
Experimental Farm Branch which conducted a series o~ stations 
throughout the Dominion. These experimental ~arms aemon-
strated approved methods of cultivation which were best 
suited to certain areas and carried on extensive research 
16'7 
work on the farms. It was throu.gh the work of these branch 
farms that many of the dl~ought-resistant and disease-resistant 
varieties of wheat were produce.d. The 1Jni versi ties of the 
Prairie Provinces were equipped with a College of Agriculture 
which made extensive studies of the soil in the provinces. 
All these sources distributed useful bulletins and 
pamphlets. Lecturers and demonstrators traveled through the 
wheat country making contacts with the ~armers. The ~armers 
bene~ited greatly from these services. As was mentioned 
previously, an essential part of the government's function 
was control o~ the grading o~ western wheat by inspection 
service. 
Public services were supplied the ~armers by the 
government. The transcontinental railway system was so 
constructed that it shortened the ~armer's market distance. 
Police, mails, and irrigation projects were highly developed 
in the weste~n provinces. 
g. The Ottawa Agreement and \v.heat 
The Ottawa Con~erence in all its rami~ications has 
very aptly been termed an experiment in indirect imperialism. 
The signi~icance o~ this con~erence cannot be overemphasized 
when it is remembered that the traditional British policy is 
one o~ "muddling through" rather than attempting to plan ~or 
the solution o~ a major problem. Perhaps one of th~ most 
important problems ~aci"ng the con~erence was the un~mployment 
situation in England, but keen interest was also reyealed in 
the wheat problem of England and the Dominions. 
The Dominions were given a pre~erential position 
in the wheat trade of England to the extent that all wheat 
entering the country was sold at the world price. A tari~~ 
168 
of two shillings per quarter was made on foreign wheat, 
whereas there was no such tariff on the wheat from the 
Dominions. · The dual condi~tions uppermos·t in the mi~ds of 
the English statesmen were to provide the mother country 
It 
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with materials for food purposes and to furnish sue~ a 
market for Dominion products as would give them pr eferen.tial 
treatment. The Conference was not particularly important 
in terms of wheat since this was an article outside the 
usual scope of products considered in the agreements. 
This protectionist policy, in direct contrast to the free-
trade policy that had been in vogue for long period~, 
I provided the ammunition necessary for further consideration 
of the wheat situation by many nations. 
2. Australia 
a. Wheat Pool Act of 1920 
In Queensland, Australia, a government monopoly of 
the wheat trade was set up by the Wheat Pool Act of 1920. 
A single selling agency handled all sales of wheat. While it 
was originally adopted for a five-year period, the Act was 
renewed again in 1925. 
Farmers were loud in their criticism of the compul-
sory pools and by ballot the system of compulsory pooling was 
rejected in 1920. The pool·s then operated as volub'Jiary organi-
zations but with very little success. 
b. Governmental Price-Fixing Schemes 
. Then the economic crisis developed in 1929-1930, 
the governments in several states in Australia made appeals 
,, 
to farmers to grow more wheat. This appeal was made in an 
attempt to ensure a surplus production which would help the 
Australian Governments to meet their financial obligations 
overseas. The Commonwealth Government formulated a. scheme 
for wheat marketing. This plan involved the establishment 
of a compulsory wheat pool embracing all the states. The 
scheme provided a guaranteed price of 4/- ~r bushel at 
railway sidings. However, the Federal Parlianment failed to 
put its stamp of approval upon these measures. 
As the falling wheat prices continued at the 
beginning of the Australian wheat marketing season, the 
Government announced a loan to establish a minimum ·price o~ 
seventy-three cents a bushel. About thirty-five cents o~ 
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this amount was advanced immediately by the Comm.onw,ealth banks. 
to growers. The loan proved to be too small. Credit began 
to tighten and prices continued to decline. Growers, 
especially those who marketed their wheat later in the 
season, received little if no more than the regular market 
price. 
Again in October, 1935, a fixed price for wheat for 
domestic consumption was established. By 1936, th~ profita-
bi1ity of wheat p~oduction was la~gely dependent upon 
government measu~es. 
c.·Prefe~ential T~eatment in the United Kingdom Market 
The Ottawa Ag~eement, adopted in the summe~ of 
1932, gave Aust~alia, ~ike Canada, preferential t~eatment in 
the huge United Kingdom wheat market. The amount of the 
p~efe~ence was six cents at par exchange or about fou~ cents 
a bushel at the prevailing exchange. In addition to the 
prefe~entia1 treat~~·nt secu~ed in the United Kingdom, the 
Aust~alian Governmeht in 1931-1932 paid a production bonus 
to wheat producers which amounted to about five cents a 
bushel. The Aust~alian Parliament had appropriated ove~ 
eight million dolla~s in 1931 for this purpose. 
d. Wheat Subsidies 
In 1931, many Aust~a1ian wheat fa~mers we~e in a 
despe~ate financial position. The annual c~op was large~ than 
ever and the world price of wheat was at its lowest level for 
many years. S~cial assistance was given to the fa~mers but 
this assistance proved inadequate. Further relief ahd debt 
adjustment Acts were passed in each of the wheat-growing 
states, namely, New South Wales, Victo~ia~ South Australia~ 
Western Australia and Queehsland. The Federal Parliament 
granted a bounty to wheat farmers and the government of New 
South Wales supplemented this assistance durihg the 1931-1932 
171 
crop year with an additional appropriation amounting to 
three hundred thousand pounds sterling. The Commonwealth 
Government made funther allocations to wheat farmers during 
the following two years. In spite of all this aid, the price 
situation remained unsatisfactory and the farmers were rest-
less in the wheat-growing districts. 
To meet the problems of the 1932 marketing season, 
the Australian Government passed the Farmer's Assistance Law. 
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This law provided an appropriation of over six million dollars 
which was allotted to the states on the basis of their wheat 
production. It was distributed only to the most needy 
farmers and not in the form of a production bonus. A tax 
was levied on flour for local consumption which was suffi-
cient to pay a bounty on wheat for the year's crop. Australian 
exchange was depreciated and competition consequently greatly 
I 
increased for United States exports in the 1930-1932 period. 
This depreciated currency made it desirab~e as well 
as necessary for Australia to export as much wheat as possible 
in order to maintain her credit structure and to avpid further 
depreciation. This stimulus to export was further augmented 
by the bonus paid to wheat producers and the higher domestic 
prices. As a result, an export parity was maintained. Other 
wheat in the foreign markets was undersold and competition 
was rendered almost impossible. During the 1930-1932 season, 
Australia had practically monopolized the regular wheat market 
trade. This was also true of the sale of Australiab wheat 
abd flour in Japan and China at that time. 
Further aid to wheat producers in Australia became 
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a method for financing the marketing pools. The Commonwealth 
Bank of Australia, a government institution, helped to finance 
both the Victoria and South Australia Vl.heat Pools. The 
Western Australia Wheat Pool was financed by the Cooperative 
Wholesale Society of Great Brit~in. The Austral~an Govern-
ment also provided some terminal elevators for wheat storage 
which assisted in moving the whea~ throughout the continent.~~ 
During the four years from 1931 to l934, Australian 
subsidies to wheat producers, in the form of bonuses and relief, 
amounted to approximately ~~enty million dollars. Finally, 
at the beginning of 1934, the Commonwealth set up a Royal 
Comrndssion to investigate the e?onomic position of the wheat 
industry. In the report submitted by. the Commission it was 
recommended that the Commonwealth Government should continue 
its assistance to the industry and that the appropriation 
should be increased to four million pounds. Low prices caused 
by the contraction of acreage under wheat during 1935-l936 
made it necessary to grant further assistance·to the wheat 
growers. In 1936-1937, world prices for wheat rose and with 
this rise the acreage under wheat was increased. In 1938, a 
~z. 5' pp. 140-142 
large world su~plus of the grain had accumulated. The price 
fell and in September, the Federal and State Governments 
agreed upon a plan to establish a home-consumption price for 
wheat at 4/8 per bushel at sidings by impo·sing an excise tax 
on all flour used in Australia. The proceeds were applied b1 
way of subsidy to the wheat growers. The flour tax was to 
achieve a price equivalent to 5s/2d per bushel at Australian 
ports. If world prices rose above this level~ a wheat tax 
was to be imposed. Millers would be subsidized from the 
proceeds of this tax in order to hold down flour and bread 
prices. As a result of this flour tax, marginal wheat areas 
-7~ 
were reconstructed and the land was converted to grazing. 
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In July, 1939, the Premier of Victoria, A. A. Dunstan, 
made an attack on the proposal that Australia should reduce 
her wheat exports. To this charge the Commonwealth Prime 
Minister, ff,. G. Menzies, replied that Australia could no 
longer assume that_ the world would buy all the wheat she cared 
to grow. To guarantee the price of wheat without controlling 
the production of it would aggravate the problem of over-
production. 1~. Menzies believed that the situation could only 
be solved by Federal and State cooperation. 
With the following month, Mr. Menzies announced 
that the Commonwealth was willing to share with the States, 
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on a pound-~o~-pound basis~ an addi?ional g~ant ~o~ the 
assistance of wheat-growers in the disposal of the coming 
harvest. This amount was not to exceed three-and-one-hal~ 
-million pounds~ provided that the States made certa~n that 
production would not be increased. In proportion as the 
marketable surplus exceeded this amount the return was to 
.;~ 
be reduced. This was an entirely new ~orm o~ assistance 
since the previous advances to the wheat ~armers had been on 
the basis o~ production-acreage~ without any governmental 
' 
control o~ the industry. The new plan provided to complete 
production control. 
Just prior to the outbreak o~ war in 1939, the 
export price dropped to the. all-time low o~ 2s/2id per 
bushel at the ~ustralian ports. War shipping conditions 
were complicated and it was di~ficult to disp.ose o~ the wheat 
stocks. The existing stabilization scheme proved to be in-
adequate. The Government acquired the carry-over fnom the 
previous season and all subsequent production. The Australia 
Wheat Board was established to market the wheat as oppor-
tunities occurred. Growers were given an advance on their 
production and were guaranteed a price o~ 3s/10d. Each 
season's harvest was traated as a separate pool. The flour 
• 
tax continued and provided the necessary ~unds to cover the 
guaranteed price. 
* 16, PP• 354-355 
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c. Signi~icant \Vheat Controls in Argentina 
1. The Comision Interaliada para la Compra de Cereales, 1917 
Argentina ~ollowed the trend o~ organizing a 
centralized governmental agency ~or the purpose o~ regulating 
the sale o~ wheat supplies during World War I. For this 
purpose the Comision Interaliada para la Compra de Cereales 
' 
was set up in Buenos Aires with a corresponding branch o~fice 
in Montevideo, Uruguay. In 1917, the French and British 
Governments negotiated a loan of $195~000~000 ~or t~e 
purchase o~ Argentine wheat. 
2. The Junta Reguladora de Granos 
Argentina, as one o~ the principal export~rs o~ 
wheat~ was concerned vitally with any schemes that might in 
any way a~~ect the export markets or prices ~or grain. One 
o~ the most signi~icant steps toward agricultural control 
was taken by Argentina in 1933, when it created the Junta 
Reguladora de Granos in November. The ~ormation o~ the 
Grain Regulating Board was merely one part o~ a larger and 
more ambitious scheme ~or price control by means o~ the 
modi~ication o~ the method o~ exchange control and the 
devaluation o~ the peso. The exchange control was ~lanned 
to enable the government to establish a ~und out o~ the 
pro~its which accrued ~rom the dif~erence between the ~ixed 
rate at which the exporters sell and the higher, but fluc-
tuating rates, at which importers bid for their requirements. 
This fund was used to stabilize grain prices tbroug~ price-
fixing by the government. 
Under the terms of the d~cree, the Grain Regulating 
Board purchased, at fixed prices, all the wheat offered by 
domestic farmers and resold it whenever propitious at world 
prices for shipment into foreign markets. The immediate 
basic purchasing prices fixed by the Board for wheat delivery 
on wagon at the dock in the Port of Buenos Aires was 80 kilos, 
specific weight, average quality at $5.75 per 100 kilos. 
3. Mechanics of Export Ope~ations 
The mechanics of the operations were as simplified 
as possible. The Banco de la Nacion advanced 80 per cent of 
the value of the sale immediately to the farmer, and at the 
same time charged interest on the advance to the Gr~in 
Regulating Board until the grain was sold and exported, at 
which time the remaining twenty per cent was paid. There was 
no control over the farmer as for his privilege to d~spose of 
his wheat directly or at a price lower than the Board price, 
if he so desired. Such disposition was prevalent since it 
enabled the farmer to secure a higher immediate return than 
the eighty per cent advanced by the Grain Regulating Board. 
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4. Conclusions 
This provision of the Argentina plan was especially 
significant in that it differed from other world plans in a 
rather definite fashion. :Most control schemes insiste·d upon 
complete control in order to maintain the pr~ce and the 
market conditions. In Argentina, the attempt aided1 the 
farmer in a sindlar manner, but the lack of adequat~ storage 
facilities in the ~gentine made it imperative to move the 
wheat into foreign markets as rapidly as possible. The 
activities of the Board were efficient with the main 
endeavor being to maintain the normal relations between the 
farmers and the exporters in the same manner as previously. 
The Board serv?d merely to facilitate the continuation of 
such arrangements. The guaranteed b~sic price assu~ed the 
wheat farmer or a fair return, and at the same time, per-
mitted him to speculate if he cared to, against the"possible 
~" rise in the market price of his grain. 
The activities of the Grain Regulating Board should 
be reviewed in the light of the International Wheat Agreement 
which had been concluded in August, 1933. Under the terms or 
this agreement, 11 Arzgentina decided to restrict exports rather 
than production". The methods, as discussed above, brought 
a high factor of success to the Board's operations during 
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the fi~st years of its existence, although Nature played 
an important role in the poor crop yields of the United 
States and Canada during this p3riod. "In December 1934, 
it appeared that this control was the outstanding exception 
to the general rule that it was politically possible for 
such a control to resist growers' demands to raise its 
buying price and, in conjunction with generally rising 
prices, to liquidate its holdings in about a year at a 
<1r loss of only a few million dollars." 
The financial activities of the Argentine Govern-
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ment in setting up a fund based upon exchange operations to 
cover possible grain losses, however, led to considerable 
monetary profit. The published reports of the Ministry of 
Finance for the period ending September 30, 1934, indicated 
a profit of $91,300,000 on the sale of foreign exchange by 
the Exchange Control Office as compared with the loss of the 
Grain Regulating Board for the year ending November 28, 1934, 
~~-3~ 
of $8,814,942. 
The Grain Board was rather inoperative during 1935 
and in the first half of 1936, but it became increasingly 
important again in the latter part of 1936. Many farmers in 
Argentina had evidently been of the opinion that the year 
1936 offered the ideal opportunity for the Government to 
divorce itself from the wheat trade which was then in a 
~r 27, PP• 38-39 
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favo!'able position. "The Wheat Boa!'d was in ope!'ation dUX'ing 
the enti!'e yea!', but since wheat p!'ices !'emained above the 
official minimum, no tX'ansactions took place in these g!'ains .u 
This is the way the Royal Bank of Canada summed up the wheat 
situation in 1935. 
In Decembe!', 1936, the G!'ain Boa!'d eliminated 
official minimum pl"ices o:f wheat in !'ecogni t'i on of the 
imp!'oved conditions fo~ Al"gentine agl"icultuX'al commodities, 
and the !'ealization that p!'ospel"ity had definitely come close 
to actuality in Argentina. uThe elimination of gua!'anteed 
pl"ices foX' wheat was a majol" facto!' in the situation, and the 
!'eduction of the selling !'ate fol" official exchange was a 
!'ecognition of the X'eal value of 4he peso, whiCh had app!'e-
ciated in !'esponse to an impl"ovement in the countl"ies balance 
of' payments."* Thus, one of the majol" attempts at pl"ice 
contl"ol in a single countl"y became a facto!' of non-impo!'tance 
foX' the immediate futul"e of a ~ajo~ commodity. 
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CHAPTERV 
EFFORTS AT COOPERATION BE~~EN NATIONAL GROUPS RESULT 
IN FORMAL II'lTERNATIONAL WHEAT CONFERENCES 
A. League of Nations Economic Commission 
Rome~ March~ 1931 
At the suggestion of the League of Nations 
Economic Commission, the International Institute of 
Agriculture in Rome invited delegates of forty-seven 
countries including all the wheat-exporting countries 
e.x:cep t the United States, to gather on Mar ch. 26, 1931 
' for a study of the world wheat situation. The conference 
discuss~d the wheat crisis from three points of view, 
namely, the possibility of international agreement to 
restrict production, inter-European preferences, and 
the possibility of- organizing the marketing of wheat on 
an international basis. 
Eventually the conference approved several 
recommendations for short-term loans to farmers in an 
attempt to increase the consumption of wheat and possible 
means of international cooperation in solving the tremen-
dous wheat problem facing the world. Suggestions for 
using direct methods in ac~ieving acreage reduction 
failed to be approved. Perhaps one of the most important 
results of the meeting was the unanimous agreement among 
the delegates of the non-European wheat-exporting countries 
to hold a confe~ence of thei~ own in London. May 18 was 
the day set for this session. The tentative topic fo~ 
discussion at thi~ meeting was one of paramount import-
ance to all the wheat exporters, namely, possible schemes 
for the disposal of the world's wheat su~pluses. Canada, 
Australia, South Africa, Argentina, and India agreed to 
attend the forthcoming session. The United States which 
had not been officially represented at this meeting was 
invited to send delegates to the London conference in May. 
B. Conference of Wheat-Exporting Count~ies 
London, May 18~ 1931 
The conference of wheat-exporting countries 
was held at the Canada Rouse in London, on May 18~ 1931, 
and had for its objective the regulation~ wheat exports 
for the 1931-1932 crop and the stabilization of wheat 
' prices. It was a step forward in the direction of mutual 
interest on the part of the wheat-exporting countries to 
replace unfettered competition by the method of conference 
and agreements. It was attended by delegates from Canada, 
India, Australia, the United States~ ~gentina, Bulgaria, 
Hungary~ Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Soviet Russia. 
The very fact that these wheat-expo~ting countries came 
together to discuss their trade problems was a matter of 
great significance. It appeared a gigantic undertaking 
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to introduce any element of international control in a 
commodity of such world-wide distribution as wheat. 
This conference was an outcome of the meeting 
which had convened at Rome~ in March~ by invitation of 
the International Institute of Agriculture. The Rome 
Conference was attended by delegates from forty-seven 
countries and represented all the importing and exporting 
wheat interests concerned. Even though it led to mutual 
discussions of the wheat problem~ it failed to achieve 
any practical results because of the divergence of 
interests between the two classes of representatives. 
As was to be expected, the importing countries had 
refused to abandon their tariffs and bounties and to 
decrease their home production. Therefore, this con-
ference in May had convened, as suggested by the Canadian 
delegates, to endeavor to reach marketing agreements 
among the exporters of wheat only. 
The first task was to obtain concrete and 
accurate knowledge of the import demands and export 
supplies of the world's wheat market. This aim in 
itself presented difficulties since international statis-
tics were very unreliable. To obtain information on the 
available reserves of wheat and the true capacity of the 
market was practically impossible. The duty of assigning 
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to each count~y a de~inite sha~e o~ the wheat market was 
equal1y as di~ficult since the small count~ies' quotas 
would be as hard to set as the big count~ies. Pe~haps the 
most difficult task of the entire con~erence was to establish 
some agreement With Russia. For many months p~evious to the 
conference, Russia boasted of her freedom ~rom excessive 
wheat carry-ove~s which had p~oved such a burden to Canada 
and the United States. She had g~eat confidence in her 
ability to inc~ease her p~oduction of cheap wheat. This 
wheat was raised on land that paid no rent and cultivated by 
means of large-scaled mechanized methods. As usual, the 
Russians were hard bargainers at the con~erence. They 
insisted that Russia claimed as a right her old pre-war 
position· in the wheat market. By stating th;i.s alleged right 
Russia acted in strict accordance with her revolutionary 
tradition which favored declaratory diplomacy. 
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The assigning of quotas fo~ the other big wheat-
exporting countries of Canada, United States, Aust~alia and 
~gentina, in turn, offered difficult problems because of the 
glut in the wheat market which resulted from the abnormal 
surplus stocks located principally in Canada and the United 
States. The amount held was no less than two-fifths of the 
annual requirements of the European importing countries. To 
decrease wheat exports without reducing acreage would merely 
tend to enlarge the surplus. Persistence in maintaining prices 
and stimulated domestic production in all the importing 
countries likewise lessened international demand. 
Ten out of the eleven wheat-exporting countries in 
attendance at the conference approved of the principles 
involved in the Polish proposals. An international wheat 
organization was authorized by these proposals to control 
the limit of exports of each country by means of a quota 
system. The single dissenting country was the United States. 
This refusal of the United States to agree with the other 
wheat-exporting countr.ies was in harmony with the statement 
made by Samuel R. McKelvie~ head of the American delegation~ 
that the United States would not under any circumstances 
participate in an international wheat pool. The United States 
delegation~ on the other hand, favored a plan for the volun-
tary cooperation of the wheat-exporting countries which 
restricted wheat planting. on this issue, Russia displayed 
strong opposition and refused to restrict its wheat areas. 
In addition to the Polish plan, the Australians 
had a plan for export quotas similar to the Polish scheme. 
Both concepts contained a provision that the countries which 
adhered to the agreement must give bond for their observance 
of the agreemen·ii. This bond would be deposited with the Bank 
for International Settlements at Basle. ~to 
?~ 82 ~ pp. 3811-3813 
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Imagine the United States giving a bond for the 
performance of its agreementl The whole situation revealed 
what a mistake it was for the United States Government to 
go into the business of buying wheat in the first place. 
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If the wheat had been permitted to find a natural market, 
even at some concession in prices, the country would not 
have been burdened with accumulated unsold wheat supplies. 
Surplus stocks ran somewhere between two hundred million and 
two hundred fifty million bushels of wheat. FUrthermore, it 
. would not have had to consider what course the other wheat-
exporting countries might be inclined to take. This course 
of action was definitely a grievous mistake for which the 
country was obliged to pay dearly. The whole world knew of 
our predicament. As long as our surpluses mounted, it would 
be di~ficult for United States wheat farmers to count on any 
substantial and enduring advances in prices. 
The conference adjourned because its members could 
not agree upon any of the importabt suggestions made for the 
improvement of the wheat market. The only mai~ decision of 
the conference was to set up a committee consisting of one 
representative from each participating country. This commit-
tee would establish a "clearing house of information to serve 
the wheat-exporting countries •••••••• thereby assisting 
?to the orderly distribution of wheat in world markets." 
?f. 83, P• 3979 
This was face-saving since it was quite difficult to indicate 
how such a clea~ing house might p~acticably wo~k. Canada 
felt that the Inte~national Institute of Ag~icultu~e at Rome 
and the Canadian Royal G~ain Commission had the fullest 
possible info~mation ~especting wo~ld wheat c~op conditions, 
needs and supplies. 
At the Rome Confe~ence in Ma~ch, delegates ~epo~ted 
that no scheme for expo~ts o~ similar inte~national surplus 
control could be de¥ised there because importing countries were 
not ~ep~esented. In London, apparently, too many exporting 
countries were rep~esented to achieve unanimity on the accep-
tance of workable international schemes o~ controls. 
c. International Wheat Confe~ence 
Geneve, May 10, 1933 
The League of Nations Economic Relations Commdttee's 
consultation of experts from the United States, Canada, Argen-
t 
187 
tina and Australia met at Geneva on May 10, to begin discussions 
on the wheat-expo~ts problem. This conference originated in 
Argentina's proposal made to the preparatory commission that 
a conference of all wheat exporters be convoked to provide 
for the reduction of wheat acreage. Each of these four countries 
sent experts to Geneva to study the question and to prepare a 
report. This meeting was not arranged as an international 
conference. It was conceivad as an occasion for the wheat 
exporters to talk over their problems face to face and to 
develop some possibilities of remedying the present malady 
o£ surplus wheat through an international agreement. It was 
sincerely hoped that a tentative understanding could be 
reached among the exporting countries. With this as back-
. 
ground, the World Economic Conference which met in London~ 
in June, 1931~ could concentrate on the most desirable type 
of action to be taken for the solution of the wheat problem. 
As was mentioned before~ ~Jo international confer-
ences had already been held to discuss the wheat problem. 
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The £irst ~eating was held at Rome in March, 1931, while the 
second with only wheat-exporting countries represented met in 
London in May, 1931. At the London conference many of the 
wheat-exporting countries suggested the desirability of 
entering into an international agreement which would limit the 
quantity of wheat to be exported from each country. By so 
doing, the decline in wheat prices on the world market could 
be checked. Nothing came of those suggestions largely because 
the United States was not then in a position to agree to the 
restriction of either production or exports. 
The continued decline of prices in general and wheat 
prices in particular during subsequent years intensified the 
problem. Excessive wheat supplies had accumulated, despite the 
fact that purchases of wheat by the Oriental countries had been 
189 
stimulated by the exceptionally low p~ices which prevailed. 
The fact that a g~eate~ quantity of wheat was being used in 
the United States fo~ feeding livestock .did· not ~educe these 
supplies. Production continued to out~un consumption through 
1930-1931. In 1931, due to sho~t c~ops in Russia, the Danubian 
countries and the United States, production and consumption 
were just about balanced. World supplies of wheat were still 
excessive and the marked advances in American wheat prices 
were not accompanied by parallel price inc~eases in fo~eign 
markets. 
Afte~ their abandonment of the gold standard, Argen-
tina and Australia had been fo~ced to ma~ket thei~ whea~ 
~egardless of the p~ice to be obtained. The low market price 
of wheat, in terms of gold, was offset by the depreciation in 
thei~ exchanges. Produce~s were, therefore, able to continue 
operations and pay thei~ debts ~n spite of the exceedingly low 
prices. 
The low and unsatisfacto~y wheat prices during the 
1931-1933 period turned the attention of all the majo~ wheat-
expo~ting count~ies to a direct attack on 4he surplus p~oblem. 
The Danubian count~ies had t~ied to meet the situation by 
making arrangements with the impo~ting European countries to 
give them special prefe~ence in those markets. The Danubian 
countries had relatively little to offer, and the "fou~ giants" 
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kept a jealous e~e on any special p~ivileges acco~ded their 
Eu~opean competito~s. These negotiations p~oduced little 
~esult. In 1932, the Danubian ~egions suffe~ed a seve~e c~op 
failu~e and the~e was little wheat fo~ expo~t available in 
these countries. The question of Danubian p~efe~ence was 
the~eby tempo~a~ily eliminated. This question had been 
~aised again by the Danubian count~ies at the St~assa 
Confe~ence and the tentative agenda fo~ the Wo~ld Economic 
Confe~ence included a special ~efe~ence to this phase of the 
p~oblem. 
.. 
'ir' 
The new fa~m-~elief legislation in the ~nited States 
was aimed di~ectly at rest~icted p~oduction and this legis-
lation inc~eased interest in the ~astriction of output by 
othe~ count~ies. In the Fall of 1932, economic expe~ts f~om 
seve~al count~ies met at.Geneva to ~aft the agenda fo~ the 
Wo~ld Economic Confe~ences. The ~gentine Gove~nment made a 
definite suggestion cove~ing the "~eduction o.f the ~ea sown 
in the ch~ef expo~ting count~ies and thei~ limitation in 
impo~ting count~ies as a means of g~adually abso~bing the 
abnormal stocks which had accumulated through a failure of 
. ~~~~-
supply to adJust itself naturally to demand." Simil~ 
inte~est in the subject had been developed. in Canada, 
especially in the P~ai~ie P~ovinces where the greater pal:'t 
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of the Canadian wheat was grown. During the winter o~ 1933, 
the Premiers of the Prairie Provinces made a formal request 
to the Dominion Government that Canada take the initiative 
in calling a conference of the principal wheat-exporting 
countries to cons~der the problem of excessive wheat stocks. 
Australian currency suffered greater depreciation than 
C.anadian currency. As a result, the prices received for 
wheat seemed somewhat more favorable to the Australian 
farmers than they did to the Canadian farmers. The interest 
in international restrictions was not as keen in Australia 
as in Canada. 
Realizing the seriousness of the wheat question 
the United States desired to cooperate vigorously with the 
other large wheat-exporting countries. An attempt was made 
to limit wheat production so that prices might be raised 
high enough to' restore farmers to the ranks of purchasers 
once again. Henry Morgenthau, the American senior delegate, 
explained to the group at Geneva that the American members 
had brought no plan for an international solution but hoped 
that the committees would soon devise a workable plan. 
D. World Monetary and Economic Conference 
London, June 12, 1933 
The World Monetary and Economic Conference began its 
session in London, on June 12, 1933. · Two thousand represents.-
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tives from sixty-six nations were present, by invitation, 
to consider the need for a common understanding in combating 
the economic ill which had besieged the world. 
On June 15, Prime Minister Richard B. Bennett of 
Canada, addressed the gathering on the wheat problem in which 
his country was so keenly interested. He said that the vast 
wheat surplus could be adequately handled only by international 
agreement. At the time of this conference, the depression 
was at its worst and commodity prices at their lowest level. 
World trade was staggering under the burdens of mounting 
tariff walls and depreciated currencies. Unemployment con-
tinued to become more widespread. The main task of the 
conference was to reallocate world wheat markets along 
national lines, and in so doing to establish not only limits 
but methods for satisfactory competition among. the wheat 
producers. As domestic markets had·contracted under the 
terrific impact of the crisis, there was increased pressure 
by the major wheat producers to find markets abroad. The 
other countries, being a part of the flabn.oad", faced the same 
problems and fought back by raising higher tariff walls. The 
crisis even went so far as to affect the stability of national 
currencies. Great Britain, the sterling group, and a number 
of smaller and weaker nations took advantage of this Situation 
and permitted a certain degree of depreciation of their 
currencies in the foreign exchange markets. This practice 
strengthened their position in wheat-export competition. 
At the same time, these countries reduced their imports 
because of the lower buying power of their currencies. 
Others, such as Germany, fought back by reducing wages and 
production costs. Domestic prices were kept high through 
excessively high tariffs, and export prices were kept low 
to stimulat exports. France maintained a strong financial 
position at the expense of competitive strength in the 
foreign markets of the world. 
The maintenance of the economic status quo when 
it is one of small profits and limited markets means that 
each national group must be willing to accept its relative 
economic position and give up all fuope of strengthening 
itself at the cost of its competitors. In other words, it 
means giving up such adv~ntages as were contained in the 
Ottawa Agreement. Unfortunately, national interests were 
given preferential treatment at the conference. 
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A deadlock was reached in the very first meeting of 
the World Economic Conference. This deadlock was due to the 
drop in the value of the dollar which had occurred shortly 
before the convening of the conference. The United States 
could not see its way clear to revalue the dollar in terms 
of gold, since the devaluation had resulted from the need 
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~o~ ~elieving the economic dist~ess of the American farme~s. 
Devaluation of the dollar was caused by the sharp drop in 
agricultural prices, especially in the collapse of the wheat 
p~ice in Decembe~, 1932. Fearing the effects of competitive 
~urrencies on fo~eign trade it was difficult fo~ the Confe~ence 
to attack the problem of tariffs or to do anything else to 
improve economic conditions t~oughout the wo~ld. The impact 
of wheat prices on world p~osperity was more clearly viewed 
* as a result of the Confe~ence. 
In the light of such staggering economic problems, 
the attempts of two thousand people drawn from sixty-six 
countries in the world, failed to resolve a suitable agreement 
conce~ning the appropriate measures to be adopted in order 
to restore world prosperity. Once again, an international 
conference failed in its primary objective because of the 
intensity of national interests. The conference adjourned. 
Its delegates were left in a state of confusion concerning 
the proper method practicable to arrest the forces which had 
ca~sed the world depression. 
E. International Wheat Agreement 
London, August 25, 1933 
Undoubtedly, the most important attempt made to set 
up an agreement and a regulatory body for the international 
wheat trade was the world Wheat Agreement of .1933. Twenty-two 
* 69, P• 8 
nations, including the nine leading exporting and thirteen 
importing countries and the U.S.S.R., with the exclusion of 
the Far Eastern countries, acting upon a suggestion made by 
the World Monetary and Economic Conference signed a wheat 
agreement in London, in August, 1933. This final agreement 
obligated wheat-importing nations to ~ollow a program to 
increase the price of wheat by reducing domestic production 
and to stimulate consumption by relaxing their tariff 
restrictions. The four major exporters of wheat and the 
Danubian countries accepted specific export quotas for the 
1933-1934 crop and also pledged themselves to reduce pro-
duction. The Soviet Union, again, gave no pledge as to 
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wheat production ·and thus, no agreement could be reached 
regarding its export quota. The export quotas for the four 
wheat giants were based on 85 per cent of their an tual pro-
duction for the 1931-1933 period after domestic requirements 
were reduced. The Danubian export allotment reamined the same 
as that of the previous year. These exporters promised not 
to extend their wheat acreage. 
The chief barrier to this agreement had been the 
matter of determining the high price to establish for wheat 
which would requi~e importers to lower their tariffs. This 
problem was settled by compromise. The final decision made 
' provided that tariffs should be lowered when wheat ~emained 
at a price _equivalent to 63.08 cents in gold per bushel or 
approximately eighty~nine cents for four months. 
The importers further agreed not to encourage 
qomestic production and to do their utmost to increase 
consumption. They pledged themselves to lower tariffs when 
the wheat price had risen above the levels established for 
that purpose and thus they would modify their quota restric-
tions in limiting wheat imports. There were many loopholes 
I 
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in the importers' pledge. The most important of these was a 
provision that all changes were dependent upon domestic 
conditions in each country and necessitated approval, in many 
instances, by national legislatures .• * 
There was uncertainty for a time regarding the 
acceptability of the international wheat agreement to 
Argentina. Export maxima were fixed under its terms for the 
"big four 11 on the basis of an effective demand by the importing 
countries of 560 million bushels during the 1933-1934 crop 
year. In subsequent crops, exports were curtailed on the. basis 
of a 15 per cent cut in production. The governments of Bulg~ia, 
Hungary, Russia and Yugoslavia agreed to restrict their 
combined exports to 50 million bushels annually. Russia refused 
again to accept any limitation on production but agreed to 
limit exports to a figure to be arrived at in subsequent 
negotiations. Until Russia would come into the scheme the whole 
* 86., P• 1484 
agreement was subject to jeopardy by a ~udde~ ~lood o~ 
Russian wheat exports. Secretary o~ Agriculture, Henry A. 
Wallace, enthusiastically and promptly moved ~or a 15 per 
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cent reduction in wheat acreage by the American wheat ~armers. 
T.he quota for the four exporting countries was to 
be about 450 million bushels. This restriction would accom-
plish what these ~our countries had agreed to do during 
1933-1934 by re·~raini~g from pressing upon the market more 
wheat supplies than they could absorb. With the allotted 
quotas, marketing should have been more orderly. 
During_l934-l935, each of the four exporting 
countries agreed to reduce their wheat exports to 15 per 
cent less than their normal export surplus. The latter was 
to be determined by deducting the normal domestic require-
ments ~rom the average output ~or the acreage sown in the 
1931-1933 period. Then the di~ference between the active 
import demand for wheat in 1934-1935 and the decreased quotas 
~or the four exporting countries plus the Danubian and Russian 
countries was to be applied to the reduction o~ the excessive 
stocks in the United States and Canada. The United States 
minimum quota was 90 million bushels ~or 1934-1935, but it was 
not at all certain that we could export any such volume unless 
the spread between domestic and ~oreign prices was reduced.* 
* 65, P• 277 
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The government which signed the London agreement 
in addition to the 11big four" were those of Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, 
the Irish Free State, Italy, Poland, Rumania,, Spain, Czecho-
slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Soviet Russia and Yugoslavia. 
While the Agreement proved unsuccessful the fact 
than an agl'eement had been reached was an ac):lievement since. 
it attempted to conform to the normal pl'ocess of supply and 
demand instead of' undel'taking to work against them as did so 
many similal' plans. Within a year the Agreement was practi-
cally inoperative. P·lanned quotas of world wheat exports in 
1933-1934 fell shol't. Argentina had high yields and exceeded 
its export quotas. This condition was offset by the non-ful-
fillment of quotas by Australia and the United States. Quotas 
f'ol' the 1934-1935 pel'iod were ineffective because of crop 
failures in Canada and the United States. Wheat stocks were 
thus substantially reduced and pr.ices began to increaseo 
The impol'ting countries in turn were f'aeed with problems of' 
maintaining domestic employment and balancing their inter-
national payments. So they failed to support their pledges. 
With additional crop failures in North America dul'ing the 
1935-1936 pel'iod wheat stocks were !'educed further and pr~.ces 
rose sharply. Not until the world bumpel' crop in 1938 was 
the pl'oblem of dealing with wheat surpluses finally solvedo 
F. Gonfe~ence of Wo~ld Wheat Expe~ts 
Regina~ Saskatchewan, August, 1933 
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While the expe~ts and diplomats we~e h~lding a 
wheat confe~ence in London, some two hundred of the wo~ld's 
g~eatest autho~ities on wheat attended an inte~national wheat 
confe~ence in Regina, Saskatchewan. The attempts made in 
London to change the di~ection and t~end of wheat p:roduct:J.on 
and consumption we~e futile as the thesis discussion of this 
meeting ~eveals. The Canadian sessions tu~ned out to be 
merely idle talks about artificial schemes to raise the p~ice 
of' wheat and inc~ease its consumption. In Regina, the sug-
gested ~emedy fo~ low wheat p~ices was to st~t a tree flow 
of t~ade and exchange ~ather than to ~educe wheat acreage 
as was suggested at all the othe~ wheat confe~ences. 
Sir Daniel Hall, British delegate to the Regina 
Confe~ence, said that the~e was no overproduction of wheat 
while the~e were so many hungry people and that cu~tailing 
output was simply bad business. The 1929-1932 flood of wheat 
would have caused no price troubles had it Be~n allowed to 
flow freely ove~ the world. But~ unfortunately, the channels 
-3~· we~e blocked by tariffs and artificial cont~ols. 
Much time was devoted to the pu~ely scientific and 
technical problems of ce~eal chemist~y, milling, baking, seed 
?r 68, p. 9 
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:i.mprovement, plant breeding and insect control. Other speakers 
p~esented first-hand information on the broad economic problems 
of production, consumption, transportation, storage, financing, 
marketing a~d governmental plans fo~ the control of wheat. 
The Russian expe~iment in the so-called wheat facto~ies was 
also discussed. 
Two important achievements of this co~ference were 
the setting up of an international committee to repo~t on 
grain statistics and a plan for the meteorologists in the 
different countries to go forward with a program of expansion' 
of weather-service data to be distributed to the wheat farmers 
the world over. The Regina Conference gave considerable 
attention to the various measures adopted in the ensuing years 
of an extension of government planning and a ~egulation and 
control of the wheat industry. There was almost complete 
unanimity of agreement that these measures, despite any 
temporary success, always did more harm than good in the end. 
Adverse criticism was spoken against the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act of the Uni·ted States. The Act was viewed as economically 
unsound and most economists felt that it was going to result in 
serious disaster to the American wheat farmers especially. In 
one of the addresses of the conference, the defunct Farm Board 
and Wheat Pool of the United States was condemned for stock-
piling wheat surplus with the use of government money. Charges 
were also hurled against the American plans o~ inflation. 
Even though these addresses were notably frank and audacious 
they met with the general approval o~ the delegates. 
The fever of new nationalism which was rapidly 
afflicting and cursing the world was hailed, as far as wheat 
was concerned, as just another attempt to increase production 
in every importing country. The prevailing low price and the 
big supply of wheat were claimed to be due first, to a natural 
cause, namely, the big crops of 1928, Europe's big crop in 
1929, Russia's.bumper crop in 1930, and Europe's big crop in 
1932; second, to an artificial cause which included attempts 
by the governments and wheat pools to raise wheat prices. 
G. The Wheat Advisory Committee 
London, 1934-1939 
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When serious difficulties arose over the operation of 
the International Wheat Agreement in 1933-1934, its first year 
of operation, all efforts to overcome these difficulties and to 
reach modifications of the agreement were futile. Negotiations 
for a new wheat agreement progressed but without substantial 
results. At the International Wheat Conference in London, during 
August, 1954, the only positive result was the suggestion to 
# 
continue the existence of the Villeat Advisory Committee and its 
Secretariat m~ London. With each successive broken pledge, the 
International Wheat Agreement lost ground and ~inally ceased to 
be operative by the end of 1935. The only part of the Agreement 
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that continued to function was the consultative and commun~-
cative fUnction of the Wheat·Adviso~y Committee in London. 
The Committee met internittently in the 1934-1939 
pe~iod and issued a few p~ess releases and memo~anda. Su~veys 
of the wheat situation we~e prepa~ed and s~atistics published. 
At v~ious othe~ times delegates we~e invited to attend wheat 
conferences. Every effo~t was made by the Committee to fo.rmu-
late a more p~actical international wheat agreement. But, as 
usual, not much was accomplished at these conferences other 
than to decry the evils besetting the wo~ld's wheat economy. 
In 1938, and again in 1939, the possibility of a new agreement 
was again conside~ed. Too many delays and the fea~ of the 
approaching wa~ cont~ibuted to its unfulfillment.* 
H. Conclusions 
The nume~ous inte~national conferences failed to 
accomplish thei~ objectives. The delegates had hoped to 
establish a mo~e orde~ly m~keting of wheat and assure a fai~ 
~eturn of profit to the wheat f~mer without too much exploita-
tion of the consumer. Despite the vigorous effo~ts of economists, 
statesmen, and business men combined, the b~~iers that strangled 
world wheat trade failed to be ~emoved o~ modified. 
Forces making for economic disinteg~ation t~oughout 
the world t~eatened the collapse of international t~ade. The 
resolutions of the Geneva Confe~ence were not followed t~ough 
-:c. 61, pp. 60-63 
by the gove~nments ~epresented at the conference. 
T.he majo~ cause of these failures was clear. 
Nations were still obsessed by economic nationalism. The~ 
tried to hold economic forces within their own political 
boundaries and adopted protectionist measu~es which resulted 
in restricted world trade. In such a narrow confine~ each 
country fought desperately to prese~ve its own economy with-
out any regard fo~ another country. Not only could this be 
said of Germany~ Italy~ and France, but G~eat Britain was 
equally as dete~mined to maintain its tariff policy at all 
costs. 
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Tariffs, quotas and other methods of t~ade ~estric­
tions are regarded as the ~oot causes of the world depression. 
Wholesale prices~ c~edit and currency policies we~e considered 
secondary causes. The essential duty of each of the inter-
nat:i.onal wheat conferences was to ~estore the free flow of 
international wheat supplies by removing existing obstacles. 
In all instances~ discussions led to mutual recognition of the 
obstacles but no one dared to be the first to take the first 
step toward accomplishing the desired goal. Each country 
feared that its national interests would be endangered and 
this retarded the spirit of sacrifice necessary to achieve 
restoration of free trade. 
Prices had fallen because countries were prevented 
by trade barriers ~rom selling their goods. If these 
countries marketed these goods, prices would soon find 
their economic level. Talk of increased credit facilities 
was nonsense when business men were pl:"evented from doing 
business with the capital resources they already possessed. 
If the markets of the world were opened, plenty of 'credit 
, would have been forthcoming for the expansion o~ profitable 
international wheat tl:"adin~. 
The problem of exchange and depreciated cul:"rencies 
were actual issues to be resolved. These issues were the 
result not the cause of world trade depression. I~ inter-
national trade flowed freely the exchanges would have soon 
found their true relationships. For the e~ficient operation 
of these international exchanges it seemed that a stable 
monetary standard was not only desirable but absolutely 
necessary. Despite this necessity, the conference gave 
li·ttle.ol:" no attention to this matter. 
The continuation of the wheat conferences were 
always at the mercy of the signatory statesmen even though 
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the conferences which followed the London Economic Conference 
in 1933 arrived at agreements of a more or less tentative 
chal:"acter. The amount of success which any of these agreements 
could achieve depended upon the extent to which these countries 
remained loyal to their pledges. 
Furthermore, international wheat agreements lacked 
~lexibility and ~ailed to provide ~or un~oreseen changes. 
An ·example o~ such changes was seen in the ~ailure o~ the 
wheat crop in the drought that scourged the United States 
in 1934. No provision had been made ~or action to be taken 
in "t;he case o~ such an adversity. Until the element o:r 
:flexibility should pervade these agreements it seemed that 
any artificial efforts to control the price o:r wheat and 
the :flow o:r the wheat trade throughout the world were doomed 
ultimately to :failure. 
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CHAPTER VI. Conclusions 
Wheat provided an excellent medium by means of 
which to study the effect of price control schemes. Attempts 
to control the price and quantity of a commodity such as 
. 
wheat., which is produced in countless countri·es by large 
numbers of farmers, created ~ problem that was gigantic in 
Bcope. Biological and mechanical inventions permitted the 
wheat industry to extend its acreage and to increase its 
yields beyond measure. Consequently, this situation produced 
problems which were difficult to solve. Of necessity, wheat 
continued to be subject to greater governmental control than 
other basic foodstuffs. The market for distributing wheat 
was highly competitive and the task of controlling production 
and consumption was fraught with many difficulties. 
The world's demand for ·wheat increased rapidly 
during the years of 1920 to 1929. This demand IS tered off 
in the years that followed, until the advent of World War II 
cau~ed significant changes in the unbalanced world wheat 
situation. The inelastic need ~or wheat for human consumption 
in the important wheat-consuming countries was of vital 
consequence to the world wheat economy. Falling per capita 
consumption of wheat in many countries was the result of 
import restrictions imposed with the hope of encouraging 
wheat substitutes. 
Since 1914, governmental intervention on behalr 
of wheat growers greatly arfected the conditions or inter-
national trade. This intervention was extended and intensi-
fied during the interwar period. The use of artificial and 
governmental controls in the surplus and deficit wheat 
countries depended largely upon the relative and potential 
importance of wheat in the economy of the country, and the 
attitude or each government concerning the protection and 
assistance or wheat producers. The financial position of 
each country, especially during the depression when measures 
were taken to promote foreign trade,was considered. Growing 
economic nationalism, which received support after World 
War I, fostered even greater control measures in the importing 
countries. These countries resorted to rigid limitations 
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such as milling regulations, import quotas, licenses, embargoes 
and exchange discrimination. The exporting countries, likewise, 
boosted domestic production by awarding production bonuses, 
establishing fixed prices and by sponsoring direct export 
subsidy programs. 
Vfhen Europe returned to its prewar agriculture 
pattern, expanded wheat areas caused great disequilibrium in 
the wheat industry. Exportable wheat supplies continued to 
mount during the years of prosperity and contributed, in great 
volume, to the crisis or 1929. The rarmer's plight was further 
augmented by the t~emendous problem of dealing with wheat 
surpluses. Drastic readjustments became necessary as the 
world markets and prices gradually shrank. Expediency 
requi~ed that the government step in and give needed assis-
tance to the wheat farmers. 
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The results of the nationalistic measures, designed 
to support prices and promote expo~t trade, were disappointing. 
This condition tended to encourage the belief that, particularly 
in the case of wheat, national devices must be supplemented 
by international action. Various attempts to secure inte~­
national cooperation had been made since 1929. The Interna-
tional V~eat Ag~eement of 1933, which was accepted by twenty-
two countries, failed to attain its objectives. This Ag~ee­
ment attempted to limit production for a two-year period in 
the four ~ading exporting countries and to curtail ~est~ic­
tiotis by importing countries. 
The United States Government initiated a movement 
to obtain inte~national cooperation and mutual unde~standing 
in March, 1938. Recommendations were sent to the International 
Wheat Advisory Committee, which was organized in London in 
1933. These recommendations called for renewed discussions 
among the wheat exporters concerning ·possible action to be 
taken in o~der to secure better equilibrium ih the world wheat 
trade. Acting upon the committee's invitation representatives 
of Canada, Argentina, Australia and the United States met 
for conferences in London in April, 1938. The delegates 
of these countries decided that a system of export quotas 
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must be established to regulate wheat supplies. Unfortunately, 
no definite agreement could be reached concerning the proposed 
quotas. 
Although it was obvious that some sh~ing of the 
world markets would have to be accepted, mounting interna-
tional rivalry tended to prevent the successful operation 
of any such agreement. T.he sacrifices entailed in this type 
of program appeared too costly to each individual country. 
At best, only a temporary alleviation of the difficulties 
could be promised. The old problem of international adjust-
ment of production continued to be the chief obstacle obstruc-
ting the acceptance of a suitable and ~acticable international 
wheat agreement. 
The competitive position of American wheat in the 
world markets declined greatly in 1929. Domestic producers 
viewed this decline with alarm. Unless a substantial part 
of the foreign demand for American wheat could be regained, 
the entire economic life of the wheat regions would be dis-
rupted. 
Perhaps the most unsatisfactory feature of the 
wheat situation in tne United States Was. the low price of 
210 
wheat. The world price of wheat necessarily had an important 
influence upon economic and social conditions in this country 
because of the predominance of wheat as a cash crop. In each 
case, the price received was dependent upon the world position 
rather than upon the domestic production of wheat. The low 
prices prevalent in the 1938-1939 period illustrate the diffi-
culties which confront any nation or group that attempts to 
regulate prices by a control of the supply. 
We have seen the far-reaching results of the numerous 
plans conceived in an attempt to control both wheat supply and 
wheat prices. The strong nationalistic spirit present in each 
individual country, be it export or import-producing, has 
prevented a satisfactory international solution to the problem. 
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